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Despite growing calls for public-private partnerships (PPPs) to supplement the 
diminishing investment in South Africa’s transport sector, an inspection of the World 
Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Database and the Government Technical 
Advisory Centre’s Public-Private Partnerships Database, revealed that over the past 
fifteen years the uptake of transport PPPs in the country was very low compared to the 
four largest developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which performed 
well in this regard. Prior research did not provide insight into why South Africa’s 
experience was different from these countries.  
 
It is within this context that this study was undertaken to identify reasons for the low 
uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa and draw lessons from the four largest 
developing economies. This aim was achieved by: (1) analysing trends in the data of 
transport PPPs of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) over the past 
fifteen years; (2) analysing explanations of transport industry players for the low uptake 
of transport PPPs in South Africa; (3) assessing the opinions of transport industry 
players on practices that could improve the uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa; 
and (4) providing policy recommendations on practices that could contribute to the 
uptake of transport PPPs in the country. The methodological choice was qualitative 
research, which involved the collection and analysis of primary data from the interviews 
of fourteen participants, who have a lived-experience in transport PPPs, and 
secondary data from existing sources. The study revealed a general perception existed 
that overregulation, lack of public participation and consultation, a lack of capacity of 
officials to implement major projects, and the politicisation of infrastructure through 
party politics, rhetoric by politicians, political risk, and the domination of the state in the 
delivery of strategic infrastructure, contribute to the low uptake of transport PPPs in the 
country. It also showed strong political commitment, the establishment of PPP units, 
prioritisation of long-term brownfield projects with a low demand risk, provision of 
viability gap funding, competitive bidding, and the political support for the willingness 
of the user pay principle, have contributed to the progress of the other BRICS 
countries.          
 
By drawing lessons from the other BRICS countries and soliciting the opinions of 
transport industry players with a lived-experience on transport PPPs, it can be 
v 
 
concluded that the study met its objectives. It is valuable as it provides a benchmark 
for policymakers and the private sector on identified areas that require intervention.        
vi 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Background to the study 
Over the past twenty years, there have been growing calls in South Africa by policy-
makers and executives of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to improve the level of joint 
investment by the public and private sectors in the country’s major capital projects 
(National Planning Commission (NPC), 2012; Aigbavboa, Liphadzi & Thwala, 2014; 
Ittmann, 2017). These calls were made as a result of growing concerns of the impact 
of the budget deficit on priorities of the state, such as infrastructure investment and the 
consequences it poses for economic growth (NPC, 2012; Aigbavboa et al., 2014; 
Ittmann, 2017). In this regard, joint investment in public capital projects is widely 
regarded as a viable option for bridging this deficit by augmenting deficiencies within 
the public sector budget with private capital (NPC, 2012; Aigbavboa et al., 2014, 
Ittmann, 2017).  
  
In particular, the call made by the Minister of Finance during the 2016 budget speech, 
could be regarded as one of the most significant pronouncements by the public sector. 
Unlike previous calls, the Minister made an unequivocal appeal for joint investments in 
clearly defined capital projects (National Treasury, 2016a). The Minister indicated that 
without this joint investment, the financing of capital projects will increasingly prove to 
be a challenge due to growing fiscal constraints (Ibid). This call was restated by the 
President of the Republic during a meeting with the leaders of business and 
developmental finance institutions (DFIs) to address the decline in public infrastructure 
investment (The Presidency, 2020). He stated ‘… this meeting is extraordinary in that 
it brings together, for the first time, government, financiers – including multilateral 
development banks and development finance institutions – organised business and 
infrastructure-oriented industry players under one roof to discuss public sector 
infrastructure in a meaningful way’ (The Presidency, 2020: para.5). During this 
meeting, the head of state indicated how this problem would be resolved through ‘… a 
legally permissible transitional dispensation to ramp-up state capacity in the technical 
and financial areas, which was premised on private sector collaboration’ (Ibid: 
para.34). He then directed that an infrastructure investment plan be developed that ‘… 
outlines a public-private partnership framework and removes policy bottlenecks in 




the public-private partnership legal environment requires revision, and innovative ideas 
should be accommodated in the procurement space (Ibid: para.45).       
 
This decline in the public sector budget is expected to adversely affect the state’s ability 
to invest in capital intensive sectors such as transport (National Treasury, 2016a; The 
Presidency, 2020). This is demonstrated in part by the downward revision of the public 
sector medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) budget for infrastructure from 
ZAR 847 billion rand in 2014 to ZAR 813.1 billion rand in 2015, due to the low economic 
growth and cost containment measures applied by the state (National Treasury, 2015; 
Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission (PICC), 2016). The public sector 
MTEF budget for infrastructure then increased to ZAR 865.4 billion rand in 2016 
(National Treasury, 2016b), and then to ZAR 947.2 billion rand in 2017 (National 
Treasury, 2017). A downward revision of the MTEF was experienced in 2018 to ZAR 
834.1 billion (National Treasury, 2018), with an increase to ZAR 864.9 billion in 2019 
(National Treasury, 2019) and a decline to ZAR 815 billion in 2020 (National Treasury, 
2020). This budget has been allocated mainly to transport and energy projects 
(National Treasury, 2015; National Treasury, 2016b; National Treasury, 2017; National 
Treasury, 2018; National Treasury, 2019; National Treasury, 2020).  
 
Literature reveals that a deficit in transport capital investment poses major 
consequences for a country’s economy as there is a strong correlation between 
transport capital investment and economic growth (Galvao, Wang and Mileski, 2016; 
Kościelniaka & Górkab, 2016; Polyakova & Vasilyeva, 2016; Ittmann, 2017). It is widely 
accepted that transport capital investment plays a critical role in unlocking economic 
opportunities within and beyond a country’s border by providing transport 
infrastructure, required in mobilising goods and services from where they are produced 
to where they are consumed, in exchange for economic gain (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015; 
Galvao et al., 2016; Kościelniaka & Górkab, 2016; Ittmann, 2017).  
 
Transport capital investment also contributes to sustainable livelihoods and a reduction 
in poverty by improving the mobility and access of communities to education, 
healthcare and employment opportunities (Luke & Heyns, 2013; Polyakova & 
Vasilyeva, 2016). This implies that it is highly likely that a deficit in funding for transport 




plans as envisaged by the National Development Plan (NDP). The NDP explicitly calls 
for the prioritisation of transport capital investment for freight corridors, such as the 
Durban-Gauteng freight corridor, expansion of the port of Durban, the building of a new 
coal line and extension of existing lines, upgrades to the iron ore line to Saldanha, and 
improvements to public transport infrastructure and systems (NPC, 2012; Ittmann, 
2017).        
  
Akin to South Africa’s experience, the four largest developing economies of Brazil 
(Dwyer, 2013; Cruz, Marques & Franco, 2015), Russia (Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & 
Kakabadse, 2014), India (Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015) and China (Forbes, 2012; 
Chen, Hubbard & Liao, 2013), have also received and responded to similar calls by 
prominent political and business figures to enhance the level of joint investment by the 
public and private sectors in their respective economies. However, unlike South Africa, 
these countries are making progress in this regard, as shown by the several projects 
being implemented through such partnerships, especially in the transport sector 
(Forbes, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Dwyer, 2013; Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & 
Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015). This progress is 
demonstrated by the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database, 
which indicates that over the past fifteen years, 463 transport PPPs have reached 
financial closure in India, 168 in China, 88 in Brazil, and 17 in Russia (WBG, 2019a). 
In contrast, the indication is that only three projects have reached financial closure over 
the same period in South Africa’s transport sector (Ibid.). These are the Gautrain light 
rail concession, which reached financial closure in 2006, the Beitbridge Border Post in 
2011, and the Durban Passenger Terminal by MSC Cruises in 2019 (WBG, 2019a; 
GTAC, 2019). Although the Gautrain light rail concession is categorised as a PPP, this 
project is underwritten by the government with very little risk exposure to the private 
sector (Dachs, 2011) compared to the Beitbridge Border Post, which deserves to be 
categorised as a PPP, as it was financed by the private sector with high risk accruing 
to the latter (WBG, 2019a).         
 
The literature indicates that some of the reasons why these countries are performing 
well on the uptake of transport PPPs relates to a high political will and commitment to 
implement these projects (Forbes, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Dwyer, 2013; Churakov, 




2015). As a result, these projects are placed high on the priority list of policymakers 
and given due consideration in the respective countries’ budgeting processes (Forbes 
2012; Chen et al., 2013; Dwyer, 2013; Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 
2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015). For example, the Russian 
government had plans to implement over 100 PPP projects across the country, of 
which most were predominantly in the transport sector (Churakov, 2014). This included 
projects such as the investment programme by GK Avtodor, a state-owned company, 
which aimed at concluding seven major highway PPP agreements in 2014 and 2015 
(Ibid.). The establishment of dedicated PPP units that are intended to bridge the critical 
skills deficit in the public sector to initiate, plan, and implement PPPs, resulted in the 
conclusion of higher quality partnership agreements that achieved greater affordability, 
allocation of risk, and value-for-money (Forbes, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Dwyer, 2013; 
Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & 
Karnam, 2015).  
 
The economic power of Brazil, Russia, India and China has grown substantially in 
recent years (Klonowski, 2011; Guriev, 2016). Guriev (2016) indicated that these 
economies now jointly have a nominal gross domestic product (GDP) that was similar 
to both the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) and was 
expected to supersede them in a few years. The literature indicates that increasing 
infrastructure investment in sectors, such as transport and energy has contributed to 
the nominal GDP growth of these countries and will continue with this trend into the 
foreseeable future (Forbes, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Dwyer, 2013; Churakov, 2014; 
Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015). For 
this reason, infrastructure investment has been prioritised within South Africa’s NDP 
as a means of unlocking the country’s economic growth (NPC, 2012; PICC, 2016). 
Furthermore, given the apparent progress of the four largest developing economies, in 
leveraging joint investment to finance capital intense projects in sectors such as 
transport (Forbes, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Dwyer, 2013; Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev 
& Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015), it is expected 
that South Africa can draw some valuable lessons from their experiences to enhance 





However, Chen et al. (2013) and Perera (2016) suggested that are some segments of 
society, such as labour federations and civil society groups, which hold less favourable 
views on private investment in public capital projects. It appears as though these views 
are fueled by perceptions of these partnerships as being conduits for corruption, 
privatisation of state resources, and transfer of direct costs to the public (Ibid.). For 
example, in the case of the Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) project in Taiwan, which 
aimed to collect freeway toll payments electronically, opposition was expressed by 
various interest groups to the project amid allegations of corruption, tender 
irregularities, and failure of the government and private partner to consider public 
interest (Ibid.). This included public interest, non-governmental organisations, such as 
the Taiwan Consumer’s Foundation (TCF) and the Taiwan People’s Alliance, which 
served as channels for public pressure against the project, which led to a campaign to 
boycott the ETC lanes (Ibid.). Following heightened public pressure and a court ruling 
by the Taipei Senior Administrative Court, the qualification of the senior bidder was 
cancelled on grounds that public interest had not been taken into consideration in the 
project process and that the project would entail high costs for users (Ibid.). This public 
campaign resulted in shifting costs back to the government and the private partner 
(Ibid.). Nevertheless, despite skepticism from these quarters (Chen et al., 2013), joint 
investment remains high on the national agenda of countries such as Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (Forbes, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Dwyer, 2013; Aigbavboa et al., 2014; 
Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & 
Karnam, 2015).    
 
It is within this context that public-private partnerships (PPPs) gain prominence as a 
form of joint investment and an emerging procurement option for public capital projects 
across the BRICS countries (Forbes, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Dwyer, 2013; Aigbavboa 
et al., 2014; Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; 
Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015; National Treasury, 2016a). The literature indicates that 
there is no universally accepted definition of PPP (Boardman, Greve & Hodge, 2015; 
World Bank Group (WBG), 2015a; Kościelniaka & Górkab, 2016; Koskela, Rooke & 
Siriwardena, 2016; Perera, 2016; Polyakova & Vasilyeva, 2016; Thomassen, Vassbø, 
Solheim-Kile & Lohne, 2016), and further shows how the institutional and legal 
particularities of each country play a significant role in influencing their respective 




its public finance or procurement laws, have a direct bearing on its definition of PPP. 
Tiong (2013) and Šovran and Hadžić (2016) indicated that some countries have even 
developed specific laws for PPP that define and regulate this form of procurement. 
Šovran and Hadžić (2016) further indicated that according to the 2015 data of the 
World Bank, 63 countries had specific laws on public-private partnerships.     
 
Arata, Petrangeli and Longo (2016: pg.344) state, ‘… in the PPP acronym the most 
important P is the third one: Partnership’. This indicates that a relationship based on 
mutual trust, cooperation, sharing of burdens, and responsibilities is important towards 
the successful realisation of the project. However, Mansor and Rashid (2016) 
suggested that trust is usually obtained through repetitive transactions between 
partners, which could lead to a monopoly and discourage competition.   
 
Given the international perspective and comparative aspects of the proposed study, 
coupled with reliance on the data from the World Bank Group (WBG), a common 
understanding of a PPP, as defined by this multilateral development institution, which 
has 189 affiliate countries (WBG, 2015b), would assist in the analysis and 
interpretation of both the results and findings of the study. The WBG (2015a: para.1) 
defined a PPP as ‘… a long-term contract between a private party and a government 
entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant 
risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance”.  
 
A review of the literature indicated that the growing popularity of PPPs across the 
BRICS countries and the rest of the world, can be attributed to the advantages arising 
from the inherent ability of PPPs to allow the public sector to leverage private capital 
and expertise in a manner, which yields value-for-money, affordability and appropriate 
transfer of risk in the delivery of much-needed capital projects (Forbes, 2012; Chen et 
al., 2013; Dwyer, 2013; Aerts, Grage, Dooms & Haezendonck, 2014; Aigbavboa et al., 
2014; Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; Sanni & Hashim, 2014; Yaya, 
2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015; Khmel & Shengchuan, 2016; 
Koskela et al., 2016). This view is also supported by Verhoest, Carbonara, Lember, 
Petersen, Scherrer and Van den Hurk (2013), Perera (2016), Polyakova and Vasilyeva 
(2016), and Šovran and Hadžić (2016), who suggested that the growing popularity of 




of the private sector to deliver complex infrastructure projects on time and within 
budget, and the growing economic constraint affecting the ability of governments to 
deliver all their infrastructure requirements following their respective development 
plans.  
 
Literature shows the advantages and negotiating power that arise from PPPs could be 
differentiated for the public and private partners (Kościelniaka & Górkab, 2016; Oppio 
& Torrieri, 2016). For example, private investment benefits the public partner by 
reducing the burden on the public budget, whereas the public partner benefits the 
private partner by providing it with the opportunity to implement projects, which are 
characterised by a high return on the investment rate and that could otherwise prove 
impossible to implement (Kościelniaka & Górkab, 2016). To this effect, Oppio and 
Torrieri (2016) suggested that the public and private advantage and associated 
negotiating power, need to be estimated in terms of capital gains that arise from the 
investment. Capital gain is a function of the level of risk and uncertainty undertaken by 
each partner (Ibid.), which implies that the greater the risk undertaken, the greater the 
capital gain obtained from the investment and vice versa (Ibid.) The public partner 
tends to underestimate the percentage of the total capital gain, which is due to it, as it 
is unable to adequately identify and differentiate between false and genuine risk (Ibid.). 
As a result, the private partner tends to overemphasise its risk exposure, thereby 
overestimating the percentage of the total capital gain due to it (Ibid.). This deprives 
the public partner of an opportunity to save or generate capital from the investment. 
This could be remedied if the public sector undertakes a robust risk analysis that would 
allow for the appropriate allocation of risk and subsequent fair allocation of capital gains 
that arise from the investment (Ibid.).   
 
PPPs are also recognised for their ability to promote regular maintenance of 
infrastructure over the long term, as this is usually incorporated as a general 
requirement for such projects (Dwyer, 2013; Aigbavboa et al., 2014; Mouraviev & 
Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015). This could play a 
crucial role in reducing the maintenance backlog on the transport infrastructure in 
South Africa (Chigurah, 2012).     
 




viable mechanism for promoting the state’s policy on Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE). This is a policy of the state aimed at addressing the inequalities of the past by 
providing previously marginalised citizens and regions with an opportunity to 
participate in major economic activities of the state (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2016). PPPs are seen as a viable mechanism for promoting BEE due to the economic 
benefits, which can accrue to previously marginalised citizens (Aigbavboa et al., 2014). 
This includes the granting of equity or top management participation to previously 
marginalised citizens in business entities, known as special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
that are usually established to build and operate PPPs (Ibid.). It is the view of the state 
that the participation of previously marginalised citizens in the ownership and 
management of major economic activities of the state, would contribute towards 
economic redress (Department of Trade and Industry, 2016).  
 
However, Šovran and Hadžić (2016) indicated how Piketty, a professor at the Paris 
School of Economics, pointed out that moving into the 21st century, equity holders are 
the real beneficiaries of economic activity, as the average rate of return on equity is 
three to four times higher than the average growth rate of productivity. Given that only 
a few previously marginalised citizens can afford to invest in equity, this suggests that 
PPPs will not benefit a large number amongst this group.   
 
The literature suggests that there are some inherent disadvantages associated with 
PPPs, such as the prohibitive amount of time, capital and effort that is usually required 
to obtain the necessary approvals and support from the relevant authorities for 
implementation (Dachs, 2011; Chen et al., 2013; Churakov, 2014; Sanni & Hashim, 
2014; Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC), 2016; Thomassen et al., 2016). 
It appears that these delays in obtaining approvals are associated with the limited 
capacity of state officials to prepare a compelling business case to conform to 
regulatory requirements (Sanni & Hashim, 2014; GTAC, 2016; Thomassen et al., 
2016).  
 
To this effect, transaction advisors are usually appointed at great cost to the state to 
assist in ‘… understanding the different forms of economic organisation and 
contractual arrangements’ required in obtaining regulatory approval’ (Thomassen et 




opportunism, and an information problem caused by bounded rationality (Mansor & 
Rashid, 2016; Thomassen et al., 2016). Bounded rationality refers to the limitation of 
human foresight and cognition (Mansor & Rashid, 2016; Thomassen et al., 2016). 
Thomassen et al. (2016: pg.820) further stated ‘… bounded rationality and 
opportunism give rise to the possibility that one or more of the parties to exchange will 
exploit their information advantage at either the pre- or post-contractual stages’.  
 
Although exploitation of information by one or more party in the exchange is not in itself 
a negative practice, if such exploitation is guided by opportunism, which is referred to 
as ‘… self-interest guided by guile’ (Thomassen et al., 2016: pg.820), then the likely 
outcome is high transaction costs. Other factors that contribute to high transaction 
costs, include the long-term character of the projects, ownership and financing 
structures, and risk-sharing arrangements (Mansor & Rashid, 2016; Thomassen et al., 
2016). 
 
Mansor and Rashid (2016) and Thomasssen et al. (2016) indicated that these factors 
also contribute to the incompleteness of contracts. An incomplete contract refers to ‘… 
a contract, which fails to state all the parties’ rights and obligations, has gaps, missing 
provisions, and ambiguities in its terms and conditions’ (Mansor & Rashid, 2016: 
pg.93). Mansor and Rashid (2016) and Thomassen et al. (2016) stated that in theory, 
a complete contract cannot be achieved and that contracts will inevitably remain 
incomplete. Standardised contracts have been introduced in countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, Australia, India and South Africa, to address some gaps, omissions, 
and ambiguities found in incomplete contracts (Mansor & Rashid, 2016). This is 
achieved by leveraging the knowledge of institutions that have years of experience in 
drafting contracts, such as the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) and the International 
Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) (Ibid.). However, standard contracts 
remain prone to becoming incomplete contracts, due to new kinds of risks and 
uncertainties, which may arise with time (Ibid.). The incompleteness of contracts 
should not be regarded in itself as entirely negative, as it gives rise to positive aspects 
such as managerial flexibility and allowance for service innovation, and serves as a 
signal of trust and motivation between the partners, which could improve the economic 





PPPs also require a high level of political and community support to succeed, 
especially when the controversial user-pay principle is to be adopted (Dachs, 2011; 
Churakov 2014; Boardman et al., 2015). This principle is deemed controversial as 
society is seemingly divided on this issue (Churakov, 2014). Those who support it, 
believe that it is an equitable system for financing infrastructure, where the person who 
derives a direct benefit from the use of this infrastructure is personally held liable for 
repayment (Ibid.). However, those who do not support it, are of the view that tax is a 
more appropriate mechanism for repayment, especially in a country where high levels 
of unemployment and poverty are prevalent (Ibid.). It is their view that poor people will 
be prejudiced by a system of direct payment, which could violate their right to free and 
unrestricted movement (Ibid.) Mouraviev and Kakabadse (2014) indicated that the 
literature tends to be skewed by focusing more on the advantages of PPPs rather than 
their disadvantages. This suggests that there is limited understanding of the inherent 
disadvantages associated with PPPs, which can have major political, economical, 
social, technological, environmental and legal consequences, should such projects fail.  
 
Literature reveals international best practice on PPPs, which is widely embraced 
around the world for contributing to the growth of the global PPP market (Dachs, 2011; 
Istrate & Puentes, 2011; Tiong, 2013; Verhoest et al., 2013; Perera, 2016; Ittmann, 
2017). The Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary refers to best practice as ‘… a 
working method or set of working methods that is officially accepted as being the best 
to use in a particular business or industry, usually described formally and in detail’ 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017). This includes amongst others; the establishment 
of a regulatory framework for PPPs, the establishment of a PPP unit that typically 
resides in a ministry of finance, the standardisation of the PPP approval process, and 
establishing high thresholds in terms of the size of projects that can be considered as 
PPPs (Dachs, 2011; Istrate & Puentes, 2011; Tiong, 2013; Verhoest et al., 2013; 
Mansor & Rashid, 2016; Perera, 2016; Ittmann 2017).  
 
South Africa seems to be performing well in conforming to a number of these practices 
(Tiong, 2013; Mansor & Rashid, 2016; Ittmann, 2017). This is demonstrated in part by 
the country’s adoption of a regulatory framework for PPPs that is underpinned by 
Treasury Regulation 16 of the Public Finance Management Act No.1 of 1999 (PFMA), 




Centre (GTAC), which is responsible for providing transaction advisory services to the 
state (Tiong, 2013; GTAC, 2016; Ittmann, 2017). However, despite South Africa’s 
recognition as a developing country with a high degree of conformity to PPP best 
practice (Tiong, 2013), the prevalence of PPPs in South Africa’s transport sector 
remains stubbornly low (GTAC, 2016; WBG, 2016; Ittmann, 2017). There has been 
some success of PPP policy in other sectors, such as healthcare, education and 
tourism (GTAC, 2016).  
 
This is in stark contrast to the four largest developing economies and other developing 
countries, which have cumulatively undertaken several PPPs in their transport sectors 
over the last ten years (Forbes, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Dwyer, 2013; Churakov, 2014; 
Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gafurova & Akhmetshina, 2015; 
Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015; WBG, 2016). Sanni and Hashim (2014) also 
questioned the adoption of systems being used by advanced economies in sub-
Saharan countries for the promotion of PPPs. This suggests that countries, such as 
South Africa, might be using inappropriate systems that are not geared for the 
economic landscape of a developing country.      
 
1.2. Problem statement  
PPPs are widely recognised around the world as an alternative form of financing for 
transport capital projects (Koskela et al., 2016; Perera, 2016; Ittmann, 2017). Several 
major transport projects, which probably would have never been realised through 
traditional funding, have been successfully implemented through this alternative form 
of financing, (Koskela et al., 2016; Perera, 2016; Ittmann, 2017). Examples of such 
projects include the Rapid Metro Rail Gurgaon system in India (Kumar, 2012), the Suez 
Canal in Egypt (Aerts et al.., 2014), and the multimodal freight transport PPPs in the 
United States (Ittmann, 2017). This is the reason why a growing number of policy-
makers and prominent business people across the four largest developing economies 
and the rest of the world, have been making calls for their adoption and appear to be 
succeeding in this regard, as several projects have been undertaken through this form 
of procurement (Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015). For example, the 
Russian government had plans to implement over 100 PPPs projects across their 
country, of which most were predominantly in the transport sector (Churakov, 2014). 




which was established to promote PPPs in the country’s highways sector (Ibid.). To 
this end, it developed an investment programme aimed at concluding seven major 
highway PPP agreements in 2014 and 2015 (Ibid.).  
 
However, inspections of the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure 
Database (WBG, 2019a) and the National Treasury’s PPP Database (GTAC, 2019) 
revealed that South Africa has not been able to emulate the performance of the four 
largest developing countries on the uptake of PPPs in this sector. Even with the relative 
success of a major PPP, such as the Gautrain Rapid Rail project, which is regarded 
as the largest PPP on African soil (Dachs, 2011; Ittmann, 2017), this does not appear 
to have bolstered the demand for PPPs in this sector. The other two projects to reach 
financial closure in South Africa over the period in review include the Beitbridge Border 
Post and the Durban Passenger Terminal by MSC Cruises (WBG, 2019a; GTAC, 
2019). The disparity in the performance of South Africa compared to its BRICS 
counterparts is demonstrated by Figure 1.1, which indicates that several transport 
PPPs have reached financial closure in India, China, Brazil and Russia over the past 
fifteen years. In contrast, it indicates that only a few projects have reached financial 
closure over the same period in South Africa. It is not apparent from these databases 
why South Africa’s experience has been different from the four largest developing 















Figure 1-1: Number of transport PPPs that have reached financial closure in the 
BRICS countries over the past fifteen years 
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Therefore, the problem relates to the low uptake of PPPs in South Africa’s transport 
sector. This problem poses adverse consequences for transport capital investment in 
the country as the state has expressed that it is unable to fully meet the investment 
requirement for capital intense sectors, such as transport without exploring alternative 
avenues of funding (National Treasury, 2016a). Although the public sector budget for 
transport capital investment is large compared to other sectors, private sector 
involvement is still envisaged to supplement the deficit in public investment as 
demonstrated by the release of the Green Paper on National Rail Policy (Kruger & 
Luke, 2015). For example, this policy advocates the need to include private sector 
participation to expand rail’s funding sources (Ibid). Also, the partnership between 
Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) and the DBSA, aims to accelerate private sector 
participation in infrastructure investment (Ibid.).         
 
Although international trends indicate that PPPs are unlikely to replace the dominance 
of public investment in transport capital projects (Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), 
2013), it is apparent that in the context of slow economic growth, budget deficits are 
likely to increase in capital intensive sectors, such as transport. As a result, the country 
is unlikely to realise all the major capital projects that have been planned, without 
leveraging alternative sources of finance. This is demonstrated in part by the general 
decline in real year-on-year growth in the allocation of public infrastructure investment 
in capital intensive sectors, such as transport (PICC, 2016). The downward revision of 
the budget for infrastructure capital projects from ZAR 847 billion rand during the 2014 
MTEF period to ZAR 813.1 billion rand in the 2015 MTEF period (National Treasury, 
2015) showed that there was a shortfall of approximately ZAR 33.9 billion rand. 
Although this shortfall only represented about four percent of the initial MTEF budget 
of ZAR 847 billion rand, it could have funded new transport capital projects equivalent 
in value to the Gautrain Rapid Rail project, which cost approximately ZAR 25 billion 
rand (Dachs, 2011).    
 
Given the slow to moderate outlook on economic growth, this deficit is only expected 
to worsen unless alternative sources of capital, such as PPPs are employed (National 
Treasury, 2016a). A comparison of the National Budget Reviews of 2015 to 2020, 
indicates there has been a general downward revision on transport and logistics MTEF 




National Treasury, 2017; National Treasury, 2018; National Treasury, 2019; National 
Treasury, 2020). There was a decline from ZAR 347.1 billion rand in 2014 to ZAR 339.2 
billion rand in 2015 (National Treasury, 2015; National Treasury, 2016b), and a further 
decline to ZAR 291.6 billion rand in 2016 (National Treasury, 2016b). An increase in 
the 2017 MTEF was then observed with a budget of ZAR 327.7 billion rand (National 
Treasury, 2017), with a subsequent decrease to ZAR 288.2 billion rand in 2018 
(National Treasury, 2018). An increase to ZAR 313.9 billion rand was realised in 2019 
(National Treasury, 2019), followed by a decrease to ZAR 308.3 billion rand in the 2020 
MTEF (National Treasury, 2020). 
 
1.3. Research questions  
1.3.1. Main research questions 
In light of the research problem, the study sought to address the main research 
questions, which were:  
 What are the reasons for the low uptake of PPPs in South Africa’s transport 
sector   
 What lessons could the country draw from the practices of the four largest 
developing economies in benchmarking PPP practice in this sector?   
 
1.3.2. Investigative research questions  
The main research questions were addressed by answering the following investigative 
research questions, namely: 
   
 What trends were evident in the PPP practices of the BRICS countries over the 
past fifteen years? 
 Which reasons were provided by transport industry players for the low uptake 
of transport PPPs in South Africa? 
 What opinions were held by transport industry players of practices that could 
contribute to the uptake in transport PPPs in South Africa? 






1.4. Research objectives 
1.4.1. Primary objective  
Based on the main research questions, the study aimed to identify reasons for the low 
uptake of PPPs in South Africa’s transport sector and draw lessons from the four 
largest developing economies that could be used to benchmark PPP practice in the 
country’s transport sector.  
 
1.4.2. Secondary objectives 
To realise the primary objective, the following secondary objectives were pursued:  
 To identify trends in the PPP practices of the BRICS countries over the past 
fifteen years.   
 To analyse the explanations of transport industry players for the low uptake of 
transport PPPs in South Africa 
 To assess the opinions of transport industry players on practices that could 
contribute to the uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa 
 To provide policy recommendations on practices that could contribute to the 
uptake of transport PPPs in the country. 
 
1.5. Significance of the research 
The research is valuable as it provides a benchmark for PPP practice in South Africa’s 
transport sector based on the practices of the four largest developing economies of 
Brazil, Russia, India and China, which are performing well in this regard. Lessons 
drawn from these countries can assist South Africa to avoid costly and time-consuming 
mistakes that have been experienced in those countries.  
 
The study further draws on the insights of transport industry players that are not 
previously captured in existing research. These insights assisted in narrowing the key 
challenges amidst a broad spectrum of challenges that plague PPPs, and proposed 
targeted measures for resolving them. Identifying and resolving the key challenges is 
important as these can lead to an increased uptake of PPPs, which are widely regarded 
as a viable option for bridging the funding deficit for transport capital projects in the 
country (NPC, 2012; Ittmann, 2017). As a result, their adoption can lead to various 
socio-economic benefits associated with transport capital investment being realised, 




economic growth in accordance with the NDP. The NDP explicitly calls for the 
prioritisation of transport capital investment in areas, such as freight corridors, 
expansion of ports, upgrades to public transport systems, and the extension of coal 
and iron-ore lines as a means of improving the movement of people and goods within 
and beyond the borders of the country (NPC, 2012). This call has seen a significant 
proportion of the public sector infrastructure budget being allocated to transport capital 
projects; however, this is still regarded as not being adequate to fulfill plans (NPC, 
2012; Ittmann, 2017). Furthermore, the NDP highlights that this call is unlikely to be 
realised unless alternative funding avenues, such as PPPs, are explored (NPC, 2012; 
Ittmann, 2017). The study aids this call by revealing new information that can be used 
by policymakers and the private sector to make informed decisions when implementing 
transport PPPs in the South African environment.            
 
1.6. Research methodology   
The research paradigm that was adopted for the study was positivism, as the research 
relied on the lived-experiences of transport industry players to describe the causal 
relationship between PPP practice and the uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa 
(Su, 2018). Although positivism is usually associated with quantitative methods 
(Žukauskas, Vveinhardt & Andriukaitienė, 2018), Su (2018) highlights a growing 
recognition that a positivist paradigm could also employ qualitative methods. This 
assertion stems from the ontological and epistemological positions of positive 
qualitative research (Ibid.). Positivism also proved useful in summarising the trends in 
the data of the BRICS countries through non-statistical means.   
 
A deductive research approach was involved, as the study entailed the testing of 
existing theories on PPP practices, through their application to the South African 
transport environment (Crowther & Lauesen, 2017).The research design and plan was 
descriptive and exploratory as the study had to describe trends in the research data 
and reveal new insights, based on the lived-experiences of the participants (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). The methodological choice was qualitative research as it lent 
itself to the collection and analysis of qualitative data, which provided further insights 
and new views that were not previously captured by previous literature (University of 




by describing the context of the opinions provided, which was impossible through 
quantitative methods (Su, 2018).  
 
Based on the study’s need for information from transport industry players, the research 
strategy employed was a survey as it allowed for the collection of information from a 
sample of individuals (Given, 2008). The use of open-ended questions in the survey, 
allowed for new and unbiased viewpoints to be obtained, improving the reliability and 
trustworthiness of the study (Ibid.). A cross-sectional time horizon was adopted, as 
data were gathered over a specific period (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). This time horizon 
proved useful in the rapid collection of data from the senior and executive members of 
the organisations, who were identified as the research sample, and who had busy 
schedules and limited accessibility. The time and cost savings associated with this time 
horizon (Ibid.) were also beneficial to the study.    
 
The research population consisted of organisations that had or planned to be involved 
in transport PPPs in South Africa (Ezoic, 2019). This is an assortment of organisations, 
such as public authorities; private companies (special purpose vehicles); lenders; 
equity investors; engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractors and 
subcontractors; operations and maintenance (O&M) contractors; and insurers 
(Delmon, 2017). As the size of the population was unknown, a sampling frame was 
developed through the amalgamation of data on organisations involved in transport 
PPPs. Sources of this data included the World Bank’s Private Participation in 
Infrastructure database (WB, 2019a) and the Government Technical Advisory Centre’s 
PPP database (GTAC, 2017; GTAC, 2018; GTAC, 2019).   
 
A sample of fourteen participants was selected from this sampling frame using 
purposive sampling, which allowed for the intentional selection of participants that 
could provide information-rich responses in accordance with the purpose of the study 
(Salmons, 2011). Selecting a small sample also allowed for the interrogation of 
opinions to reveal information-rich responses, which would be difficult with a larger 
sample (Saunders et al., 2009). The selection of a representative sample, consisting 
of participants from the public and private sectors, aided in the triangulation of data 





Interviews of the participants were conducted in settings convenient to them. This 
included participants from the following organisations, namely: the Airports Company 
of South Africa (ACSA); The Department of Public Enterprises (DPE); the Department 
of Transport (DOT); the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA); the Gautrain 
Management Agency (GMA); South African National Roads Agency Limited 
(SANRAL); Transnet Limited; South African Airways (SAA); Toll Infrastructure Services 
(TollInfra); Comair Limited; The J&J Group; Infracon Consulting; SA Airlink; and 
PowerLaw Capital. 
 
Secondary and primary data were collected and analysed as both were required to 
address the research objectives. Secondary data were obtained from existing sources, 
such as the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Database and the 
Government Technical Advisory Centre’s Database (Riedel, 2000). Primary data were 
collected through interviews, using a semi-structured questionnaire, held with the 
participants at their preferred venue (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011). Interviews provide 
insight, which aids in exploring and understanding a research topic (Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2017). With regard to a semi-structured 
interview, Galletta (2013) shows it is beneficial in providing adequate structure to 
address specific topics, while providing flexibility to participants to introduce new 
meanings and interpretations to the study topic. The procedure used for the interviews 
was face-to-face, which allowed for probing questions to be asked, revealing 
information-rich responses (Spinter Research, 2019). This entailed the preparation and 
pre-testing of interview questions; approaching and requesting the participation of 
participants; the introduction of the interview; indicating the length of the interview; the 
assurance of confidentiality; recording the interview; and closing the interview (Food 
and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), 2019). The transcribed 
interviews were then amalgamated, using Microsoft Word, and uploaded to Atlas.ti for 
coding and the development of themes. The findings were then described and 
analysed, and conclusions drawn.   
 
1.7. Outline of the Dissertation Chapters  
Chapter one provides an introduction and background to the study, a formulation of 
the research problem, research questions, and objectives. It also sets out the 





Chapters two and three entail an in-depth review of the literature on the research topic. 
Based on these discussions, an outline was developed of the theoretical framework 
that identified the major themes. The major themes revealed and discussed in chapter 
two include the definition for PPP; the types of PPP contracts that exist; the advantages 
and disadvantages of PPPs; attributes of projects that are suitable for implementation 
as PPPs; financing of PPPs; typical project structure, lifecycle and process for the 
development of PPPs; international best practice and critical success factors. The 
themes revealed in chapter three, include the role of PPPs in unlocking transport 
capital investment; the prevalence of transport PPPs in the BRICS; conformity of the 
BRICS countries to international best practice; reasons for the successful uptake of 
transport PPPs in the BRICS countries; and reasons for the low uptake of transport 
PPPs in South Africa. These chapters allowed for a deductive approach to the 
research, as they provided the existing theories that were tested. These theories also 
revealed gaps in the literature that needed to be addressed and aided in the 
development of the data collection instruments. 
 
Chapter four elaborates on the research methodology used for the study. Using the 
research onion of Saunders, Lewis, Thornhill and Bristow (2019), it described the 
research philosophy, the approach to research development, the methodological 
choice, the research strategy, and time horizon. It also identified the research 
population and sample, and outlined the sources, instruments, and procedures for data 
collection and analysis, which contributed to the trustworthiness of the design of the 
study. The chapter also sets out the ethical considerations of the study.   
 
Chapter five provides an analysis of the secondary data and a discussion of findings. 
It addresses the first objective by revealing trends that were evident in the PPP 
practices of the BRICS countries over the past fifteen years. This allowed for the 
identification of practices that are generally recognised as contributing to the success 
of the BRICS countries, and the exposure of areas of underperformance.  
 
Chapter six provides an analysis of the primary data and a discussion of the findings. 
It addresses the second and third research objectives by revealing the opinions of 




PPPs, and their views on practices that could improve the uptake. 
 
Chapter seven covers the conclusions and recommendations of the study. It addresses 
the fourth research objective by providing an overview of the study, a summary of key 
findings and conclusions, implications for theory and practice, policy 
recommendations, and recommendations for further study. This includes an 
elaboration of the value of the study in guiding policy-makers and business leaders 





CHAPTER 2 : BEST PRACTICE IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides relevant literature and background information that is 
necessary to understand the research area. It also identified gaps in previous 
research by revealing the extent to which it fails to address the research questions. 
This was achieved by providing a theoretical framework upon which the research is 
grounded. It is advisable to initiate research on some form of theoretical basis 
according to Saunders et al. (2009) so that the study can be linked to the existing 
body of knowledge. This assisted in identifying what is already known about PPPs, 
navigating the extensive body of knowledge that exists in the area of the study, 
providing a sense of direction in conducting the study, and addressing the research 
questions.  
 
2.2. Theoretical framework   
The study of PPPs involves a broad area of knowledge that entails several theories 
and interrelated concepts. Therefore, to avoid getting lost in the literature, it was 
important to develop a theoretical framework that would identify specific theories and 
essential concepts that would assist in explaining why the problem exists and allow for 
the research questions to be adequately addressed. 
 
For this study, the essential theories and concepts that needed to be defined within the 
theoretical framework are those that defined what PPPs are, why and when they are 
used, and how best they could be implemented. This included the definition for PPPs; 
the type of PPP contracts that exist; the advantages and disadvantages of PPPs; 
attributes of projects that are suitable for implementation as PPPs; financing of PPPs; 
typical project structure, lifecycle and process for the development of PPPs; 
international best practice and critical success factors. Table 2.1 provides a summary 
of these essential concepts.  
 
Table 2-1: Essential concepts and theories that need to be defined in the 
theoretical framework  
I. Definition of PPP 




III. Advantages of PPPs  
IV. Disadvantages of PPPs 
V. Projects that are suitable for implementation as PPPs 
VI. Financing of PPPs 
VII. Typical PPP project structures 
VIII. The typical process for the development of PPPs  
IX. The typical lifecycle of PPPs  
X. International best practice and critical success factors  
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion 
 
2.3. Definition of PPPs  
A review of the literature shows that there is no universally accepted definition of PPPs 
across the jurisdictions of various countries (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World Bank (IBRD/WB), 2017; Kościelniaka & Górkab, 2016; 
Koskela et al., 2016). Instead, countries appear to define PPPs based on their unique 
institutional and legal requirements (The World Bank Group, 2015a).  
 
Despite varying definitions, the literature also reveals a common thread in the 
parameters that are typically used by different jurisdictions to define PPPs (Mandri-
Perrott, n.d.; IBRD/WB, 2017). These include the type of assets involved (IBRD/WB, 
2017), functions for which the private party is responsible (Mandri-Perrott, n.d.), and 
the method of paying the private party (Zapparov, 2015). The type of asset involved 
can be either new or existing, although the IBRD/WB (2017) indicated that most PPPs 
involve new assets, which are referred to as greenfield projects. In contrast PPPs, 
which are used to transfer the responsibility for upgrading and managing existing 
assets to private parties, are referred to as brownfield projects (Pan, n.d.). For asset 
types ‘… assets or services provided are specified in terms of outputs rather than 
inputs-that is, defining what is required, rather than how it is to be done’ (IBRD/WB, 
2017: pg.6). PPPs also integrate several functions, which the private party will be 
responsible for, and will vary based on the type of asset or service involved (Mandri-
Perrott, n.d.). Typical functions include the design, build or rehabilitation of the 
infrastructure, finance, maintenance and operations (Ibid.). Concerning the methods of 
paying the private party, it can collect payment through fees from users, the 
government, or a combination of the two, and payment is typically linked to 





For this study, the two definitions, one by the IBRD/WB (2017) and the other by the 
National Treasury (2017) were examined. The definition by the IBRD/WB (2017: pg.1) 
states that a PPP ‘… is a long-term contract between a private party and a government 
entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant 
risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance’. This 
definition shows that the IBRD/WB held the view that PPPs should involve long-term 
contracts. In contrast, South Africa’s definition as articulated by the National Treasury 
(2017: pg.159) defines a PPP as ‘… a contract between a public sector institution and 
private party, where the private party performs an institutional function that is usually 
provided by the public sector and/or uses state property in terms of the PPP 
agreement’. This contract is characterised by ‘… most of the project risk (financial, 
technical, operational) being transferred to the private party, and the public sector 
paying for a full set of services, including new infrastructure, maintenance and facilities 
management, through monthly or annual payments’ (Ibid., 2017: pg.159).  
 
By comparing the two definitions it becomes apparent that South Africa’s definition is 
of the view that PPPs can also include short and medium-term contracts. This is 
demonstrated by the presence of contracts with a duration ranging from three to five 
years on the 2017 National Treasury list of PPPs (Ibid.). However, Tiong (2013) 
indicated that PPPs are most suited for long-term contracts as it typically takes a long 
time to get these projects to a bankable state and obtain the relevant approvals from 
authorities to implement them. Pre-approval activities can prove cumbersome, due to; 
the requirement for the preparation of pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, the 
appointment of transaction advisors to assist in structuring the project, and preparation 
of a business case, marketing the project to potential investors and funders, and the 
acquisition of land (Ibid.). Therefore, limiting South Africa’s definition of PPPs to long-
term contracts could dissuade officials from wasting time and resources in obtaining 
approvals on short- and medium-term contracts that are not suitable for PPPs.  
 
2.4. Types of PPP contracts  
The IBRD/WB (2017), stated that there is a broad spectrum of contracts with varying 
levels of involvement and risk undertaken by the private party that could be considered 
as PPPs. This spectrum was characterised by an increase in private involvement 




this spectrum, which ranges from contracts with the least private involvement to those 
with the most (i.e. from operations and maintenance to build-own-operate-transfer). 
  
Table 2-2: Types of PPP Contracts 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from Mandri-Perrott (n.d.)   
 
The World Bank Group (2015a: para.1) states that ‘PPP typically do not include service 
contracts or turnkey construction contracts, which are categorised as public 
procurement projects, or the privatisation of utilities where there is a limited ongoing 
role for the public sector’. Although National Treasury (2017) recognises some of the 
contracts that are identified in Table 2.2, it is not apparent whether it recognises the 
entire spectrum of contracts that are widely considered as PPPs. The 2017 budget 
review by the National Treasury (2017) indicated that the 31 PPPs undertaken to date 
in South Africa, involve the following types of contracts: twenty-three are categorised 
as design, finance, build, operate and transfer (DFBOT); three projects are categorised 
as design, finance and operate (DFO); three projects are categorised as design, build, 
operate and transfer (DBOT); one is categorised as an equity partnership project; and 
one as a facilities management project. The budget review also showed that contracts 
that are underway in the transport sector, mainly involve roads (Ibid.). These contracts 
are identified in Table 2.3 and include the design-finance-build-operate-transfer 
(DFBOT) and design-finance-operate (DFO) of transport PPPs. They involve contracts 
with a high project cost and long-term projects, with the financing structure of these 
displaying a high debt-to-equity ratio. It is also apparent that the prevalent form of 
 Operations and maintenance (O&M)  


















t  Franchise  
 Lease and affermage  
 Private finance initiative (PFI)  
 Concession  
 Design-construct-manage-finance (DCMF) 
 Design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) 
 Design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM) 
 Rehabilitate-operate-transfer (ROT) 
 Build-transfer-operate (BTO) 
 Build-operate-transfer (BOT) 




payment is user-charges, however, in certain instances, it involves unitary payment or 
a combination of both forms of payment.  
 
Table 2.3 further shows that the state provides guarantees on some of these contracts. 
Zapparov (2015) stated that guarantees are provided to improve the bankability of a 
project, which can prove to be a crucial incentive in attracting investors, especially to 
projects that are deemed high-risk. Table 2.3 also reveals that these contracts have 
been undertaken at the national and provincial levels of government. This suggests 
that municipalities do not have an appetite for transport PPPs. Instead, the types of 
PPP contracts undertaken at the municipal level of government mainly involve low-
value, medium-term, social infrastructure projects (National Treasury, 2017).                 
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Source: National Treasury (2017)  
 
2.5. Advantages of PPPs 
A review of the literature suggests that PPPs are widely lauded for delivering better 
value-for-money in major capital projects compared to traditional procurement 
(Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015; Koskela et al., 2016; Perera, 2016). PPPs allow the 
public sector to leverage private capital and expertise in a manner that yields value-
for-money, affordability, and appropriate transfer of risk in the delivery of much-needed 
capital projects (Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015). In the context of PPPs, value-for-
money is achieved through the agreement between the public and private partners, 
where the private partner is given the freedom to specify its input specifications 
(IBRD/WB, 2017). However, in certain instances, the public sector may specify or 
prescribe some of the input specifications, especially if a project affects policy or 
strategic objectives of the state (National Treasury, 2004). The freedom granted to the 
private sector to specify their inputs, allows for innovation and creation of additional 
benefits in relation to the amount of money paid for a service that would otherwise not 
be realised if the input specifications were specified by the public sector (IBRD/WB, 
2017). This means that the public sector can derive greater benefits without having to 
pay more. PPPs are also able to make projects more affordable for the public sector 
as they allow payment through user fees and/or unitary payments over the long-term, 
as opposed to incurring capital expenditure on high-value projects over the short- to 
medium-term (Ibid.). A significant proportion of the risk can also be transferred to the 
private partner at a premium, which serves as a strong incentive for the successful 
delivery of the project (Ibid.).       
  
PPPs leverage the financial and technical capacity of the private sector to deliver 




growing economic constraint affecting the ability of governments to deliver all their 
infrastructure requirements in accordance with their respective development plans 
(Koskela et al., 2016; Perera, 2016). This is achieved through contractual agreements 
that typically compel the private party to raise the required capital, dedicate specialist 
skills to the project and carry risks associated with project delivery over the lifecycle of 
the project (Perera, 2016). As a result, there is greater budgetary certainty and the 
quality of operations is maintained throughout the PPPs (Perera, 2016).  
 
Perera (2016: pg.14) also stated PPPs avoid ‘… negative effects of either exclusive 
public ownership or outright privatization’ ‘This is seen as a win-win situation for both 
public and private entities where they undertake large scale projects’ (Ibid., 2016: 
pg.14). Koskela et al. (2016) showed that PPPs also offer better Through-Life-
Management (TLM), which refers to the management of a programme throughout its 
lifecycle, by providing contractors with long-term involvement and the opportunity to 
reduce costs at different stages of the lifecycle.  
 
A balanced perspective of the advantages or benefits that emanate from PPPs for both 
the public and private sectors is required according to Koskela et al. (2016) and 
Sreenath (2015). This is based on the tendency of researchers to place greater 
emphasis on the advantages for the public sector that emanate from PPPs in 
comparison to the private sector (Sreenath, 2015; Ittmann, 2017). It creates a false 
perception that the public sector stands to benefit more than the private sector through 
this form of procurement.   
 
Sreenath (2015) showed that the public sector derives several advantages from PPPs. 
This includes a greater transfer of risk to the private partner, which compels it to provide 
much better care of the facilities and at a superior level of service, as they stand to 
suffer severe financial consequences if the project fails (Ibid.). The responsibility for 
raising the required capital also lies with the private sector (Ibid.), which gives the public 
sector an opportunity to channel limited financial resources towards other competing 
priorities that would not have been funded if capital had to be invested in high-cost 
infrastructure projects. Another advantage is that the responsibility for construction, 
operation, recruitment, and training of staff also lies with the private partner; the 




in delivering on its obligations to communities (IBRD/WB, 2017). The use of modern 
technology also yields greater value-for-money for the public sector, and private 
involvement usually results in a reduction in political pressure (Ibid.).  
  
Koskela et al. (2016) showed that the private sector derives several advantages from 
PPPs. This includes the opportunity to be part of a good investment (Ibid.). PPPs 
provide cash flow over the long-term, and allow the private partner to borrow up to 80% 
from financial institutions (Ibid.), therefore, it does not have to use its capital reserves. 
Furthermore, the private partner can improve its knowledge about public sector 
processes and build its reputation in the market by undertaking mega-infrastructure 
projects on behalf of the state (IBRD/WB, 2017), which could benefit future projects.  
 
In the light of the preceding discussion, an approach that uses a balanced outlook in 
distinguishing the advantages of PPPs from both the public and private sector 
perspective, provides a comprehensive picture for ascribing benefits to both sectors in 
a more realistic manner. Table 2.4 differentiates these advantages between the public 
and private sectors.  
 
Table 2-4: Differentiation of advantages of PPPs for the public and private sector 
Public sector Private sector 
 Greater affordability when compared to 
traditional procurement as payments are 
done over the long term. 
 PPPs are usually a good investment due to 
the high value of the projects and provide 
cash flow over the long-term. 
 PPPs can offer greater value-for-money. E.g. 
the use of innovation and modern technology 
could yield greater value-for-money for the 
public sector. 
 
 PPPs allow for innovation by specifying 
output specifications as opposed to input 
specifications, which empower the private 
party to investigate more efficient options that 
result in greater value-for-money for the 
public sector, and potential cost savings for 
the private party.  
 Greater transfer of risk to the private partner, 
which compels it to provide much better care 
of the facilities, with superior service, as they 
stand to suffer severe financial 
consequences.  
 The right to establish special purpose 
vehicles and use of project finance assists in 
mitigating some of the financial risks to the 
private party. i.e. limited recourse finance. 
 
 The responsibility for raising the required 
capital lies with the private sector, therefore, 
 PPPs allow the private partner to borrow up 




providing the public sector with an opportunity 
to channel limited financial resources to other 
competing priorities, which would not have 
been funded if capital had to be invested in 
high-value infrastructure projects. 
does not have to use its capital reserves. 
 
 The responsibility for construction, operation, 
recruitment, and training of staff also lies with 
the private partner. 
 The private partner can improve its 
knowledge about public sector processes, 
which could benefit future projects.  
 Expertise, skills, and efficiencies of the 
private sector are of benefit to the public 
sector in delivering on its obligations to 
communities. 
 PPPs allow for the creation of jobs and skills 
development, which could lead to greater 
support by the community and buy-in.    
 PPPs also result in a reduction in political 
pressure due to private involvement. 
 PPPs provide private partners with an 
opportunity to build their reputation in the 
market by undertaking mega-infrastructure 
projects on behalf of the state. These may 
strengthen political will and support for future 
projects.  
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
2.6. Disadvantages of PPPs 
From the literature, the indication is that despite their growing popularity, PPPs are not 
a panacea for all infrastructure related problems (Kościelniaka & Górkab, 2016; 
IBRD/WB, 2017). PPPs have some inherent disadvantages, such as the amount of 
time, capital, and effort that is usually required to obtain approvals and support for 
implementation (Kościelniaka & Górkab, 2016; IBRD/WB, 2017). For example, this is 
demonstrated by the protracted approval process for the Gautrain Rapid Rail project, 
which took about ten years from pre-feasibility in 1997/98 until Treasury approved and 
cabinet endorsement was granted in 2006/7 (Dachs, 2011). Although protracted 
approval processes are not limited to PPPs, Van der Merwe, Negota and Van Zyl 
(2001) showed that delays in the approval process of the Gautrain Rapid Rail project, 
emanated from factors directly associated with the project’s status as a PPP. These 
factors included the need to adhere to an extensive range of regulatory requirements 
prescribed by the then newly established PPP unit, environmental impact assessments 
(EIA), and delays in appointing a suitable financial consultant that could satisfy the 
prescribed requirements (Ibid.). Although the requirement for conducting an EIA is not 




another factor that contributed to retarding the approval process (Ibid.).  
 
A lack of political support for PPPs can also be disastrous for these undertakings. This 
is demonstrated by Boardman, Greve and Hodge (2015), who shared the view that 
PPPs require a high level of political and community support to succeed, especially if 
the user-pay principle is to be applied. The user-pay principle refers to a method of 
payment, where users are directly responsible for payment of the use of the 
infrastructure (Zapparov, 2015). This is demonstrated by the discontent caused by the 
introduction of the electronic tolling (e-tolls) roads project under the Gauteng Freeways 
Improvement Programme. Although not a PPP, this project sought to implement the 
user-pay principle on specified national roads. Pienaar (2012) stated that this project 
raised much controversy due to the government’s intention to make road users pay for 
a service for which they had been receiving for free. This was done without clearly 
outlining the benefits of this transition (Ibid.). As a result, there was outright rejection 
and limited buy-in by affected communities and politicians within the region (Ibid.). The 
rejection and unwillingness of the community to pay for a major PPP project, such as 
the e-tolls, can also harm the sovereign credit rating of a country, which would increase 
the cost of capital to be raised from the international capital market (Ibid). This 
downgrade in credit rating, and an increase in the cost of capital, is not restricted to 
the project in dispute but has a real and outward negative impact on other projects 
across the various sectors of the economy.  
 
Hodges and Dellacha (n.d.) showed that in some countries the private party is at a 
disadvantage, as it is not able to protect ideas or concepts that it proposed to the public 
sector through unsolicited proposals. Instead, the private party, which is the proposing 
entity, needs to rely on one of three systems that have been developed that supposedly 
afford the proposing entity with some degree of an advantage during the bidding 
process. This includes the Bonus System, the Swiss Challenge System, and the Best 
and Final Offer System (Zin Zawawi, Kulatunga & Thayaparan, 2016). The Bonus 
System, which is used in countries such as Chile and Korea, affords the original 
proposing entity with bonus points during the bidding process, which is usually limited 
to five to ten percent of total points (Ibid.). In contrast, the Swiss Challenge System 
used in Italy, Taiwan, and some Indian states, allows the original proposing entity to 




Best and Final Offer System, which is used in countries such as Argentina and South 
Africa, the original proposing entity is given the advantage of automatically competing 
in the final round of the tender process (Ibid.). However, none of these systems can 
provide the original proposing entity with a guarantee that they will be the successful 
bidder and the likelihood of another service provider being awarded the contract still 
exists. The disadvantages of PPPs should be seen from the perspective of both the 
public and private sector according to Kościelniaka and Górkab (2016). However, there 
tends to be greater emphasis on the disadvantages that may be realised by the public 
sector as opposed to having a balanced view that fully incorporates private sector 
concerns (Ibid.). Disadvantages of PPPs can have an immensely detrimental impact 
on the financial and reputational wellbeing of private parties, if not implemented 
properly, given the large number of resources at stake (Ibid.). 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, it is apparent that using a balanced outlook to 
differentiate the disadvantages of PPPs from both the public and private sector 
perspectives, will assist in drawing a more comprehensive picture of potential 
limitations and pitfalls of PPPs for both sectors, and provide guidance for improved 
decision-making. Table 2.5 provides a summary of these disadvantages as they relate 
to the public and private sectors. 
 
Table 2-5: Disadvantages of PPP projects 
Disadvantages for the public sector  Disadvantages for the private sector 
 Long approval processes.    Long approval processes.  
 High transaction costs.  Possible financial losses due to late or 
non-payment of transaction fees. 
 The backlash from the public if the 
project is not implemented properly. 
 The backlash from the public and 
reputational risk if the project is not 
implemented properly. 
 Few bidders.  The high cost of bids due to few bidders 
and complex bid evaluation process. 
 Contracts are more complicated than for 
traditional procurement. 
 Contracts are more complicated than for 
traditional procurement. 
 A large number of resources are 
required in evaluating bids. 
 
 A large number of resources are 
required in preparing bids. 




have cost implications for the public 
sector. 
have cost implications for the private 
sector. 
 Unforeseen circumstances, which arise 
from the long-term nature of the project, 
which could negatively affect the project, 
may result in renegotiation in an 
uncompetitive environment.  
 
 Unforeseen circumstances which arise 
from the long-term nature of the project, 
which could negatively affect the project 
and long-term commitments, result in 
high opportunity costs as resources are 
tied-down for specified activities. 
 
 Limited negotiating skills resulting in 
suboptimal contracts for the public 
sector.  
 Taking advantage of the public sector’s 
limited negotiating skills may damage 
the private sector’s reputation and ability 
to secure future projects. 
 Inability to enforce performance.   Inability to enforce performance.  
 Using a service provider to implement 
ideas or concepts that they did not 
develop, can have dire consequences. 
 Inability to copyright ideas or concepts 
for possible projects that could be copied 
and awarded to another service provider 
for implementation. 
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
2.7. Projects that are suitable for implementation as PPPs 
Not all projects according to Tiong (2013) are suited for PPPs. Although there are no 
set rules, the following attributes are characteristic of projects that are suitable for 
implementation as PPPs, namely: long term contracts (Ibid.), large project size 
(IBRD/WB, 2017), and a focus on economic infrastructure (Palmer, 2015). Tiong 
(2013) had the view that long-term contracts are typically suited for PPP as they 
promote greater affordability by allowing lower unitary payments over a longer 
repayment period compared to short-term contracts. PPPs also typically require a long 
period for the preparation of a compelling business case, needed for approvals from 
the authorities (Ibid.). As a result, it is usually not worthwhile to pursue short-term 
projects as PPPs. The IBRD/WB (2017) also showed that transaction advisory costs 
associated with PPPs, are typically high and can make this procurement option less 
attractive for a small-sized project, therefore, proper consideration must be applied 
before undertaking this option. The high transaction costs emanate from the 
professional fees paid by the public sector to multidisciplinary teams of experts, who 
are required to prepare a bankable business case (Ibid.). Due to these high transaction 




project-size that can be implemented as PPPs (Public Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility, 2019). For example, in Australia and Singapore, the threshold for projects that 
can be implemented as PPPs, are those with a project size above 50 million American 
Dollars (USD 50million), and in Brazil, it is 20 million Brazilian Reais (R$20million BRL) 
(Ibid.). As a result, large-size projects are typically suited for PPPs.   
 
Palmer (2015) indicated that PPPs are more suited for the procurement of economic 
infrastructure rather than social infrastructure. Economic infrastructure refers to the 
various forms of demand-based infrastructures in a country (Ibid.). This includes 
transport and information communications technologies (ICT) infrastructure, which 
typically have a high commercial value. In contrast, social infrastructure refers to those 
required to support social activities, such as health and education (NPC, 2012). This 
includes schools, hospitals, clinics, and residential infrastructures, which typically have 
a low commercial value (Ibid.). Palmer’s (2015) view was premised on the idea that 
there is a likelihood of private involvement in PPPs in economic infrastructure projects 
greater than social infrastructure, due to the potential for higher returns (Ibid.). As a 
result, economic infrastructure is more suitable than social infrastructure for 
implementation as PPPs. This is demonstrated in Figure 2.1, which indicates that 
demand-based infrastructures, such as communications and transport, bear returns 













Figure 2-1: Relationship between return and risk for social and economic 
infrastructure projects 















Transport with demand 
risk (e.g. toll road) 
Ports/airports  
Communications 
 (e.g. telecoms towers) 
Add greenfield risk or 





Reduce for brownfield risk or 





Gafurova and Akhmetshina (2015), showed that the establishment of PPPs for 
economic infrastructure, tends to be a growing trend in developing economies. This is 
on the basis that economic infrastructure has been prioritised for the critical role it plays 
in stimulating much needed economic growth (Ibid.). However, given that most 
developing economies cannot satisfy their demand for economic infrastructure solely 
through public sector funding, private involvement is required to bridge any deficiencies 
(Ibid.).  
 
Based on the preceding discussion, projects that are suitable for implementation as 
PPPs, are those that ideally entail all of the attributes identified in Figure 2.2, namely; 










Figure 2-2: Main attributes of projects that are suitable for PPPs 
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
2.8. Financing of PPPs  
There are two major forms of finance for PPPs according to Mandri-Perrott (n.d.), 
namely, corporate and project finance. Corporate finance is regarded as full recourse 
financing, where the project sponsor undertakes direct responsibility for the repayment 
of the loan (Ibid.). In this instance, the lender can rely on the balance sheet of the 
project sponsor as recourse should the project fail or be unable to generate sufficient 
revenue to repay the loan. Project finance is regarded as non-recourse or limited 
recourse financing, where the lenders of capital rely purely on the revenue generated 
by the project, as the source of repayment for the loan that was granted (Zapparov, 
2015). A project company, referred to as a special purpose vehicle (SPV), is 






loan (Ibid.). This serves as a buffer to the project sponsor’s balance sheet should the 
project fail or be in default of the loan agreement.  
 
Zapparov (2015) showed that project finance is more suited for capital intense projects, 
such as transport infrastructure (i.e. ports, warehouses, airports, roads). This is due to 
the tenure for project finance being typically longer than the tenure of corporate 
finance, with a higher debt-to-equity ratio (Ibid.). As a result, project finance is usually 
more affordable than corporate finance. This is the reason why project finance is a 
more popular option than corporate finance for the financing of PPPs (Ibid.). A project 
finance structure with a debt-to-equity ratio ranging between 60:40 and 80:20 is 
regarded as high according to the APM Group (2020a). If the ratio lies below 60:40, it 
regards it low, and if it lies above 80:20, it considers it too high (Ibid.). 
 
Many sources exist for project finance that can be pursued by the SPV, which include 
debt and equity finance (Lewis, 2015; Zapparov, 2015). Equity is acquired through 
shareholder loans, cash contributions, and mezzanine finance, while debt is acquired 
through loans from commercial banks, multilateral institutions, export credit agencies 
(ECAs) and project bonds (Zapparov, 2015; Deloitte, 2018). Deloitte (2018) shows that 
project bonds are still an under-utilised avenue for debt financing in South Africa. As 
of April 2013, the country only achieved its first investment-grade listing on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange for a project in the energy sector (Ibid.). However, the 
successful listing of this project bond has affirmed the sophistication of South Africa’s 
bond market and has set the country on a path for additional listings in the future (Ibid.).  
 
On this basis, project finance seems to be the better option for the financing of PPPs 
as it allows for: long-term contract tenure; high debt-to-equity ratio; greater affordability 
than corporate finance; more attractive options for the project sponsor as it protects 
their balance sheet; and includes a combination of various sources of finance, such as 
debt, equity, and contributions by the public sector.  
 
2.9. Typical PPP project structure  
The typical structure of PPPs under a project finance arrangement according to Lewis 
(2015), is determined through the contractual or legal agreements that exist between 




equity investors, lenders, engineering-procurement-construction (EPC) contractor, 
operations and maintenance (O&M) contractor, sub-contractors, a government 
implementing agency, and/or end-users (Ibid.). Ittmann (2017) and Zapparov (2015) 
showed that under a project finance arrangement, these contractual agreements 
typically focus on who will be paying for the infrastructure (i.e. offtaker, end-user, or a 
combination of the two). As a result, the PPP structure can be differentiated according 
to one of three forms. The first form is used when a state entity enters into an offtake 
agreement with the SPV for the payment of the infrastructure (Ittmann, 2015). An 
offtake agreement is a legal contract that provides surety of revenue to the SPV and, 
in certain instances, can be backed by a sovereign guarantee (The World Bank Group, 
2018). The second form is used when the user-pay principle is adopted for payment of 
the infrastructure. It involves the direct collection of fees from the end-user for the use 
of the infrastructure; e.g. tolls on a toll road (Ittmann, 2017). A third form also exists, 
which is a hybrid of the off-take agreement and user-pay principle. This involves a 
combination of the contributions by a state entity and the fees collected from end-users 
towards payment of the total fees (Zapparov, 2015). What the three forms have in 
common is that they all involve the establishment of an SPV by the project sponsor 
that will serve as the concessionaire and borrower of loans (Zapparov, 2015; Ittmann, 
2017).  
 
However, Chowdhury, Po-Han and Tiong (2011) were of the view that focusing only 
on contractual agreements between participants is an inadequate technique for 
determining the structure of a PPP, as other factors need to be taken into 
consideration. They held the view that an alternative technique called network theory, 
could lead to a more in-depth analysis of relationships that comprise the PPP structure 
compared to a superficial one that only considers contractual or legal arrangements 
(Ibid.). Network theory according to the University of Twente (2017: para. 2) refers to 
‘… the study of how the social structure of relationships around a person, group, or 
organization affects beliefs or behavior’. It is used as a technique for the mapping of 
relationships, using graphs to identify patterns that can be used to explain various 
phenomena within an organisation (Ibid.). Chowdhury et al. (2011) held the view that 
the adoption of this technique, where the contractual agreements are categorised as 
core or peripheral, depending on the role that the respective relationships play and the 




understanding of the PPP’ structure as opposed to just focusing on contractual 
arrangements (Ibid.).  
 
The socio-economic impact of the various forms of project finance according to Pienaar 
(2012), should also be considered when determining the appropriate option to be 
implemented, as a society can respond differently to these. For example, a society with 
widespread poverty has a greater likelihood to reject a project based on the user-pay 
principle as it represents a direct cost, whereas, a unitary payment by a state entity, 
derived through taxes, is more likely to be accepted (Ibid.).    
 
In light of the above discussion, it is evident that the PPP’ structure can be determined 
through various techniques. This includes a basic technique that focusses only on the 
contractual agreements that exist between participants, or an alternative technique that 
takes into consideration other factors. The latter technique is more likely to identify key 
relationships that are critical towards the success of the project and as a consequence, 
lend greater effort in strengthening them. It will also provide a more in-depth 
assessment and understanding of the key relationships asbeing different to a 
superficial or generic assessment of all the participants. Furthermore, conducting 
credible socio-economic impact studies as part of the process of evaluating the 
appropriate form of PPP’ structure, will likely lead to a project with a greater likelihood 
of being accepted by society.  
 
2.10. PPP process  
The process for planning and implementing PPPs according to the IBRD/WB (2017) 
and the APM Group Limited (2018) typically involves some activities that are clustered 
together into phases. The IBRD/WB (2014) showed that these phases are iteratively 
developed, appraised and approved before proceeding to the next phase (Ibid.). This 
is on the basis that this approach allows for greater involvement by key stakeholders 
and oversight agencies in each phase, and reduces the chance of wasting time and 
limited resources on projects that are not suitable for this type of procurement (Ibid.). 
It allows for quality control measures to be effectively implemented, where approvals 
need to be sought at predetermined stages before the project proceeds any further 




for the identification and discontinuation of weak projects at an early stage of project 
development (Ibid.).    
 
However, there does not exist a universal consensus on the activities that need to be 
performed in each phase, including where each phase should commence or end. This 
is demonstrated by a comparison of the PPP processes outlined by the IBRD/WB 
(2017) and the APM Group Limited (2018). Although the PPP processes shown by 
these entities both entail six phases, it is apparent that the scope of activities contained 
in each phase is not the same, as explained below:  
 
The first phase, as described by the APM Group Limited (2018), focusses on the 
identification and screening of PPP projects. This entails the identification and scoping 
of potential projects of PPPs, assessing their economic and financial viability, and 
socio-economic impact, using techniques such as the cost-benefit analysis (Ibid.). In 
contrast, the IBRD/WB (2017) regarded identification and screening of projects as two 
distinct phases; where the first phase primarily focusses on the identification of priority 
projects that usually emerge from a broad public investment planning and project 
selection process. Screening is conducted after the identification of projects and is 
regarded as a separate phase (Ibid.).   
 
The APM Group Limited (2018) then showed that the second phase involves the 
appraisal and preparation of the project contract (Ibid.). This is achieved by refining the 
scope and preliminary design of the project, testing its technical feasibility, and 
assessing its environmental impact (Ibid.). The socio-economic assessment is also 
refined, and the commercial feasibility, project risk, and affordability are assessed 
(Ibid). The procurement route and plan are also defined in this phase (Ibid.). The 
IBRD/WB (2017) showed that the primary activity entailed in this phase is the screening 
of projects.   
  
The third phase described by the APM Group Limited (2018), entails structuring and 
drafting of the tender and contract. This involves the finalisation of the structure of the 
project contract of aspects relating to the payment mechanisms and financial risk 
(Ibid.). The due diligence is also finalised, together with the previous analysis of the 




proposal requirements, and evaluation criteria are finalised (Ibid.). The final draft of the 
contract is also finalised (Ibid.). A comparison of activities described in phase three of 
the IBRD/WB (2017), showed that they are similar to that of the APM Group Limited 
(2018). This is demonstrated by the development of a business case to demonstrate 
that the PPP is a sound investment decision. Similarly, the structuring of the PPP is 
also conducted in this phase (Ibid.). 
 
In the fourth phase, the APM Group Limited (2018) showed that the main activities 
involve the launching of the tender and awarding of the contract to the most suitable 
bidder. This entails the qualification of bidders with the view of entering into dialogue 
with suitable bidders through interactive processes (Ibid.). Proposals are then 
evaluated and negotiations are held in some instances, which then results in the 
contract being awarded to the most suitable bidder (Ibid.). The contract is then signed 
and the project is brought to financial closure (Ibid.). In contrast, the fourth phase of 
the IBRD/WB (2017) involves the drafting of the PPP contract.  
 
The management of the contract commences in the fifth phase according to the APM 
Group Limited (2018). Its main activities entail the management of the contract on 
aspects relating to the development and commissioning of the project (Ibid.). This 
involves the establishment of the contract management team, and the strategy and 
oversight approval of the design (Ibid.). The project site and permits are then prepared 
and construction commences (Ibid.). Monitoring is also provided during construction, 
and any changes, claims, or disputes are managed (Ibid.). The fifth phase of the 
IBRD/WB (2017) focusses on the management of the PPP transaction. 
  
The APM Group Limited (2018) then showed that the management of the contract 
continues into the sixth phase. Its main activities involve the management of the 
contract on aspects relating to operations, maintenance, and hand-over of the project 
(Ibid.). This entails the monitoring of performance, and managing changes, claims and 
disputes (Ibid.). Furthermore, the project is also finalised and handed over to the public 
sector (Ibid.). Phase six of the IBRD/WB (2017) showed that the activities associated 





It is not apparent, which of the two processes yields better results concerning the 
successful planning and implementation of PPPs. This presents a gap in the literature, 
however, this will not be investigated as part of the study. Table 2.6 provides a 
summary of the differences in the phases of the PPP processes of the APM Group 
Limited and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.    
 
Table 2-6: Differences in the phases of the PPP processes of the APM Group 
Limited and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
PHASES APM Group Limited (2018) IBRD/WB (2017) 
Phase 1 
 
Identifying projects and screening as a 
PPP. 
Identifying priority projects.  
Phase 2 Appraising and preparing the project-
contract. 
Screening as PPP. 
Phase 3 Structuring and drafting tender and 
contract. 
Business case and structuring of 
PPP. 
Phase 4 Tender and award.  Drafting PPP contract  
Phase 5 Managing contract: developing and 
commissioning.   
Managing PPP transaction.  
Phase 6 Managing contract: operating, maintaining 
and handing-back. 
Managing PPP contract. 
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
2.11. Typical PPP lifecycle   
PPPs are typically long-term projects that can take ten to thirty years to reach project 
closure (Mandri-Perrott, n.d.). The typical timeline associated with the project phases 
of a PPP, includes the project preparation phase, which typically takes about two to 
three years; the construction phase, which takes about two to three years; and the 
operation phase, which takes about ten to thirty years to complete (Ibid.). However, 
Pereira (2014) showed that the typical lifecycle could be disrupted by several events, 
which present a risk, such as a dispute over the interpretation of the contract, or 
performance by either party that is not in accordance with their agreement. This 
disruption could either prolong any phase of the project or lead to the early termination 
of the contract (Ibid.). For example, the Gautrain rapid rail project had a protracted 
project preparation phase, when it took over ten years to obtain the state’s approval 
for the project (Van der Merwe et al., 2001; Dachs, 2011). This is significantly much 




2.12. International best practice and critical success factors  
Best practice is defined by the Cambridge University Press (2017: para.1) as ‘… a 
working method or set of working methods that is officially accepted as being the best 
to use in a particular business or industry, usually described formally and in detail’. In 
the case of PPPs, several practices are widely recognised as best practice, due to their 
contribution towards the proliferation and success of PPPs. These practices are 
outlined in the following sub-sections:      
 
2.12.1. Regulation  
Regulation plays an important role in the financial sustainability of the PPP project, 
where operators and investors have a right to make a return that is fair and consistent 
with the costs of financing the contractual commitments (IBRD/WB, 2017). Regulation 
also contributes to allocative efficiency, where the price is reflective of the cost, and 
production efficiency, where costs are minimised (Tiong, 2013). Furthermore, 
regulation contributes to the fairness of the project by ensuring that the poor are not 
out-priced (Ibid.).  
 
Tiong (2013: pg.4) also stated that according to a World Bank survey, ‘Insufficient legal 
protection of investors is the primary concern of PPP investors. Legal recourse is 
usually the most important mechanism that investors have to safeguard their 
investment, if a project is not executed in accordance with expectations (Ibid.). 
Therefore, the establishment of a regulatory framework for the protection of the rights 
of PPP investors, is regarded as a critical success factor in attracting PPP investors 
(Tiong, 2013; IBRD/WB, 2017). Tiong (2013), Churakov (2014) and Wei, Wenjuan and 
Xu (2015) showed that regulatory frameworks for PPPs in developing countries are 
generally underdeveloped or untested. This is one of the major reasons why PPPs are 
not as prevalent in developing countries compared to developed countries, and why it 
is so difficult to attract investors.  
 
To establish a coherent regulatory framework, a review of the literature shows that the 
following aspects need to be considered, namely: the establishment of a PPP law 
(Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014); authorisation of a government entity to enter into a 
PPP agreement (IBRD/WB, 2017); an outline monitoring and regulation process (Ibid.); 




(Ibid.); the protection of project revenues (Ibid.); foreign investment issues (Tiong, 
2013); land and labour law issues (Ibid.); and incentive-based regulations (Tiong, 
2013; Meng, Martinez, Zhang & Pan, 2015).   
 
Bovis (2015) and Wei et al. (2015) showed that although PPPs can be implemented 
without a specified regulatory policy framework, the most successful countries have 
introduced such a framework to control the implementation of PPPs for the benefit of 
all stakeholders. This can be in the form of a specific law, commonly known as ‘PPP 
law’ as in the case of Brazil and Russia (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014), or as a 
section of the public finance management legislation, as in the case of South Africa 
and China (Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). Pereira (2014) was of the view that a 
regulatory framework for PPPs would require more than one specific law, as multiple 
issues affect PPPs, such as property rights, environmental concerns, labour laws, and 
dispute resolution, which are typically regulated through other forms of legislation. 
 
The IBRD/WB (2017) held the view that the regulatory framework should specify which 
government department or entity is involved in the project, and the extent to which it 
can enter into legally binding agreements of this nature. It should also indicate the legal 
limitations of the government department or entity to delegate authority to a private 
operator (Ibid.). This is intended to mitigate the risk associated with binding the state 
in long-term, high-value projects by departments or entities of the state. The regulatory 
framework should show which government department or entity will monitor the project 
(Ibid). It should also indicate whether or not a regulator exists or is contemplated, and 
what regulatory powers will be given to this entity (Ibid.).    
 
Pereira (2014) showed that the regulatory framework should indicate whether the 
competitive bidding process is fair, transparent, and objective. It should also indicate 
whether there are conflicting procurement laws at the national, provincial or local 
government level (Ibid.). Furthermore, it should specify whether or not the PPP 
agreement can be extended without inviting new bids through a competitive tender 
process (Ibid.). The regulatory framework should also clearly outline the consequences 
of a breach of procurement laws and stipulate whether or not the domestic or 
international arbitration will be considered (Ibid.). If the court system is prescribed, its 




indicated (Ibid.). The regulatory framework should stipulate whether or not international 
arbitration awards are recognised and are enforceable (Ibid.). The regulatory 
framework should further outline tariff-setting guidelines (Ibid.). These should have 
clear rules for billing and the collection of project revenues throughout the contract 
period of the project (Ibid.).   
 
Tiong (2013) was of the view that the regulatory framework should specify any 
restrictions on foreign ownership of local companies by foreign investors. It should also 
indicate whether or not there are restrictions on currency conversions (Ibid.). The 
regulatory framework should specify limitations on private ownership of land, possible 
expropriation of land owned by other parties, and environmental impact assessment 
requirements (Ibid.). This requirement is the norm in infrastructure-related PPPs. The 
regulatory framework should also show whether public employees can be transferred 
to the private operator and whether or not their employment is still subject to the terms 
and conditions of the public service. It should also indicate whether or not employees 
can be retrenched to achieve operating efficiencies (Ibid.). An incentive-based 
regulation, which is also referred to as a performance-based regulation, is an important 
aspect of the regulatory framework for PPPs, where performance is encouraged 
through various contractual arrangements. This typically involves a financial incentive 
for improved performance in the delivery of services (Meng et al., 2015). Based on the 
preceding discussion, Table 2.7 lists the requirements of a regulatory framework for 
PPPs.  
 
Table 2-7: Requirements of a regulatory framework for PPP 
 Establishment of a law or laws for PPP. 
 Specification of the government entity that is authorised to enter into a PPP 
agreement. 
 Clearly defined procurement processes. 
 Clearly defined monitoring and regulation process. 
 Options for dispute resolution.  
 Protection of project revenues.  
 Consideration of foreign investment issues.  
 Consideration of land issues.   
 Incentive-based regulation.  




2.12.2. Governance   
Good governance and trust are critical in establishing and managing PPPs that will 
generate interest within the private sector and improve public acceptance of the PPP 
programme according to Boardman et al. (2015) and Wei et al. (2015). Good 
governance of PPPs is premised on the following principles, namely: 
 
I. Trust: this is one of the most important principles as it creates the foundation for 
strong relationships between partners and is usually a prerequisite to other 
principles, such as fairness and transparency;  
II. Efficiency: which entails the elimination of wastage, unnecessary delays, or 
creating an undue burden on future generations;  
III. Accountability: which entails policy-makers taking responsibility for decisions;  
IV. Transparency: openness about the reasons behind decisions;  
V. Decency: taking decisions that do not cause harm to the dignity of citizens;  
VI. Fairness: taking decisions that are equitable and fair to all stakeholders; and  
VII. Participation: involving all stakeholders in decision-making.  
 
Boardman et al. (2015), Wei et al. (2015), and Ittmann (2017) showed that good 
governance and trust can be built by creating an environment in which there is:   
 
VIII. Strong political commitment and support;  
IX. Oversight by the legislature;  
X. Audits by supreme auditing institutions;  
XI. Transparency of processes and proactive disclosure of project information;  
XII. Supplementing contract disclosure with project summaries;  
XIII. Extensive public participation and consultation to promote the public interest; 
and  
XIV. Cooperative decision-making.  
 
Ittmann (2017) showed that there exists a high level of mistrust in the decision-making 
processes of both the public and private sector. For example, the public sector is 
typically suspected of poor planning and trying to place an excessive financial burden 
on the private sector, and the private sector is typically suspected of trying to extract 




governance process, which allows for decisions to be made, in a manner that do not 
inspire confidence (Boardman et al., 2015; Wei et al., 2015).         
 
In light of the preceding discussion, good governance needs to be promoted in a 
manner that inspires confidence of not only the public and private sectors, but also of 
the communities on whose behalf these projects are being undertaken. This includes 
adherence to the requirements of good governance as outlined in Table 2.8.      
 
Table 2-8: Requirements for good governance 
 Strong political commitment. 
 Oversight by the legislature.  
 Audits by supreme auditing institutions.  
 Transparency of processes and proactive disclosure of project information.  
 Supplementing contract disclosure with project summaries.  
 Extensive public participation and consultation to promote the public interest.  
 Cooperative decision-making.  
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion 
 
2.12.3. Institutionalisation of PPPs 
PPPs are usually complex projects that require expert technical knowledge to be 
successfully executed (Perera, 2016). However, several countries lack the technical 
capacity and expertise to undertake PPPs in a manner that protects the public interest 
and expedites delivery of the project (Ibid.). To address this issue, specialised 
institutions called PPP units, have been established for the specific purpose of 
providing technical, quality control and policy formulation advice to other government 
entities that are interested in pursuing PPPs (Istrate & Puentes, 2011). These units 
can reside at either national or subnational levels of government, where their functions 
are influenced by the cultural practices of the country in which they operate (Ibid.). The 
importance of these units extends beyond financial issues, such as the assessment of 
value-for-money and affordability, but also includes the alignment of the project to the 
government’s long-term priorities, the allocation of risk between the public and private 
sectors, and policy reform that will contribute to the successful implementation of the 
project (Ibid.).  
  




national or subnational ministry of finance with a dual mandate to regulate and develop 
the domestic PPP market (Ibid.). However, there seems to be growing international 
criticism of the practice of mandating PPP units, with both a regulatory and 
developmental responsibility (Polyakova & Vasilyeva, 2016). Critics believe that a 
direct conflict of interest arises when a PPP unit is expected to execute concurrent 
responsibilities of a regulatory and developmental nature, as the PPP unit effectively 
becomes ‘a referee and a player’ in the same transaction (Ibid.). It is held that these 
concurrent responsibilities can negate each other to the detriment of the PPP market, 
as the impartiality of the regulator will be undermined by undertaking a robust 
developmental role (Ibid.) 
 
2.12.4. Project identification, selection and appraisal  
Projects which can potentially be implemented as PPPs can be identified from three 
sources, namely: the normal public investment planning process (National Treasury, 
2017); sector reform processes (IBRD/WB (2017); and unsolicited proposals (Ittmann, 
2017). PPPs can be identified by the public sector through the public investment 
planning process according to the National Treasury (2017), which involves the 
prioritisation of projects intended to address specific societal needs and priorities. The 
IBRD/WB (2017) showed that PPPs can also be identified through sector reform 
processes, where the public sector can take deliberate action by introducing private 
sector participation, as a means of improving performance in an ailing sector, 
particularly where traditional procurement seems to be failing. Ittmann (2017) showed 
that PPPs can also be introduced by the private sector of its own accord through 
unsolicited proposals for consideration by the public sector. During the identification 
process, several governments employ a screening process to identify projects that can 
be implemented as PPPs (APM Group Limited, 2018). These governments usually 
conduct screening at different stages, and might involve screening all projects or only 
certain types of projects (Ibid.).  
 
It is regarded as good practice to appraise identified projects to ascertain that it makes 
sense to implement these as PPPs. Four criteria for the appraisal of PPPs are 
identified, namely: (1) feasibility and economic viability of a project (APM Group 
Limited, 2018); (2) commercial viability (Ittmann, 2017); (3) value-for-money 




The APM Group Limited (2018) showed that projects that are identified for 
implementation as PPPs, need to be able to fulfill policy priorities. This involves 
feasibility studies to ensure that the project is implementable, and economic appraisal 
to ensure that the project can be justified from a cost-benefit perspective (Ibid.). 
Commercial viability is used to assess whether or not a project makes financial sense 
from a business perspective, which would affect its ability to attract credible sponsors 
and lenders (Ittmann, 2017). It typically focusses on the project's ability to yield 
reasonable financial returns (Ibid.). These returns should be sufficiently adequate to 
stimulate private sector interest without creating a financial burden, either on the state 
through an offtake agreement, or the end-user through the user-pay principle (Ibid.).    
   
Value-for-money of a PPP is used to compare whether or not a PPP will deliver better 
quality to price ratio than other procurement options (Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015). 
To this end, the public sector comparator (PSC) is an intrinsic tool used by most PPP 
units worldwide, to determine value-for-money (Ibid.) The PSC is a hypothetical public 
sector project that provides the public sector with a frame of reference against which a 
PPP can be compared, and to assess which procurement option provides greater 
value for money (Ibid.). Through the PSC, a PPP unit can demonstrate quantitatively 
whether or not PPP are superior options to traditional procurement (Ibid.). A PSC plays 
a critical role in justifying a PPP, especially when the costs of the PSC outweigh the 
PPP and also serves as a powerful tool for justifying private sector involvement in 
public projects (Ibid.). However, there is growing criticism against the use of PSC, due 
to the high level of uncertainty in the results of this exercise (Thieriot & Dominguez, 
2015). Risks that affect the results are often difficult to determine and are often ignored, 
and the exercise is prone to manipulation (Ibid.). Furthermore, the amount of time and 
costs for conducting a PSC can be high (Ibid.). In some instances, PSC is not a viable 
option as the public sector does not have the funding required for projects and is 
therefore, irrelevant (Ibid.). Nevertheless, it is still advisable to have some form of 
value-for-money assessment of PPPs (Ibid.). 
 
Tiong (2013) indicated that fiscal responsibility focusses on whether public authorities 
will be able to afford the project in relation to other commitments of government 
spending. The Concord Coalition (2020: para.2) states ‘Fiscal responsibility is essential 




choices we make today -- or fail to make -- will determine what kind of future our 
children and grandchildren inherit 20 and 40 years from now’. Based on this discussion, 
PPPs can be identified and selected from multiple sources, provided they adhere to 
the following criteria, namely: projects must be economically viable; commercially 
(financially) viable; provide value-for-money; and promote fiscal responsibility.  
 
2.12.5. Identifying, assessing and allocating risk   
There exist several risks that can adversely affect a PPP according to the Global 
Infrastructure Hub (2016). These risks include the site risk; design, construction and 
commissioning risk; operations risk; demand and other commercial risks; regulatory or 
political risk; change in the legal framework; default risk; economic or financial risk; 
force majeure; and asset ownership (Ibid.). Taruvinga (2017) showed that risk can also 
emanate from other sources, which include the availability of labour and raw materials; 
contract variation; the environment; a faulty tender specification; ground conditions; 
insolvency of subcontractors and suppliers; the lack of commitment from a partner; the 
lack of experience in the PPP environment; land expropriation; residual risk; and 
unproven engineering technologies. Table 2.9 provides descriptions for all of these 
risks for PPPs. 
 
Table 2-9: Types of risk for PPP projects 
Type of risk Description  
Site  Site risk emanates from the availability and quality of the project site. This 
is typically a major risk for transport projects, which may entail high costs 
and a long duration for obtaining a site, issuing of permits, geological 
conditions, and environmental impact of the project. 
Design, construction, 
and commissioning 
Design, construction and commissioning risk emanates from delays or 
cost overruns in construction and inadequacies in design. 
Operation Operations risk emanates from disruptions to the operations or asset 
availability.     
Demand and other 
commercial risk 
Demand and other commercial risk emanate from usage, which is 
different from what was expected; e.g. fewer users than expected.    
Regulatory or political Regulatory or political risk emanates from regulatory or political 
decisions, such as a change in political administration and priorities.  
Change in the legal 
framework 
Change in the legal framework refers to the risk that emanates from 




Default  Defualt risk emanates from the inability of the private partner to financially 
or technically implement a project.   
Economic or financial  Economic or financial risk emanates from changes in interest rates, 
exchange rates or inflation.   
Force majeure  Force majeure refers to the uninsurable risk that emanates from external 
events beyond the control of the parties, such as natural disasters.  
Asset ownership  Asset ownership refers to the risk associated with the ownership of an 
asset, such as obsolescence of technology or the difference in the value 
of the asset at the end of the contract than what was expected.  
Availability of labour 
and raw materials 
Availability of labour and raw materials refers to risk that emanates from 
the unavailability of labour and raw materials from local sources, which 
may result in a need to import these factors for production, causing 




The insolvency of sub-contractors may result in the appointment of new 
subcontractors and cause delays in the project.   
Contract variation An incorrect, ambiguous contract with contradictions and improper risk 
allocation can lead to variations that can delay the project.   
Environment Stringent environmental protection laws have increased the risk of PPPs.  
Faulty tender 
specification 
Faulty tender specifications can lead to the procurement of sub-standard 
materials.  
Ground conditions Unknown ground conditions can increase project costs if they are found 
at a later stage to be unfavourable.  
Lack of commitment 
from partner 
Partners can renege on their commitments to the agreement, due to 
factors beyond their control or purposefully.  
Lack of experience in 
the PPP environment 
Lack of experience, especially on the public sector side, may lead to poor 
supervision, monitoring and evaluation of the PPP performance. 
Land expropriation Delays in the expropriation of land can increase the cost of the project.  
Residual risk Even when all efforts have been taken by parties to eliminate risks, some 
risks will remain.   
Unproven engineering 
technologies 
Unproven technologies present a risk as they have not been used or 
tested before.  
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion   
 
The various types of risks can have a different impact on a project, such as delays, 
cost overruns or even project failure according to the IBRD/WB (2017). As a result, it 
is advisable to assess, then prioritise risks based on their probable impact on a project 
(Ibid.). However, Okoro, Musonda and Agumba (2018) hold the view that the various 




be seen as being equally important. The APM Group (2020b) also showed that 
although an assessment of risk can be done, either quantitatively or qualitatively, a 
qualitative approach seems to be the most preferred. It indicates that a popular option 
for assessing risk qualitatively involves the use of a risk register (Ibid.). Land purchase, 
site and demand risk, are the major types of risk for transport projects according to the 
Global Infrastructure Hub (2016), whereas the World Bank Group (2019b), identifies 
latent defects in brownfield projects, as the major risk for projects in this sector.   
 
Taruvinga (2017) shows that risk in a PPP should be allocated to the party best suited 
to mitigate the potential consequences associated with the various forms of risk, should 
take responsibility to enhance the prospect of successfully implementing the project. 
the inability to allocate risk appropriately between parties, can have dire consequences 
for PPPs, such as project failure according to Mouraviev and Kakabadse (2014).  
 
It is also not ideal to allocate or transfer more risk than necessary to the private sector, 
as this could increase the cost of the project (Taruvinga, 2017). Risk is one of the 
factors that drives the cost of capital and affects the affordability of the PPP (Tiong, 
2013). This is on the basis that the private sector charges a premium for carrying risk 
(Ibid.).  
 
The literature outlines the following principles for allocating risk:  
I. Risk should preferably be allocated before the start of a project (Taruvinga, 
2017); 
II. Allocation of risk to the party best able to control the likelihood of the risk 
occurring (Ibid.). For example, the private party typically bears the technical 
expertise required for construction, therefore, any delays relating to construction 
should be carried by this party (Ibid.); 
III. Allocation of risk to the party best able to control the impact of the risk on project 
outcomes (Cruz et al., 2015). For example, the private party can mitigate the 
risk posed by earthquakes to a construction project through the use of 
innovation, design and technology (Ibid.); and 
IV. Allocation of risk to the party that can absorb risk at the lowest cost, if the 
likelihood and impact cannot be controlled (Tiong, 2013). Typically, 




to several taxpayers compared to the private party, which would have to spread 
their risk to a few shareholders (Ibid.).        
 
2.12.6. Finance  
A project needs to be ‘bankable’ according to Ittmann (2017) to be able to raise funds. 
This means that lenders need to be confident that a project will be able to service its 
debt, which is demonstrated by its ability to generate operating cash flows that can 
cover debt service and still produce a reasonable margin of return (Ibid.). Lenders 
typically determine bankability by focussing on the technical and financial viability of a 
project (Ibid). However, Taruvinga (2017) showed that on other occasions, risk 
allocation is also taken into consideration when determining the bankability of a project.  
 
Tiong (2013) was of the view that due care should be taken that the private party is not 
pressured into taking more risk than necessary, as their lenders are likely to try and 
reduce their risk exposure. Lenders will typically reduce the amount they are willing to 
lend if the private party is carrying too much risk (Ibid.). As a consequence, this will 
increase the amount of equity or capital contributions required by the project to 
compensate for the shortfall in debt finance, and in turn, escalate expectations of 
shareholders for an increase in the amount of return to be generated for their increased 
exposure to risk. 
 
It is advisable according to Mandri-Perrott (n.d.) to finance PPPs with a high debt to 
equity ratio to achieve high leverage. Higher leverage allows equity investors to 
achieve higher returns and makes it easier to raise debt than equity (Ibid.). Zapparov 
(2015) showed that most governments are more likely to provide debt investors with 
protection, as opposed to equity investors, which serves as an incentive for higher 
leverage (Ibid.). For example, a government is likely to provide guarantees on demand 
to ensure that revenue can cover debt service (Ibid.). However, Zapparov (2015) also 
showed that projects with high leverage are susceptible to default and bankruptcy. 
Therefore, to ensure sustainable leverage and sufficient equity shareholding, 
governments can prescribe minimum equity ratio for PPPs, although they must be 
aware that restricting an investor’s ability to determine the capital structure could 






Ittmann (2017) indicated that competition between bidders should be encouraged in 
identifying the best proposal and partner for a PPP. Competition creates efficiency and 
lowers costs in the provision of public capital projects by allowing for the comparison 
of different proposals, where the proposal that offers the most value-for-money, is 
typically regarded as the best option (Ibid.).  
 
Various countries adopt different approaches to promote competition between bidders. 
For example, Australia prescribes pre-qualification of at least three bidders to create a 
shortlist of a few high quality and credible bidders, who have the technical and financial 
capability to deliver on the demands of a PPP project (IBRD/WB, 2014). In contrast, 
Singapore discourages the pre-qualification of bidders as it perceives this as potentially 
limiting competition (Ibid.). In addition to competitive bidding and pre-qualification, 
Khaderi, Shukor, Bakri and Mahbub (2018) showed that other methodologies can be 
used for PPP tenders, such as invited tendering, registered lists and negotiated 
tendering.   
 
The renegotiation of contracts is also discouraged as it undermines competition (Tiong, 
2013). Through predatory bidding, a bidder can submit a proposal, understating the 
likely cost of delivering a project to undermine other bidders and secure an award for 
the project, only to return at a later stage demanding renegotiation of terms (Ibid). 
Taruvinga (2017) showed that renegotiation, which is often a lengthy process, can also 
lead to an increase in the cost of the project. As a result, renegotiation to promote 
competition should generally be discouraged. Specifying outputs instead of inputs, also 
keeps competition open according to Aerts et al. (2014). This allows bidders to be free 
to prescribe inputs of their choice, without any constraints on the use of alternatives, 
which would not necessarily have been considered through traditional procurement.  
 
2.12.8. Innovation 
PPPs characteristically offer greater incentives for innovation than traditional 
procurement, as outputs are specified instead of inputs (Arata et al., 2016). This allows 
the private party to explore alternative approaches, techniques, designs, and 




(Ibid.). Furthermore, required services are usually bundled together, which 
necessitates an innovative and holistic approach to service delivery (IBRD/WB, 2014).   
 
The literature shows several areas in which innovative approaches to implement road 
infrastructure concessions through PPPs, can be realised, namely: 
 
I. Innovation in design; (Tiong, 2013) 
II. Innovation in construction (Ibid.);    
III. Technological innovations (Ibid.); 
IV. Environmental impact (Ibid.); 
V. Use of alternative building materials (Ibid.); 
VI. Innovation in financial structuring (Okoro et al., 2017); 
VII. Collection of revenue (Ittmann, 2017); 
VIII. Safety (Arata et al., 2016); 
IX. Travel demand management (Ibid.); and 
X. Land-use planning (Ibid.). 
  
2.12.9. Management of the transaction process 
The transaction process involves the selection of the most suitable private party that 
will implement the project, and the identification of the most effective and efficient 
solution that will address the project’s objectives (Bloomfield & Ahern, 2011). Iossa and 
Martimort (2012) showed that this process involves some steps, which include the 
following:  
 
I. Outlining the process and criteria for the selection of a contractor when deciding 
on a procurement strategy; 
II. Marketing the project to prospective bidders, lenders and subcontractors; 
III. Identification of qualified bidders, which can be done before inviting proposals 
or as part of the bid process; 
IV. Managing the bid process; and 
V. Reaching financial closure.         
 
The management of a PPP transaction is regarded as a complex process and plays 




the amounts that will be paid by the public institution and/or fees by the users 
(Bloomfield & Ahern, 2011). This is achieved through a competitive and transparent 
bidding process (Ibid.). However, in certain instances, it is ideal for the parties to 
negotiate directly, provided the reasons furnished for following this route, are not 
capricious objectives (Iossa & Martimort, 2012). For example, direct negotiations can 
be considered when implementing extensions for contracts that are already in place 
(Ibid.).                 
 
2.12.10. Contract design 
Contract design provides the foundation for what will either be a successful or 
disastrous PPP partnership (Verhoest et al., 2013). A contract is a legal document that 
outlines the relationship between parties, their respective rights and responsibilities, 
the allocation of risk, and processes to deal with change (Ibid.). In addition to the PPP 
contract, PPPs typically involve some other contractual agreements between the 
various role players, such as additional contracts between the SPV company, 
Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) contractor, lenders and equity 
investors (IBRD/WB, 2014).    
  
The literature outlines the following factors that need to be considered when designing 
contracts, namely: the standardisation of contracts (IBRD/WB, 2014); optimum 
contract duration (Verhoest et al., 2013); performance-based contracts (Ibid.); dispute 
resolution (Diaz Reus Limited Liability Partnership (Diaz Reus LLP), n.d.); the 
specification of payment and adjustment mechanisms (Verhoest et al., 2013); and 
provision for contract termination (IBRD/WB, 2017).  
 
Several countries, including South Africa, have adopted the standardisation of certain 
elements of PPP contract design, as part of their strategy to minimise the cost and time 
associated with the preparation of contracts (IBRD/WB, 2014). This has contributed to 
the incremental improvement in contracts over time, through a process that allows for 
elements of a contract that are beneficial to be retained, and those which are not, to 
be discarded through an iterative process (Ibid). The World Bank Group (2019b) further 
shows that although a deviation from standard contracts may present some benefits in 
some instances, project failure can often be traced back to a deviation as demonstrated 




London’s underground transportation infrastructure.    
  
PPP contracts typically have a defined contract duration according to Verhoest et al. 
(2013). Determining the optimum contract duration is important, as there exists a 
relationship between the time it takes to plan and implement a project and the cost of 
the project (Ibid.). A review of the literature reveals some options for determining the 
contract duration, which include the following:   
 
1) The first option involves the determination of the term of the contract by the 
state, based on what it deems to be an adequate period for the private party to 
achieve its returns (IBRD/WB, 2017).  
2) The second option involves the determination of tariffs or annual payments by 
the state, with the contract term being determined by the bidders (Ibid.).  
3) The third option involves the endogenous determination of the contract term by 
inviting bids, based on the least present value of revenue (LPVR), where the 
successful bidder is the one who demonstrates the ability to reach this value in 
the shortest period (Ibid.). This is achieved by demonstrating the ability to 
generate high traffic volumes, which results in a shorter concession period 
(Ibid.). This approach is recommended in managing risks associated with fixed-
term contracts (Ibid.). 
4) The fourth option involves the use of the Critical Path Method (CPM). ‘In project 
management, a critical path is the sequence of dependent tasks that form the 
longest duration, allowing you to determine the most efficient timeline possible 
to complete a project’ (Slate, 2018: para 21). This method seeks to logically 
illustrate the optimum amount of time required to complete activities associated 
with a contract (Ibid.).  
5) The fifth option involves engineering judgement and experience (Smartsheet, 
2019). Slate shows that although CPM does well in outlining the logical 
sequence of activities associated with a contract, it still requires input data, such 
as the duration of individual activities to determine the entire duration of the 
contract (Slate, 2018). It is within this context that engineering judgement and 
experience play a major role in providing the input data of individual activities 




6) The sixth option involves production rates, which refer to the quantity of work 
performed for a unit of time (Hanks, 2019). Production rates are commonly used 
in repetitive work, such as excavation or bricklaying where the amount of work 
that can be completed per unit of time, can easily be determined based on 
historical evidence and/or industry benchmarks (Ibid.)   
 
Verhoest et al. (2013) showed that the contract needs to indicate what deliverables are 
expected from the private party, such as the quality and quantity of assets and services 
to be provided. To this effect, performance indicators and targets are typically attached 
as an annexure to the agreement (Ibid.). The IBRD/WB (2014), showed that unlike 
traditional procurement, performance should be specified in terms of output. These 
output specifications should be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely 
(SMART) (Ibid.). Arata et al. (2016) were of the view that consequences and penalties 
for failure to achieve targets should be indicated and be enforceable. For example, 
payment deductions could be implemented for poor performance (Ibid.). Under 
extreme circumstances, step-in rights refer to the ability of one party to replace another 
and take over their responsibilities in the event of a serious breach of contract, so that 
the project can continue (Designing Buildings Limited, 2019). Furthermore, these may 
also be exercised by the public party temporarily, such as instances where service to 
the public is threatened through the continued under-performance of the private 
partner (IBRD/WB, 2014).            
 
Given the number of role players involved in a typical PPP project, coupled with the 
long-term duration, it is inevitable that disputes will arise during the lifecycle of the 
project (Diaz Reus LLP, n.d.). For example, disputes during the construction phase 
can disrupt the progress of the project, resulting in cost overruns and delays, therefore, 
mechanisms that allow for the speedy and efficient resolution of disputes are 
necessary (Ibid.). Dispute resolution methods, include mediation, litigation, domestic 
and international arbitration (Tiong, 2013; Diaz Reus LLP, n.d.), and recourse to a 
sector regulator (IBRD/WB, 2014), all of which have their advantages and 
disadvantages. Although mediation is a formal process, unlike international arbitration 
and litigation, it is not legally binding to the parties (Diaz Reus LLP, n.d.). It is regarded 
as the most convenient and cost-effective dispute resolution method, as both parties 




contrast, litigation is expensive due to the number of legal processes involved (Tiong, 
2013). Furthermore, parties are not in control of the process (Ibid.). Litigation is 
discouraged if the parties intend to maintain some form of the relationship moving into 
the future, as it can have adverse consequences on the relationship (IBRD/WB, 2014). 
Unlike litigation, international arbitration is less costly and time-consuming, and is 
gaining popularity as the most preferred dispute resolution method (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, international arbitration seems to be preferred to litigation by investors to 
resolve disputes in projects being undertaken in developing countries (Ibid.). This 
seems to be due to a lack of confidence in the court systems of developing countries 
(Ibid.).        
 
Verhoest et al. (2013) stated that payment mechanisms specify how the private party 
will be remunerated. Adjustment mechanisms affect these payments by considering 
performance and the risk factors (Ibid.). From the literature, payment mechanisms 
were identified, such as user-charges (Verhoest et al., 2013), performance-based 
government payments (Pratap & Chakrabarti, 2017), a combination of user charges 
and government payments (IBRD/WB, 2014), and bonuses, penalties or fines (Tiong, 
2013). The IBRD/WB et al. (2014) showed that a payment mechanism could also 
include some or all of these elements, coupled with payment schedules and a mode 
of payment.  
 
The IBRD/WB (2017) stipulated that provision needs to be made in the contract design 
for early termination and this can typically occur under three circumstances, namely: 
(1) when the private party defaults on the contract; (2) When the public party elects to 
terminate early, due to its default or in the interest of public interest; and (3) in the event 
of an external event, over which the parties do not have control. However, Johnson 
(2019) shows that a contract can also be terminated under the following 
circumstances, namely: (1) rescission of the contract, if it is discovered that a party 
misrepresented itself or provided fraudulent credentials to secure the contract; (2) 
termination by prior agreement on specified reasons; and (3) on completion of the 
contract when all the obligations have been fulfilled. 




2.12.11. Management of the contract  
Contract management and the associated performance is defined by the Chartered 
Institute of Procurement and Supply (CIPS) (n.d: para.1) as ‘ a continuous procurement 
process that ensures suppliers-and buyers adhere to their agreed contractual 
obligations, along with negotiating any future changes that need to take place’[sic]. It 
entails activities such as planning and scoping; establishing good relationships with 
stakeholders; administration; relationship management; performance management; 
payment and incentives; risk and resilience; contract development; supplier 
development; supplier relationship management; exit and termination; and asset 
management (Ibid.). Mazibuko and Fourie (2017) showed that contract management 
allows for the maximisation of value for money by optimising efficiency, effectiveness, 
and economy of the service, as described in the contract. It also assists with proactive 
management, which anticipates future requirements and responses to changes in 
circumstances as they occur throughout the lifecycle of the project (Ibid).   
 
The IBRD/WB (2017) showed that contract management is a competency that resides 
in the public partner. It involves the establishment of a contract management structure 
that is responsible for contract management, including how it will manage the 
relationship with the private party. This involves the appointment of a contract manager 
by the public party and or contract management team (Ibid). The contract manager will 
need to understand, over which issues they have decision-making autonomy, and on 
which they would need to solicit approval from a higher office and/or public institution, 
such as a ministry of finance (Ibid). It is advisable that they are allocated sufficient 
resources, have the requisite skills, and appropriate seniority to successfully fulfill their 
mandate (Ibid.). The contract manager according to Pratap and Chakrabarti (2017) is 
also expected to establish contract management and communication protocols for the 
relationship.  
 
The role of other entities that are involved in the management of the contract, also 
need to be specified (Pratap & Chakrabarti, 2017). These include the public sector 
institutions, such as sector regulators who are mainly tasked with ensuring that service 
standards and changes in tariffs are following the regulations (Ibid.). Pratap and 
Chakrabarti (2017) showed that more than 200 infrastructure regulators have been 




telecommunications and electricity sectors, with a few in the transport and water 
sectors (Ibid.). The contract management structure should also plan for continuity as 
the contract is most likely to outlast the contract management team (Ibid.). This will 
ensure a seamless and an uninterrupted management of the contract.  
 
The contract manager is tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that there is regular 
monitoring of compliance with the contract and performance targets, by the private 
party throughout the term of the contract (IBRD/WB, 2017). Similarly, the contract 
manager needs to monitor that the public sector party also complies with its end of the 
agreement, to ensure a successful project (Ibid.). Continuous monitoring will ensure 
that the contract manager can identify and mitigate risks and reduce their overall 
impact on the project (Ibid.).  
 
It is the view of Fagundes (2016), that through the use of key performance indicators 
(KPIs), the contract management process can highlight areas that require 
improvement over the entire lifecycle of the project. KPIs assist with monitoring and 
tracking the performance of parties involved in the PPP through the various phases of 
the project (Ibid.). Although there are several KPIs available, he regards the following 
six as the most important: (1) annualised contract value (ACV), which is a KPI that 
aggregates the value of all remaining contracts; (2) terminated contract remaining 
value (TRV), which prevents revenue loss by indicating outstanding bills, unbilled 
amounts and credit amounts; (3) order value variance from the original contract value 
(OVV), which highlights areas for improvement, such as contract goal assessment; (4) 
vendor fraud, which increases awareness of unnecessary costs; (5) compliance, which 
is a KPI that indicates if the organisation needs improvement with contract 
management; and (6) quality/complaints resolved, which is a KPI that indicates the 
percentage of complaints resolved and the time taken to resolve them (Ibid.). However, 
Hartwell (2016) held the view that a company leaves a lot to chance by not monitoring 
the following ten KPIs, namely: (1) cycle time from contract initiation to signature; (2) 
delay in approvals; (3) trends by type, geography, or other characteristics; (4) contract 
volume per customer, partner, programme, type and geography; (5) qualitative 
contract value assessments and scoring; (6) historical trend performance analysis; (7) 
contract obligation performance; (8) deviation of contract terms from standard clauses; 




authorisation and signature approvals.  
 
The final tasks for a contract manager involves managing the transition to end a PPP 
contract and hand over the asset (Pratap & Chakrabarti, 2017). These two aspects 
need to be included as termination provisions in the PPP contract (IBRD/WB, 2017). 
To realise a successful termination of the contract and handover of the asset, the CIPS 
(n.d.) prescribed that there should be a sign-off procedure that is agreed to in advance, 
which may include the linkage of the asset transfer to final payment, proof of 
stakeholder acceptance and a dispute resolution process. Gajurel (2013) showed that 
the asset typically remains in the possession of the private party during the contract 
and is transferred upon the expiry of the said contract to the public sector. However, in 
certain instances, the asset can remain in the hands of the private party for several 
years after the contract has expired (Ibid.). If the public sector intends to continue with 
the same suppliers at the end of the project term, then this should be specified at the 
beginning of the contract and not when it terminates (CIPS, n.d.).   
 
2.12.12. Strategy to deal with an incomplete contract  
An incomplete contract according to Mansor and Rashid (2016: pg.93) ‘… is a contract 
that fails to state all the parties’ rights and obligations, has gaps, missing provisions, 
and ambiguities in its terms and conditions’. Given the long-term and complex nature 
of PPP contracts, high transaction costs, and the dynamic environment in which PPPs 
operate, some circumstances that might affect the project might not be anticipated 
(Ibid.). As a result, the PPP contract cannot make provision for all possible 
circumstances and risks (Ibid.). It is for this reason that PPP contracts are largely 
regarded as being incomplete (Ibid.). To deal with this issue, Mansor and Rashid 
(2016) were of the view that a degree of flexibility be incorporated in the contract to 
avoid having to renegotiate or terminate the said contract. However, such flexibility 
should not compromise the certainty of the contract or give rise to opportunistic 
behaviour (Ibid.). This can be achieved through strong contract management 
institutions that can design and review contracts accordingly (Ibid.). Furthermore, a 
strategy for dealing with an incomplete contract includes developing trust, ethical 
conduct, information sharing, and developing a strong culture of cooperation and 





2.13. Conclusion  
This chapter indicates that several practices are regarded as best practice, due to their 
ability to contribute to the proliferation of PPPs. These practices deal with different 
aspects, such as the regulation, governance, institutionalisation, and the financing of 
PPPs; of which a detailed list is outlined in Table 2.10. They have been identified 
through the literature review entailing the global perspectives and experience of PPP 
practitioners in the public and private sectors, as well as international and academic 
institutions.  
   
Table 2-10: Detailed list of PPP practices 
Category  Practices  
Regulation  Establishment of a legal framework for PPPs (Tiong, 2013; IBRD/WB, 
2017).  
 An adequate definition of the scope of the PPP legal framework 
(Tiong, 2013; IBRD/WB, 2014). 
 Clear legislation, regulations and policies on implementing 
procedures (IBRD/WB, 2017; the APM Group Limited, 2018). 
 Incentive-based regulations (Tiong, 2013; Meng et al., 2015)  
 Regulation by contract (IBRD/WB, 2017). 
 
Governance    
 
 Strong political commitment and support (Boardman et al., 2015; Wei 
et al, 2015; Ittmann, 2017). 
 Oversight by the legislature (Boardman et al., 2015; Wei et al, 2015; 
Ittmann, 2017). 
 Audits by supreme auditing institutions (Boardman et al., 2015; Wei 
et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). 
 Transparency of processes and proactive disclosure of project 
information (Boardman et al., 2015; Wei et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). 
 Supplementing contract disclosure with project summaries 
(Boardman et al., 2015; Wei et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). 
 Extensive public participation and consultation to promote the public 
interest (Boardman et al., 2015; Wei et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). 
 Cooperative decision-making and trust (Boardman et al., 2015; Wei 









 Skills transfer and capacity development of public officials (Makofane, 
2013; Aigbavboa et al., 2014).     
 Establishment of dedicated PPP units at national and subnational 






 Appropriate project selection and pre-assessment (Telang & 
Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015). 
 An iterative approach towards the screening of projects (Churakov, 
2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014). 
 Quality of service can be readily defined and measured (Bidne, Kirby, 
Luvela, Shattuck, Standley & Welker, n.d.; De Vries & Yehoue, 2013; 
Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015; Thieriot and Dominguez, 2015).  
 Prioritisation of commercially viable projects (Ittmann, 2017).  
 Provision of viability gap funding (Telang & Kutumbale, 2014). 
 Use of the public sector comparator to determine the value of money 
(Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015). 
 High threshold of project cost (IBRD/WB, 2017). 
 Prioritisation of long-term projects with concession periods of up to 
thirty years (Tiong, 2013). 





 Allocation of risk to the party best suited to deal with it (Taruvinga, 
2017). 
 Adequate transfer of risk to the private partner (Churakov, 2014; 
Pereira, 2014). 
 Mirroring of risk allocation into the contract structure (Churakov, 2014; 
Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014). 
 Continuous risk assessment over the lifecycle of the project, 
especially for longer-term infrastructure projects (Churakov, 2014; 
Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014). 
 Private and public advantage and their associated negotiating power, 
should be estimated based on the capital gain arising from the 
investment (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 
2014). 
 Fair allocation of expected capital gains from the investment to the 
public and private sector through a robust risk analysis (Churakov, 







 Establishment and or identification of long-term financing instruments 
(Tiong, 2013; Ittmann, 2017). 
 Establishment of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) (Mandri-Perrott, 
n.d.). 
 Project finance versus corporate finance (Ibid.). 
 Developing a financing strategy aimed at providing capital for the 
objectives of each stage of project implementation, from the most 
appropriate source with the most appropriate financial instruments at 
the most appropriate time of the project’s lifecycle.  
 Using the algorithm of the fund’s source selection as the basis for 
adjusting the financing strategy, which considers multiple criteria to 
make an informed determination of the appropriate funding source. 
(Churakov, 2014; Pereira 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et 
al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017). 
 Establishment of a regional credit rating agency, which provides 
investors with information on positive and negative situations in 
finance (Tiong, 2013).  
 High debt to equity ratio in financing (Zapparov, 2015). 
 Instead of providing government guarantees, which raise the cost of 
capital, the state itself, can borrow at rates lower than the private 
sector (Pereira, 2014). 
 The establishment of a lifecycle fund or maintenance reserve, 
accounts for the replacement of components with lifecycles shorter 




 Promotion of competition in the market (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 
2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015). 
 Selection of a preferred bidder based on competition to offer better 
whole-life costs and quality, to meet users’ requirements compared to 
the one with lower construction costs (Ibid.).   
 Measures for dealing with unsolicited proposals and intellectual 
property (Bidne et al., n.d.; Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015). 
 
Innovation  Technical and service innovation (Aerts et al., 2014; IBRD/WB, 2014). 
 The creativity of the private partner (Aerts et al., 2014; IBRD/WB, 
2014). 
 Introduction of new and environmentally friendly technologies (Aerts 





Management of the 
transaction process 
 
 Appointment of transaction advisors (Bloomfield & Ahern, 2011; Iossa 
& Martimort, 2012; IBRD/WB et al., 2014). 
 Management of the bid process (Bloomfield & Ahern, 2011; Iossa & 
Martimort, 2012; IBRD/WB et al., 2014). 
 
Contract design  
 
 Standardisation of contracts (IBRD/WB, 2014). 
 Performance-based contracts (Tiong, 2013). 
 Dispute resolution (Ibid.). 
 Specification of payment and adjustment mechanisms (Verhoest et 
al., 2013). 
 Provision for contract termination (IBRD/WB, 2017). 
 
Management of the 
contract  
 
 Establishment of contract management structures (IBRD/WB, 2017). 
 Adequate monitoring and evaluation of performance (Gaffey, 2010; 
Johnston & Kouzmin, 2010).   
 Expiry of the contract and handover of the asset (Pratap & 
Chakrabarti, 2017), 
 




 Standardisation of contracts (Mansor & Rashid, 2016), 
 A multidisciplinary team of transaction advisors (IBRD/WB, 2017),  
 





CHAPTER 3 : PPP PRACTICES IN THE BRICS COUNTRIES 
 
3.1. Introduction   
Chapter three provides a thematic review of the literature on PPP practices in Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). It gives context to the study and defines 
the research problem being explored by providing a basis for comparing PPP practice 
in these countries to international best practice, and revealing the number of transport 
PPPs that have reached financial close over the past fifteen years, which demonstrates 
the extent of this problem. Furthermore, it reveals gaps in previous research that need 
to be investigated to address the research questions. The review of literature reveals 
the following themes for discussion, namely: the role of PPPs in unlocking transport 
capital investment; the prevalence of transport PPPs in BRICS; conformity of the 
BRICS countries to international best practice; reasons for the high uptake of transport 
PPPs in the BRICS countries; and reasons for the low uptake of transport PPPs in 
South Africa.    
 
3.2. Role of PPPs in unlocking transport capital investment  
The South African government in the past has largely been responsible for financing 
the public-sector capital projects (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015). However, it has realised 
that its financial capacity is no longer adequate and requires some form of private 
investment to complement and augment identified shortfalls. This is demonstrated by 
a decline in the capacity of the state to invest in its capital projects, due to factors, such 
as the slow economic growth, policy uncertainty, rising debt, and higher interest rates. 
As a result, National Treasury (2016a) was of the view that the current trajectory for 
the financing of public infrastructure in the country is unsustainable, as it is over-reliant 
on public sector investment, with marginal participation by the private sector. In 
particular, the decline in the capacity of the state to finance transport capital projects 
presents several challenges for economic growth and development (Ibid.).  
 
Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) showed that governments across the globe, acknowledge 
the significance of transport capital investment in unlocking trade, reducing the cost of 
doing business and bolstering economic growth. This is based on the view that the 
efficient movement of goods and services within and beyond the borders of a country, 




this reason that emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India and China have 
prioritised transport capital investment as a key pillar of their economic development 
plans (Chen et al., 2013; Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; 
Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015).       
 
Given the strong correlation between transport capital investment and economic 
development, it is expected that a deficit in finance for transport capital projects will 
entail negative consequences for the South African economy (National Treasury, 
2016a). The internal and external trade potential of the country will be retarded. This 
is due to an inability to expand the existing capacity of the country’s transport network, 
required for the movement of goods and services from where they are produced to the 
markets. Also, maintenance and operations of the existing transport infrastructure will 
be affected, as it requires regular reinvestment to sustain its current capacity (Ibid.). 
An inability to maintain this infrastructure will further retard this limited capacity and 
trade potential of the country. Further consequences, include job losses due to the 
inability of the economy to grow, and inflation of the price of goods and services. 
 
It is upon this basis that PPPs can play a significant role in unlocking transport capital 
investment in South Africa. PPPs are recognised for their ability to leverage financial 
resources from both the public and private sectors, given the current overreliance on 
state funding. Furthermore, PPPs are also able to leverage public and private sector 
efficiencies through the appropriate allocation of risk to the party best placed to mitigate 
such risk (Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 
2015). This reveals that both the public and private sector have vested interests in the 
success of the project, as they both face possible consequences if such projects fail; 
this serves as an incentive for improved performance by both parties. 
 
3.3. Prevalence of transport PPPs in the BRICS countries 
A review of the literature shows that there is a high prevalence of PPPs in the transport 
sectors of the four largest developing economies compared to South Africa (Chen et 
al., 2013; Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; 
Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015; GTAC, 2016). This is demonstrated in Figure 3.1, 
which indicates that for the period 1990 to 2013, there was a greater prevalence of 




South Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific where Brazil, India, and China are the largest 
economies (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015). However, sub-Saharan Africa, which 















Figure 3-1: Total number of transport projects with private sector participation 
across developing regions from 1990 to 2013 
Source: Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) 
 
A custom query of the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database 
also reveals that there has been a greater uptake of transport PPPs in the four largest 
developing economies compared to South Africa (WBG, 2019a). It shows for the period 
2004 to 2019, 463 transport PPPs have reached financial closure in India, 168 in 
China, 88 in Brazil, and 17 in Russia (Ibid.). It also shows that in South Africa only 
three projects have reached financial closure over the same period (Ibid.). It is not 
apparent why South Africa’s experience has been different from the four largest 
developing economies and this presents a gap in the study. South Africa’s PPP unit 
also maintains a detailed repository of PPPs undertaken in the country (National 
Treasury, 2017). This includes completed PPPs and PPP projects that have been 
signed off for future implementation (Ibid.). An inspection of this data repository also 
shows that over the past twenty years the uptake of PPPs in the transport sector 
remains relatively low in comparison to PPPs in other sectors (Ibid.).  




to infrastructure projects in other sectors (Ibid.). For example, the Gautrain Rapid Rail 
Link project, a provincial PPP, is regarded to date as the largest PPP project to have 
ever been undertaken on African soil, with a project cost above ZAR 23 billion rand. 
This comprised 87 percent capital contribution by the state, two percent equity 
contribution by the special purpose vehicle (SPV) and 11 percent debt raised from the 
capital markets (Ibid.). Dachs (2011) shows the Gautrain Rapid Rail link project has 
been lauded as being a ‘success story’ for PPP in the transport sector, despite initial 
criticism. However, this has not contributed to bolstering the uptake of PPPs in the 
country’s transport sector.  
 
3.4. Conformity of the BRICS countries to international best practice  
In ascertaining the degree of conformity of the BRICS countries to various aspects of 
PPP best practice, Tables 3.1 to 3.12 have been generated from the literature and are 
displayed in the subsequent sections. 
 
3.4.1. Regulation 
International best practice prescribes the establishment of a legal framework for the 
regulation of PPPs (Tiong, 2013; IBRD/WB, 2017). By contrasting the regulation of 
PPPs in the BRICS countries to international best practice, it is revealed that all of the 
BRICS countries have established legal frameworks for PPPs, albeit at differing levels 
of maturity (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 
2015; Ittmann, 2017). Brazil and Russia also appear to be the only BRICS countries 
with specific legislation for PPPs (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014).   
 
A further review indicates that Brazil enacted legislation in 2004 for the regulation of 
PPPs namely; ‘Law No. 11.079, or PPP Law’ (Pereira, 2014: pg.28). Akin to South 
Africa, this law also affords Brazil’s federation system of governance, which involves 
federal, state and local governments the authority to enter into PPPs (Ibid, 2014). In 
contrast, the regulation of PPPs in Russia received support for a federal law on PPPs 
in 2013, which came into effect in 2016 (Churakov, 2014; Polyakova & Vasilyeva, 
2016). The literature indicates that the country also regulates PPPs at the federal and 
regional level of government, however, it is not apparent whether or not it regulates 
them at the local level of government, as in the case of Brazil and South Africa 




2017). There is no specific legislation and regulations for PPPs in India according to 
Telang and Kutumbale (2014). However, a draft national PPP policy of 2011 was 
circulated for comments in the country but had not yet come into effect (Ibid.). PPPs 
appear to be regulated through other administrative and commercial laws and 
regulations of the country (Ibid.). Meng et al. (2015) also showed that China does not 
have a specific law which governs PPPs, however, regulates PPPs through the 
Administrative Measures on Concession of Infrastructure and Public Utilities Projects, 
which were adopted in 2015. Similarly, South Africa does not have a specific law that 
governs PPPs, however, the country has made provision within its overarching Public 
Finance Management Act No.1 of 1999 (PFMA) and Treasury Regulation 16, for the 
regulation of PPPs undertaken at the national and provincial tiers. There is further 
provision for the regulation of PPPs undertaken at the municipal tier, using the 
Municipal Finance Management Act No.56 of 2003 (MFMA) and its regulations, and 
the Municipal Systems Act No.32 of 2003 (MSA) (Ittmann 2017; National Treasury 
2017).  
 
The IBRD/WB (2014) and Ittmann (2017) indicated that even with the absence of a 
specific law for PPPs, it seems as though the regulatory framework for PPPs in South 
Africa, is more developed than the other BRICS countries. This could be attributed to 
the maturity of the country’s regulatory framework for PPPs compared to the other 
BRICS countries, which have mostly adopted regulatory frameworks in the past few 
years (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; 
Ittmann, 2017). However, it is not apparent whether or not a specific law for PPPs is 
required in South Africa or if it would add any value to the current regulatory framework 
for PPPs. This presented a gap and was investigated as part of the study.      
 
Ittmann (2017) holds the view that South Africa’s regulatory framework overregulates 
the country’s PPP market as a consequence of the need to comply with multiple 
regulations that regulate the various aspects of a PPP, e.g. the regulation of 
environmental, health and safety aspects. This view is supported by the President of 
the Republic who stated ‘… the public-private partnership legal environment requires 
revision’ (The Presidency, 2020: para.45). Overregulation is consequential for the PPP 
market, such as deterring private sector participation in PPP projects, due to the 




However, it is not apparent whether or not other transport industry players share the 
view that the PPP market is overregulated (Aigbavboa et al., 2014). The lack of views 
on this issue presents a gap and will form part of this study.  
 
International best practice also prescribes an adequate definition of the scope of the 
PPP legal agreement (Tiong, 2013; IBRD/WB, 2014). Brazil, Russia, China and South 
Africa seem to adhere to this requirement, as their respective PPP laws and regulations 
work in conjunction with other sector laws and regulations (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 
2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). This is demonstrated by the fact that PPP 
laws in these countries are implemented in conjunction with other laws, such as 
environmental laws and regulations, laws governing land ownership and acquisition, 
licensing requirements for foreign firms, empowerment of indigenous people, and 
employment laws (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). 
 
The IBRD/WB (2014) and Pereira (2014) suggested that Brazil and South Africa have 
well-formulated legislation and regulations with clear implementing procedures. 
However, Meng et al. (2015) and Polyakova and Vasilyeva (2016) suggested that 
regulations and policies on implementing procedures of PPPs in Russia and China 
lack clarity. It is also apparent that all the BRICS countries apply incentive-based 
regulations, which are referred to as performance-based regulations (Churakov, 2014; 
Pereira, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury 2017; Ittmann 2017). The literature 
shows that commercial agreements are regulated by contracts in all the BRICS 
countries (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 
2015; National Treasury, 2017; Ittmann, 2017). Based on the above discussion, Table 
3.1 displays the level of conformity of the BRICS countries to best practice of 
regulations. It indicates that Brazil has the highest level of conformity, followed by 
South Africa and Russia, China then India.    
 
Table 3-1: Conformity of the BRICS countries to best practice of regulations 
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Regulation       















An adequate definition of the scope of the PPP 
legal framework 
 
√ √  √ √ 
Clear legislation, regulations and policies on 
implementing procedures  
 
√      √ 
Incentive-based regulations 
 √ √ √ √ √ 
Regulations by contract  
 √ √ √ √ √ 
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
3.4.2. Governance  
International best practice prescribes for strong political support and commitment for 
PPPs (Tiong, 2013; IBRD/WB, 2017). The literature indicates that there is strong 
political support for PPPs in the four largest developing economies (Tiong, 2013; 
Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & 
Karnam 2015). This is demonstrated in part by the large number of projects approved 
by the authorities, coupled with the allocation of adequate resources for the 
implementation of PPPs in their respective countries (Tiong, 2013; Churakov, 2014; 
Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015).  
 
However, in South Africa, it is not apparent why strong political support and 
commitment for PPP does not exist, despite several pronouncements by policymakers 
for their adoption (Aigbavboa et al., 2014; Ittmann, 2017). This presents a gap and will 
be investigated as part of this study. There seems to be a lack of consistency in terms 
of political commitment and support to PPP projects, especially on long-term PPPs. 
Political commitment seems to change with every change in political leadership.  
 
The literature indicates that PPPs have only attained popularity over the past few years 
in the BRICS countries and as a result, the legislature of these countries do not have 
the depth of knowledge and competencies required to provide effective oversight over 
PPP projects (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Meng et al., 2015). It is not apparent 
whether or not there is effective oversight of PPPs by South Africa’s legislature 




be investigated as part of this study  
 
A further review indicates that the supreme auditing institutions of all the BRICS 
countries conduct audits of PPPs (Churakov, 2014; IBRD/WB, 2014; Pereira, 2014; 
Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). Except for Brazil, it appears that transparency of 
processes and proactive disclosure of project information is still a challenge across 
most of the BRICS countries (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 
2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). Project information is not disclosed proactively 
in South Africa (IBRD/WB, 2014). Individuals have to make formal requests for 
information, sometimes for a fee, which can take long periods to obtain (Ibid.). It is not 
apparent if the proactive disclosure of information is regarded as a critical success 
factor for the establishment of PPPs in the country (Ittmann, 2017). It is also not 
apparent whether or not contract disclosure is supplemented with project summaries 
in any of the BRICS countries (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 
2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann 2017). These present gaps in the study, which will be 
investigated. 
 
Except for Brazil, it is not apparent if there is extensive public participation and 
consultation in the other BRICS countries to promote the public interest (Churakov, 
2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). 
South Africa does not seem to be conducting extensive public participation and 
consultation to promote interest among the public (Aigbavboa et al., 2014). 
 
The literature also indicates that, except for South Africa, there seems to be 
cooperative decision-making and trust between the public and private sectors in the 
BRICS countries (Churakov, 2013; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng 
et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). According to Ittmann (2017), the trust deficit in South Africa 
seems to be sustained by the perception of the private sector that the public sector will 
plan poorly and try to place an excessive financial burden on the private sector, while 
the public sector has a perception that the private sector will try to extract excessive 
profits from projects. However, it is not apparent whether or not this view is widely held 
by other role players in the transport sector. This presents a gap and will be 





In light of the preceding discussion, Table 3.2 displays the level of conformity of the 
BRICS countries to best practice for governance. It shows that Brazil has the greatest 
adherence to governance principles, followed by Russia, India, and China, then South 
Africa.  
 
Table 3-2: Conformity of the BRICS countries to best practice of governance 
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Governance      












Effective oversight by the legislature 
 
 
     
Audits by supreme auditing institutions  
 
 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Transparency of processes and proactive 
disclosure of project information  
 
√     
Supplementing contract disclosure with project 
summaries 
 
     
Extensive public participation and consultation to 
promote public interest 
 
 √     











Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion 
 
3.4.3. Institutionalisation   
International best practice prescribes the institutionalisation of PPPs, through the 
establishment of PPP units at either a national or sub-national level (Perera, 2016; 
Polyakova & Vasilyeva, 2016; Ittmann, 2017). The literature indicates that all the 
BRICS countries have PPP units and that all these units have clearly defined 
institutional responsibilities and arrangements (Istrate & Puentes, 2011; IBRD/WB, 
2014). 
 
All the BRICS countries have established these units at the national level of their 
respective governments (Istrate & Puentes, 2011). However, there seems to be 
growing recognition for a need to establish similar units or agencies at the subnational 
level (Ibid.). This is expected to improve access to technical competencies for PPPs at 




(2017) supported the idea of establishing PPP units at the subnational level.  
 
In the case of South Africa, the PPP unit resides within the National Treasury and 
represents a major milestone in the PPP landscape of South Africa (National Treasury, 
2017). The unit serves as the lead agency for PPPs in the country, responsible for the 
promotion of the regulations of PPPs by following the prescripts of applicable law and 
continuous alignment to international best practice (Ibid.). The unit is also responsible 
for nurturing and developing the PPP market in the country, having facilitated the 
implementation of PPP projects across various sectors (Ittmann, 2017).  
 
A demand exists for the establishment of PPP units, due to the complex nature of PPPs 
(IBRD/WB, 2017). These units play a key role in developing capacity and guiding other 
state departments and agencies in realising their PPP projects (Ibid.). The PPP unit is 
important in South Africa as the country is faced with a chronic deficiency of 
appropriate capacity and skills for the implementation of PPPs, especially at the local 
level of government (Makofane, 2013; Aigbavboa et al., 2014).  
 
This deficiency does not seem to be as severe in the rest of the BRICS countries, 
which are offering their public officials advanced PPP training programmes (Perera, 
2016; Polyakova & Vasilyeva, 2016; IBRD/WB, 2017). These are usually conducted at 
an international forum to allow for the exchange of knowledge and experiences 
(Perera, 2016; Polyakova & Vasilyeva, 2016; IBRD/WB, 2017). Although South Africa 
offers some introductory PPP training programmes, these do not impart the level of 
knowledge required to effectively implement PPPs (Aigbavboa et al., 2014; National 
Treasury, 2017).  
 
Based on the preceding discussion, Table 3.3 displays the level of conformity of the 
BRICS countries to best practice of institutionalisation. It indicates that Brazil, Russia, 
India and China adhere to practices of institutionalisation, while the capacity 
development of public officials in South Africa remains a challenge.   
 
 





International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Institutionalisation of PPPs      












Appropriate skills transfer and capacity development 
of public officials     
 
√ √ √ √  
Establishment of dedicated PPP units at national 











Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion 
 
3.4.4. Project identification and appraisal  
International best practice prescribes for the adoption of a coherent process that will 
assist in the identification and appraisal of PPP projects (Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; 
Meng et al., 2015). Except for India and South Africa, the BRICS countries appear to 
have appropriate identification and pre-assessment processes (Churakov, 2014; 
Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). However, 
it is not apparent if any of the BRICS countries use an iterative approach to the 
screening of projects, which reveals a gap in the literature (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 
2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017; Ittmann, 
2017). It is also not apparent whether or not the quality of service can be readily defined 
and measured in any of these countries, which exposes a gap in the literature. 
(Churakov, 2014; Pereira 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 
2017).  
 
Palmer (2015) advocates for the prioritisation of commercially viable projects in the 
various sectors of the economy. This is evident in Brazil, Russia, India and China, 
which have prioritised commercially viable projects for the implementation in the 
economic sectors, such as transport and energy (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; 
Meng et al., 2015). Although South Africa prioritises commercially viable projects, 
these are mainly in the social sectors such as health and education (National Treasury, 
2017). Data from the GTAC (2017) PPP database indicates that the country has 




implementation as PPPs. However, it is not evident why the country has taken this 
decision as Palmer (2015) suggested that private sector involvement in PPPs is more 
likely in economic infrastructure projects that have a higher commercial value, due to 
the potential for higher returns (Ibid.); thus, making them more suitable than social 
infrastructure projects for implementation as PPPs. Telang and Kutumbale (2014) 
indicated that India provides viability gap funding, which is intended to make projects 
more attractive to the private sector and improve their likelihood to succeed as PPP 
projects. It is not apparent if the state provides viability gap funding as a norm for PPPs 
in South Africa, which presents a gap (Ittmann, 2017).   
 
All the BRICS countries employ the public sector comparator (PSC) as a means of 
assessing the value-for-money of PPPs (Bidne et al., n.d.; De Vries & Yehoue, 2013; 
Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015; Thieriot & Dominguez, 2015). This assists in defining 
and measuring the quality of service (Bidne et al., n.d.; De Vries & Yehoue, 2013; 
Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015; Thieriot & Dominguez, 2015). However, the 
IBRD/WB (2014) indicated that there are several methodologies used by different 
experts for determining the PSC. This creates uncertainty in the use of PSCs (Ibid.). 
 
The literature advocates for the selection of large-sized projects (Tiong, 2013; 
IBRD/WB, 2017). This is evident in the BRICS countries that have a high threshold for 
PPP project size (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et 
al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017). The literature further advocates for the selection 
of projects with long-term project tenure (Tiong, 2013; IBRD/WB, 2017). Most of the 
BRICS countries appear to prioritise long-term PPP projects (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 
2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017).     
 
All the BRICS countries involve the preparation and approval of a viable business case 
as a part of the approval process for implementing PPPs (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 
2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017; Ittmann, 
2017). However, India seems to be experiencing a challenge relating to the approval 
of several business cases, which have later been found not to have been viable 
(Telang & Kutumbale, 2014). 
Based on the preceding discussion, Table 3.4 displays the level of conformity of the 




that Brazil, Russia and China adhere to most of these practices, followed by India and 
South Africa.   
 
Table 3-4: PPP project identification and appraisal in the BRICS countries 
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Project identification and appraisal        












An iterative approach to the screening of projects  
      
Quality of service can be readily defined and 
measured 
 
      




√ √  √  
Provision of viability gap funding  
 
 
  √   
















































Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion 
 
3.4.5. Allocation of risk  
International best practice prescribes the adoption of a coherent process for the 
allocation of risk in PPP projects (Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015). It 
appears that all the BRICS countries typically allocate risk to the party best suited to 
deal with it (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 
2015; National Treasury, 2017). In all these countries, there seems to be an adequate 
transfer of risk to the private party (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & 
Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017). However, in specific 
cases, the public sector seems to carry most of the risk; this is demonstrated by the 




financial risk (Dachs, 2011; National Treasury, 2017).    
 
It is a common commercial practice for risk allocation to be mirrored in the contract 
structure of all the BRICS countries (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & 
Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). There seems to be continuous 
risk assessment over the lifecycle of the project in all of the BRICS countries 
(Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; 
National Treasury, 2017; Ittmann, 2017).  
 
In the BRICS countries, it seems as though the public and private sector have an 
advantage with their associated negotiating power, and should be estimated based on 
the capital gains arising from the investment (Churakov, 2014; Pereira 2014; Telang & 
Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017; Ittmann, 2017). There 
seems to be a robust risk assessment to determine the fair allocation of expected 
capital gains from the investment to the public and private sector in the BRICS 
countries (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 
2015).  
 
In light of the above discussion, Table 3.5 displays the level of conformity of the BRICS 
countries to best practice based on the allocation of risk. It demonstrates that all of the 
BRICS countries adhere to these practices.  
 
Table 3-5: Allocation of risk for PPPs in the BRICS countries 
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Risk allocation       

























Translation of risk allocation into contract structure 
 √ √ √ √ √ 
Continuous risk assessment over the lifecycle of the 
project, especially for longer-term infrastructure 
projects  





Private and public advantages and their associated 
negotiating power should be estimated based on the 
capital gains arising from the investment 
 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Fair allocation of expected capital gains from the 
investment to the public and private sector through 
robust risk analysis   
 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
3.4.6. Finance  
International best practice prescribes the development of appropriate instruments for 
the financing of PPP projects (Tiong, 2013; Ittmann, 2017). This includes developing 
long-term financing instruments to allow payments for PPPs to become affordable 
(IBRD/WB, 2017). Except for South Africa, the BRICS countries have well established 
long-term financing instruments (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 
2014; Meng et al., 2015; Beck, Maimbo, Faye & Triki, n.d.).  
 
The literature indicates that project finance is a popular option for the financing of PPPs 
in all the BRICS countries (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; 
Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017). The establishment of SPVs is also a 
common practice for project finance in all these countries (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 
2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). High debt to 
equity financing is also common in all these countries (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; 
Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017).     
 
The literature further shows that all of the BRICS countries employ financing strategies 
to provide capital at each stage of project implementation, using the most appropriate 
source and instrument at that stage of the project lifecycle (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 
2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017). 
However, it is not apparent whether or not any of the BRICS countries employ 
algorithms for the selection of the fund’s source, as the basis for adjusting the financing 
strategy, which considers multiple criteria to make an informed determination of the 
appropriate funding source (Churakov, 2014; Pereira 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 




Tiong (2013) also prescribed the establishment of regional rating agencies as part of 
a country’s strategy to promote PPPs. China, Russia and India have established 
regional rating agencies (Ibid.). Although Brazil and South Africa do not have regional 
rating agencies, they do have international credit rating agencies represented within 
their borders (Ibid.). The Africa Report (2014) shows the establishment of a domestic 
credit rating agency is important for the growth of Africa’s capital markets and 
investment in the continent. Such an agency could provide alternative, in-depth 
analysis into ‘… transactions and balance-sheet activities of entities across the region’ 
(Ibid: para.1). By providing better information on entities operating within the region, 
the fears of investors could be allayed (Ibid.). The regulation of credit rating agencies 
is another area that has been growing in popularity following the failure and role that 
they played in the events that led to the global financial crisis (Rabinowitz, 2014). Akin 
to other governments, South Africa has introduced the Credit Ratings Services Act 
No.24 of 2012, which sought to foster trust and legitimacy that had been eroded by the 
failure of credit rating agencies (ibid.).      
 
Although the legal framework for PPPs in Brazil allows for government guarantees, it 
appears to be the only BRICS country that chooses not to provide them to the private 
party (Pereira, 2014). It is not apparent whether or not the lifecycle fund or maintenance 
reserves are established in the BRICS countries, which are used for the replacement 
of components with lifecycles shorter than the concession period (Churakov, 2014; 
Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann 2017), which 
presents a gap.  
 
Based on the above discussion, Table 3.6 displays the level of conformity of the BRICS 
countries to best practice for the financing of PPPs. It illustrates that South Africa has 
the least adherence to these practices compared to the other BRICS countries.   
 
Table 3-6: Conformity of the BRICS countries to best practice of finance for PPPs 
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Finance       
Establishment and or identification of long-term 





































Developing a financing strategy aimed at providing 
capital for the objectives of each stage of project 
implementation from the most appropriate source 
with the most appropriate financial instruments at the 


















Using the algorithm of the fund’s source selection as 
the basis for adjusting the financing strategy, which 
considers multiple criteria to make an informed 
determination of the appropriate funding source.  
 
      
Establishment of a regional credit rating agency that 
provides investors with information on positive and 






















Instead of providing government guarantees, which 
raise the cost of capital, the state can borrow from 




    
The establishment of a lifecycle fund or maintenance 
reserve accounts for the replacement of components 
with lifecycles shorter than the concession period. 
 
     
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion 
 
3.4.7. Competition  
International best practice prescribes the creation of a competitive environment for 
PPP projects (Tiong, 2013; Ittmann, 2017). The literature indicates that competition in 
the PPP market is encouraged across all the BRICS countries (Bidne et al., n.d.; 
Churakov, 2014; De Vries & Yehoue, 2013; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; 
Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017). It shows 
that there is robust competition in their PPP markets (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; 
Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015). This is an important aspect, as 




The National Treasury (2017) shows that, although South Africa’s regulatory 
framework allows for unsolicited proposals, it seems as though there is reluctance to 
approve projects through unsolicited proposals. It appears as though all the BRICS 
countries have measures to deal with unsolicited proposals, however, it appears that 
measures also exist within their PPP regulations to deal with intellectual property 
(Bidne et al., n.d.; Churakov, 2014; De Vries & Yehoue, 2013; Pereira, 2014; Telang 
& Kutumbale, 2014; Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015; Meng et al., 2015; Thieriot & 
Dominguez, 2015; National Treasury, 2017). Based on the preceding discussion, 
Table 3.7 displays the level of conformity of the BRICS countries to best practice for 
competition for PPPs. It indicates that South Africa has the highest adherence to these 
practices compared to the rest of the BRICS countries.   
  
Table 3-7: Conformity of the BRICS countries to best practice for competition for 
PPPs  
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Competition       












Selection of a preferred bidder based on competition 
to offer better whole-life costs and quality to meet 
users’ requirements compared to the one with a 
lower construction cost   
 
    √ 
Measures for dealing with unsolicited proposals and 












Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
3.4.8. Innovation  
International best practice prescribes the promotion of innovation in PPP projects 
(Aerts et al., 2014). For example, this is demonstrated by the freedom given to private 
parties in all the BRICS countries to prescribe inputs or use alternatives that would not 
necessarily have been considered through traditional procurement, which implies that 
technical and service innovation is allowed (Aerts et al., 2014; IBRD/WB, 2014). The 




creativity of private partners in developing solutions that respond to the needs of the 
project (Aerts et al., 2014; IBRD/WB, 2014).  
 
It is apparent that new and environmentally friendly technologies and materials in the 
construction and operation of PPPs have been introduced across all the BRICS 
countries (Aerts et al., 2014; IBRD/WB, 2014; Ittmann, 2017). The University of 
Pretoria (n.d.), highlights the Gautrain as an example of an environmentally friendly 
solution in South Africa.  
 
In light of the preceding discussion, Table 3.8 displays the level of conformity of the 
BRICS countries to best practice on the promotion of innovation for PPPs. It 
demonstrates that all of the BRICS countries adhere to the prescribed practices.  
 
Table 3-8: Conformity of the BRICS countries to best practice of innovation for 
PPPs 
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Innovation      





































Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
3.4.9. Management of the transaction process  
International best practice prescribes outlining a coherent procedure for the 
management of the transaction process of PPP projects (Bloomfield & Ahern, 2011; 
Iossa & Martimort, 2012; IBRD/WB, 2014). The appointment of transaction advisors is 
a common commercial practice in all the BRICS countries (Bloomfield & Ahern, 2011; 
Iossa & Martimort, 2012; IBRD/WB, 2014). The bid process is managed in all these 
countries, although at differing levels of transparency (Bloomfield & Ahern, 2011; Iossa 





Based on the above discussion, Table 3.9 displays the level of conformity of the BRICS 
countries to best practice on the management of the transaction process of PPPs. It 
illustrates that all the BRICS countries follow these practices.  
 
Table 3-9: Conformity of the BRICS countries to best practice of the management 
of the transaction process for PPPs 
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Management of the transaction process        




















Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
3.4.10. Contract design  
International best practice prescribes outlining a coherent procedure for designing PPP 
contracts, which typically involves the standardisation of such contracts; this is evident 
in all of the BRICS countries (IBRD/WB, 2014; IBRD/WB, 2017). The PPP contract 
design in all these countries, typically includes provision for performance (Gaffey, 
2010; Bloomfield & Ahern, 2011; Dachs, 2011; Istrate & Puentes, 2011; Tiong, 2013; 
Verhoest et al., 2013; IBRD/WB, 2014; Diaz Reus LLP, n.d.). 
 
All the BRICS countries prescribe dispute resolution mechanisms as part of their 
contract design (Bloomfield & Ahern, 2011; Dachs, 2011; Istrate & Puentes, 2011; 
Tiong, 2013; Verhoest et al., 2013; IBRD/WB, 2014; Diaz Reus LLP, n.d.). Payment 
and adjustment mechanisms, as well as provision for the termination of the contract, 
are also specified in the contract design for all the BRICS countries (Istrate & Puentes, 
2011; Tiong, 2013; Verhoest et al., 2013; IBRD/WB., 2014; Diaz Reus LLP, n.d.).   
 
In light of the preceding discussion, Table 3.10 displays the level of conformity of the 
BRICS countries to best practice of contract design for PPPs. It shows all of the BRICS 




Table 3-10: Conformity of the BRICS countries to best practice of contract design 
for PPPs   
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Contract design       


































































Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
3.4.11. Management of the contract  
Best practice prescribes outlining a coherent procedure for the management of the 
PPP contract (CIPS) (n.d.). The literature shows that the practice of establishing 
contract management structures, is recognised in all the BRICS countries by 
contracting authorities (Gaffey, 2010; Johnston & Kouzmin, 2010; Dachs, 2011; Istrate 
& Puentes, 2011; Tiong, 2013; Verhoest et al., 2013; IBRD/WB, 2014). 
 
It is not apparent whether or not there is adequate monitoring and evaluation of the 
performance in all the BRICS countries, which presents a research gap (Gaffey, 2010; 
Johnston & Kouzmin, 2010; Dachs, 2011; Istrate & Puentes, 2011; Tiong, 2013; 
Verhoest et al., 2013; IBRD/WB, 2014). This could be attributed to the lack of proactive 
disclosure or transparency of project and contract information in most of these 
countries (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 
2015; National Treasury, 2017; Ittmann, 2017). The expiry of the contract and 
procedures for the handover of the asset, are specified in the PPP contracts of all the 
BRICS countries (Gaffey, 2010; Johnston & Kouzmin, 2010; Dachs, 2011; Istrate & 





Based on the above discussion, Table 3.11 displays the level of conformity of the 
BRICS countries to best practice of the management of the contract of PPP. It 
illustrates that the BRICS countries observe similar practices in this regard.   
 
Table 3-11: Conformity of the BRICS countries to the management of the PPP 
contract  
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Management of the contract       











Adequate monitoring and evaluation of performance  

















Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
3.4.12. Strategy to deal with an incomplete contract  
Given that no contract can ever be truly regarded as being complete, international best 
practice prescribes outlining a strategy to deal with an incomplete contract (Mansor & 
Rashid, 2016). In this regard, South Africa and India standardise their contracts to deal 
with issues emanating from an incomplete contract (Ibid.). This is on the basis that 
standardisation prescribes the fundamental elements that need to be incorporated into 
any contract, for it to be regarded as nearly complete as possible.  
 
Another strategy involves the use of multidisciplinary teams of transaction advisors for 
PPP projects, who can provide a broad spectrum of skills and expertise required in 
fulfilling the requirements of a transaction (Thomassen et al., 2016). This strategy 
leverages the knowledge and experiences of a wider pool of experts to create more 
complete contracts, and is evident in all of the BRICS countries.  
 
In light of the above discussion, Table 3.12 displays the level of conformity of the 
BRICS countries to best practice on strategies used to deal with an incomplete 





Table 3-12: Conformity of the BRICS countries to best practice of strategies used 
to deal with an incomplete contract 
International best practice  Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
 
Strategy to deal with an incomplete contract        
Standardisation of contracts  



















Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion 
 
3.5. Reasons for the high uptake of transport PPPs in the BRICS countries 
A review of the literature indicates several factors that have contributed to the 
successful uptake of transport PPPs in Brazil, Russia, India and China. For example, 
PPPs are not overregulated in India and China (Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et 
al., 2015). Legislation and regulations are developed in a manner that will not create 
an unnecessary burden for both regulators and investors, resulting in the likelihood of 
investments. It is also apparent that there is strong political support and commitment 
to PPPs by policy-makers (Churakov, 2014; Tiong, 2013; IBRD/WB, 2014). This is 
demonstrated through the public investment plans of the respective countries, and the 
allocation of adequate resources to initiate projects of this nature.   
 
Pereira (2014), Telang and Kutumbale (2014) and Meng et al. (2015) all indicated that 
these countries have appropriate project identification and selection processes, which 
are consistent with international best practice. This includes the selection of long-term, 
large-size projects, which are commercially-viable and prioritise economic 
infrastructure projects. Projects that entail all these attributes are highly attractive to 
investors as they offer high returns (Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng 
et al., 2015).   
 
It is also evident that the PPP units of these countries are actively involved in the 
development of the PPP market and not just the regulations (Wei et al., 2015; Perera, 
2016; Polyakova & Vasilyeva, 2016). This includes skills transfer and capacity 




(Wei et al., 2015; Perera, 2016; Polyakova & Vasilyeva, 2016). This has contributed to 
the proliferation of PPPs, which usually involve complex processes.   
 
The IBRD/WB (2014) and Telang and Kutumbale (2014) show there is a provision for 
funding through viability gap funding that contributes to improving the commercial 
viability of projects. This serves as an incentive for attracting private sector 
participation, as the risk associated with funding the project is reduced, due to the 
state’s capital contributions. It is also evident that there are adequate long-term 
financing instruments, coupled with high levels of domestic investment in these 
countries (IBRD/WB, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015). The 
literature shows that there is a robust promotion of competition in these countries 
(Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015). This 
is achieved by providing opportunities to foreign companies that compete with the 
major local companies. As a result, companies are expected to become innovative to 
remain competitive. Aerts et al. (2014) pointed out that the private sector is given the 
freedom to innovate and introduce new solutions   
 
Based on the preceding discussion, Table 3.13 provides a summary of the reasons, 
which have contributed to the high uptake of transport PPPs in Brazil, Russia, India 
and China. 
   
Table 3-13: Reasons for the high uptake of PPPs in the other BRICS countries 
 PPPs are not over-regulated  
 There is strong political support and commitment  
 There is an appropriate project selection  
 There is a prioritisation of commercially viable projects in economic sectors  
 There is appropriate skills transfer and capacity development of public officials  
 PPP units are actively involved in the development of the PPP market and not just regulations  
 There is a provision for viability gap funding  
 There is a high threshold of the project value  
 There is a high threshold for the project term  
 There are adequate long-term financing instruments and high levels of domestic investment  
 There is a robust promotion of competition  
 The private sector is given the freedom to innovate and introduce new solutions  




3.6. Reasons for the low uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa.          
A review of the literature reveals many inadequacies of PPP practice in South Africa, 
which contribute to the low uptake of PPPs in the transport sector. For example, 
Ittmann (2017) suggested that PPPs are overregulated in the country, which affects 
the ability to conclude a PPP transaction over a short period. This is exacerbated by 
poor accountability, procurement bias towards PPPs, and a lack of trust between role 
players (Ibid.). Furthermore, despite regulations defining PPPs, it is apparent that 
stakeholders, such as trade unions and most communities, do not have a common 
understanding of the definition of PPPs and often mistake it for outright privatisation, 
where the public sector only has a limited role in a project (Makofane, 2013; Aigbavboa 
et al., 2014; Ittmann, 2017). As a result, the outright rejection of PPPs as a preferred 
form of procurement is common (Makofane, 2013; Aigbavboa et al., 2014; Ittmann, 
2017).    
 
The failure of PPP regulations to explicitly define PPP contracts as ‘long-term’ 
contracts, as prescribed by international best practice, has created the possibility for 
short to medium-term contracts to be prioritised for implementation as PPPs. This is 
problematic as short and medium-term contracts are typically not suited for 
implementation as PPPs but are tempting to authorities as a means of addressing 
funding issues associated with these projects (Ittmann, 2017). The prioritisation of 
short-term contracts would likely result in long-term transport PPPs being overlooked 
by authorities, who are pursuing short term goals.    
 
There also seems to be a lack of consistency in terms of the political commitment and 
support to PPP projects especially for long-term PPPs (Makofane, 2013; Aigbavboa et 
al., 2014; Ittmann, 2017). Political commitment seemingly changes with every change 
in political leadership, which adversely affects the prioritisation of major infrastructure 
projects in the public infrastructure investment process.    
 
The IBRD/WB (2014) and Ittmann (2017) indicated that project information is not 
proactively disclosed and often difficult to obtain. Broad public consultation and 
communication remains a challenge, particularly in transport projects where the user–
pay principle is highly controversial and bound to generate public resistance to projects 




in the transport sector.  
 
Although the establishment of the Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC), in 
the national sphere of government, represents a major milestone in the 
institutionalisation of PPPs in the country, Ittmann (2017) suggested that the 
instutionalisation of PPPs at a subnational level can go much further in promoting the 
proliferation of PPPs in the country. Therefore, the decentralisation of PPP technical 
advisory to provincial and local government levels is ideal, especially given the chronic 
scarcity of critical skills at a subnational level (Makofane, 2013; Aigbavboa et al., 2014; 
Ittmann, 2017). This will aid public officials, who typically do not have the specialised 
skill-sets required to implement complex transactions associated with PPP (Makofane, 
2013; IBRD/WB, 2014). For example, contract management for PPPs is regarded as 
a scarce skill in South Africa (Makofane, 2013; Aigbavboa et al., 2014; Ittmann, 2017).   
 
A further review of the literature indicates that South Africa does not centralise the 
process for the prioritisation of projects to be implemented as PPPs (IBRD/WB, 2014; 
National Treasury, 2017). Each level of government; i.e. national, provincial, and 
municipal, prepares and submits its application, which is evaluated for approval, 
irrespective of what other levels are considering (IBRD/WB, 2014; National Treasury, 
2017).  
 
The Gautrain Rapid Rail project also indicates that there is not always an adequate 
transfer of risk to the private party (Dachs, 2011; National Treasury, 2017). This is 
demonstrated by the fact that the public sector is carrying most of the financial risk 
associated with the project. Few local companies are able to raise the level of capital 
required to finance transport PPPs (Dachs, 2011). As a consequence, very few local 
companies can participate in this market, resulting in limited competition. In contrast, 
foreign companies tend to have an advantage over local companies, as they can more 
readily raise capital in foreign markets on more preferable terms (Ibid.). Awarding 
foreign companies contracts could indicate that local knowledge and expertise is not 
being developed that could contribute to the ability of local firms to undertake projects 
in this sector in the future. The Department of Trade and Industry (2019) shows that 
although companies operating in the South African economy need to contribute to the 




multinationals cannot sell shares to African people to comply with the ownership 
element of the BEE policy, due to their global practices (Ibid.). Zvandasara (2018) 
showed that skills transfer is not always realised in these BEE transactions, which 
undermines the emergence of legitimate African-owned and managed companies. 
Dachs (2011) explained that there are very few firms that can undertake transaction 
advisory services for high-value capital projects in the country. Companies often have 
to recruit international experts to form part of their multidisciplinary transaction advisory 
team, which can deliver in accordance with expectations (Ibid.). These transaction 
advisory teams come at a high cost, which escalates the total cost of the project (Ibid.).     
 
Based on the above discussion, Table 3.14 provides a summary of the reasons, which 
have contributed to the low uptake of transport PPPs in the country.  
 
Table 3-14: Reasons for the low uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa 
 PPPs are overregulated in the country 
 Poor accountability  
 Procurement bias towards PPPs 
 Lack of trust between role players  
 Lack of a common understanding of the definition of PPPs  
 Prioritisation of short-term projects by authorities   
 Lack of consistency in terms of the political commitment and support to PPPs  
 Project information is not proactively disclosed and often difficult to obtain 
 Broad public consultation and communication remains a challenge particularly in transport 
projects 
 The user-pay principle is highly controversial 
 Centralisation of PPP technical advisory to the national government  
 Lack of a central process for the prioritisation of projects to be implemented as PPPs 
 There is not always an adequate transfer of risk to the private party  
 The absence of long-term debt finance instruments in the domestic market  
 Very few local companies can participate in this market, resulting in limited competition  
 Foreign companies tend to have an advantage over local companies as they can readily raise 
capital in foreign markets on more preferable terms  
 Awarding contracts to foreign companies could also indicate that local knowledge and 
expertise is not being developed that could contribute to the ability of local firms to undertake 
projects in this sector in the future. Similarly, companies sometimes struggle to meet the BEE 




is not always evident in BEE transactions, which retards the emergence of competent local 
firms that are transformed.  
 There are very few firms that can undertake transaction advisory services for high-value 
capital projects in the country  
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
The chapter indicates that the four largest developing economies have been 
succeeding in promoting the proliferation of PPPs in their transport sectors, while 
South Africa is struggling in that regard. Some reasons for the successful uptake in the 
largest developing countries have been identified. Furthermore, the reasons for the low 
uptake in South Africa have also been identified.  
 
The literature review showed that some gaps in the body of knowledge exist that inhibit 
the ability to adequately address the research questions. These gaps relate to the 
apparent lack of view of transport industry players on practices that could contribute to 
the proliferation of PPPs in the country’s transport sector. Based on the literature 
review, the following gaps have been identified and categorised thematically in Table 
3.15.    
 
Table 3-15: Research gaps in the PPP practice of South Africa  
Theme   Research gap 
Regulation  1. Are PPPs overregulated in South Africa? 




3. Why is there a lack of strong political will and support for 
PPPs? 
4. Is there effective oversight by the legislature? 
5. Is proactive disclosure of information required? 
6. Why is there a lack of extensive public participation and 
consultation of the public? 
7. Are all role-players involved in decision-making 
processes? 
 
Institutionalisation  8. Why is there not adequate skills transfer and capacity 
development of public officials? 





Project selection  10. Why is there no appropriate project selection and pre-
assessment of projects? 
11. Should the state provide viability gap funding? 
12. Why are social projects prioritised for implementation as 
PPPs over economic projects? 
13. Should a high threshold be put in place for project value? 
14. Should a high threshold be put in place for the project 
term? 
 
Risk  15. Is there an adequate transfer of risk to the private 
partner? 
16. Is there continuous risk assessment over the lifecycle of 
the project? 
17. Is there a robust risk analysis to determine a fair 
allocation of expected capital gains from the investment 
to the public and private sector? 
 
Finance 18. Why are there no adequate long-term financing 
instruments? 
19. Is there a need to establish a regional credit rating agency 
to provide investors with credible information on positive 
and negative developments in the country? 
20. Should the state borrow capital to finance the projects 
rather than provide the private sector with guarantees?  
21. Should a lifecycle fund or maintenance reserve account 
be established for the replacement of components with 
lifecycles shorter than the concession period? 
 
Competition  22. Why is there a lack of adequate competition in the PPP 
market? 
23. Should contracts have provision for renegotiation? 
24. Should projects rather be allowed to fail than be 
renegotiated? 
Innovation  25. Is technical and service innovation promoted? 
26. Are new and environmentally friendly technologies being 
introduced? 
 
Design of the contract 27. How should the dispute resolution mechanisms be 
prioritised i.e. mediation, arbitration or litigation   




29. Are the procedures for contract and asset handover 
specified? 
 





























CHAPTER 4 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter outlines the research methodology that was used to meet the research 
objectives, namely: (1) to identify trends in the transport PPPs of the BRICS countries 
over the past fifteen years; (2) to analyse the explanations provided by transport 
industry players for the low uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa; (3) to assess the 
opinions of transport industry players on practices that could contribute to the uptake 
of transport PPPs in South Africa and (4) to provide recommendations on practices 
that could contribute to the uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa. 
 
Research methodology is defined by Saunders et al. (2009: pg.3) as ‘… the theory of 
how research should be undertaken’. It includes the selection of appropriate 
techniques and procedures for the collection and analysis of different types of data 
(Ibid.). Babbie (2012: pg.4) defines it as ‘… the science of finding out’, which entails 
the procedures for conducting an investigation. In light of these definitions, research 
methodology can be regarded as the theory of how research should be undertaken to 
find information on a specific topic.   
 
The research onion, as depicted by Saunders et al., (2019) in Figure 4.1 is regarded 
as a useful tool for defining the research methodology. Emmanuel (2019) is of the view 
that the usefulness of the onion lies in its adaptability for any type of research within 
several contexts, provided that it is applied appropriately. Its appropriate use entails 
the unwrapping of the onion layer by layer, from the outermost layer towards the 
innermost layer (Ibid.). Figure 4.1 shows that the onion guides the selection of the most 
appropriate philosophies, approaches, strategies, methodological choices, time 






















Figure 4-1: Research onion 
Source: Saunders, Lewis, Thornhill and Bristow (2019)   
 
4.2. Research philosophy   
To define the appropriate methodology for the study, the six layers of the research 
onion were peeled away successively from the outermost layer, which describes the 
research philosophy to the innermost layer. Research philosophy is an over-arching 
term that relates to the development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge, 
and it contains assumptions about how the researcher views the world (Saunders et 
al., 2019). These assumptions underpin the research strategy that is selected and the 
methods that are chosen as part of the research strategy (Ibid.). Rubin and Rubin 
(2011) showed that an understanding of these assumptions aid in detecting the 
strengths and weaknesses of methods that are chosen for a study, and formulating a 
research design that can address those weaknesses. The types of philosophies that 
are identified in the onion, include positivism, critical realism, interpretivism, 
postmodernism and pragmatism (Saunders et al., 2019).  
 
Positivism according to Pham (2018) is a research paradigm that is useful in improving 
a researcher’s understanding of humans and events in social research, based on 
evidence. Žukauskas et al. (2018) show that it employs the approach of the natural 
scientist, which assumes that the researcher and the phenomenon under investigation 
exist independently. As a result, the researcher can describe the phenomenon 




Žukauskas et al. (2018: pg.128) state that ‘… researchers are more interested in 
general information and large-scale social data collection rather than focusing on the 
details of the research’. As a result, this paradigm is mostly associated with quantitative 
methods (Ibid.). However, Su (2018) asserts that there is growing recognition that a 
positivist paradigm can also employ qualitative methods. This assertion stems from the 
ontological and epistemological positions of positive qualitative research. 
Ontologically, it assumes that an objective and external reality exists, which can be ‘… 
apprehended and summary[s]ed, although not readily quantified’ (Ibid: pg.3). 
Epistemologically, it searches for regularities and causal relationships between 
different elements of the reality through non-statistical means, and ‘… summary[s]ing 
identified patterns into generali[s]ed findings’ (Ibid: pg.3).          
   
In light of the study’s reliance on the lived-experience of transport industry players to 
describe the causal relationship between PPP practice and the uptake of transport 
PPPs in South Africa, the appropriate research paradigm was positivism. It proved 
useful in summarising trends in the categorical data of the BRICS countries through 
non-statistical means.   
 
4.3. Research approach    
The second layer describes the various research approaches, which refer to ‘… plans 
and the procedures that span the steps from broad assumptions to detailed methods 
of data collection, analysis and interpretation’ (Cresswell, 2014: pg.1). The decision for 
selecting the appropriate approach for the study was guided by the philosophical 
assumptions, procedures of inquiry, and research methods for data collection, analysis 
and interpretation (Ibid.). The selection of the research approach was affected by the 
nature of the research problem, the researcher’s personal experiences, and audiences 
of the study (Ibid.). Saunders et al. (2019) identify three main research approaches, 
namely: deduction; abduction and induction.  
 
Deduction according to Crowther and Lauesen (2017) involves the testing of theories 
by applying them in the real world to determine their validity. These theories can 
emanate from a researcher’s ideas, which they intend to test, or from a review of 
literature that describes the ideas of others (Ibid.). Su (2018: pg.3) shows that this 




identification and empirical testing of hypothesis in propositional form’. Streefkerk 
(2019) also indicates that if there is no theory yet, then deductive research cannot be 
conducted. Given that the study involved the testing of existing theories on PPP best 
practices through their application in the South African transport environment, the 
appropriate research approach was deduction.   
     
4.4. Research design and plan    
Adams, Khan and Raeside (2014: pg.64) refer to research design as the ‘… blueprint 
for fulfilling research objectives and answering research questions’. This overall plan 
needs to contain clear objectives, which are derived from the research questions, and 
reflect the sources from where data is collected (Ibid.). The plan needs to consider 
constraints and challenges that might affect the study, such as time, costs, access to 
information and ethical issues (Ibid.). The third, fourth, and fifth layers of the research 
onion collectively define the research design and plan. These layers represent the 
methodological choices, strategies, and time horizons respectively (Saunders et al., 
2009).   
 
The study required a research design with descriptive and exploratory aspects to 
address the research objectives. Saunders et al. (2009: pg.140) state‘… the object of 
descriptive research is to portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations’. 
It could serve as a forerunner to exploratory research by providing a ‘… clear picture 
of the phenomena’ for which data is to be collected before doing so (Ibid: pg.140). 
However, Monsen and Van Horn (2007) indicated that descriptive research cannot be 
used to test or verify hypotheses. In contrast, exploratory research is useful in finding 
out ‘… what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess 
phenomena in a new light’ (Saunders et al., 2009: pg.139). Cresswell (2014), showed 
that exploratory research is usually used when very little is known about the problem 
as it allows for new insights to be obtained. The primary techniques for conducting 
exploratory research include an extensive literature search, interviewing experts and 
conducting focus group interviews (Ibid.). 
 
Descriptive research proved useful in providing information required to meet the first 
objective. It was able to generate a profile of trends in the data that was described in 




second and third objectives were met by adopting an exploratory research approach, 
which allowed for new insights to be obtained from transport industry players. The 
technique that was used to obtain these views was interviews with transport industry 
players.     
 
4.5. Methodological choice  
The third layer of the onion describes the methodological choices for data collection, 
which are quantitative or qualitative data collection techniques. Crowther and Lauesen 
(2017) stated that quantitative techniques usually involve numbers, computation and 
statistical analysis, while qualitative techniques usually involve the analysis of words. 
Saunders et al. (2009) indicated that a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques is also possible. The onion identifies the following types of methodological 
choices: mono-method quantitative; mono-method qualitative; multimethod 
quantitative; multimethod qualitative; mixed-method simple; and mixed-method 
complex (Ibid.). 
 
The University of Utah (as quoted by the University of Texas at Arlington Libraries, 
2020: para. 1) defines qualitative research as ‘a process of naturalistic inquiry that 
seeks in-depth understanding of social phenomena within their natural setting. It 
focusses on the why’ rather than the ‘what’ of social phenomena and relies on direct 
experiences of human beings as meaning-making agents in their everyday lives’. 
Crowther and Lauesen (2017) suggested that the researcher is not a neutral observer 
in this type of study but contributes towards the ‘mean-making’ of the reality of 
participants. As a result, the researcher needs to be cognisant of their role in 
conjunction with that of the participants, on influencing the validity of the study. Su 
(2018) also indicates that qualitative methods enrich the context of positivist research 
as they can explore phenomena that are not adequately described by quantitative 
research.   
 
In light of the research objectives, the most suitable methodological choice for the study 
was qualitative research. This methodological choice allowed for further insights to be 
obtained from transport industry players by allowing new views that were not previously 
captured in the literature. Furthermore, it revealed in-depth information by describing 




The context provided greater meaning to messages being communicated and reduced 
misinterpretation. Furthermore, qualitative research allowed for the complexities in 
PPP best practice to be captured by allowing for interactions between different 
practices to be described e.g. interaction between regulation and governance, or 
regulation and risk.    
 
4.6. Research strategies  
The fourth layer describes the different types of research strategies. Singh (2007: 
pg.188) refers to a research strategy as ‘… a generali[s]ed plan for a problem which 
includes structure, desired solution in terms of objectives of research, and an outline 
of planned devices necessary to implement the strategy’. The choice of research 
strategies is guided by the research questions and objectives, the extent of existing 
knowledge, and the amount of time and resources available (Adams et al., 2014). The 
types of strategies that are identified include experiment, survey, case study, action 
research, grounded theory, ethnography, archival research, and narrative enquiry 
(Saunders et al, 2009).       
 
A survey according to Groves, Fowler, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer and Tourangeau 
(2011: pg.2) ‘… is a systematic method for gathering information from (a sample of) 
entities to construct quantitative descriptors of the attributes of the large population of 
which the entities are members’. This definition does not consider qualitative methods, 
as it focusses on quantitative descriptors. In contrast, Given (2008: pg.2), defines 
survey research as ‘The set of methods used to gather data systematically from a 
range of individuals, organizations, or other units of interest’. The types of methods 
that are used to collect data include questionnaires, interviews, focus groups or 
observation (Ibid.). The recognition of interviews in the types of methods used in survey 
research indicates that this strategy can also be used for qualitative research designs.     
 
An inspection of the research objectives showed that the appropriate research strategy 
needed to address them, was a survey, as it allowed for the collection of information 
from a sample of individuals. A survey also proved suitable for describing and exploring 
the opinions of transport industry players, as it allowed for open-ended questions to be 
asked that did not restrict the viewpoints of these individuals to pre-conceived ideas. 




4.7. Time horizons  
The fifth layer of the onion describes the time horizons. A time horizon refers to the 
frequency of periods at which data is collected (Saunders et al., 2009). The choice of 
a time horizon is influenced by the research problem and not the research strategy nor 
choice of research method (Ibid.). Two types of time horizons are identified, namely: 
cross-sectional and longitudinal (Ibid.).  
 
Sekaran and Bougie (2016) refer to a cross-sectional time horizon as a study where 
data is gathered over a single period, comprised of an uninterrupted continuum of days, 
weeks or months (e.g. Census of a population at a given point in time). Babbie (2008) 
showed that cross-sectional analysis is typically used for descriptive and exploratory 
research. Its advantage is that it is typically more cost-effective than a longitudinal 
study, which can take place over many years at a high cost (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). 
However, cross-sectional analysis is typically inappropriate at making causal 
inferences (e.g. determining the speed of an object moving at a high velocity from a 
still photograph) and providing information on processes that occur over time (Monsen 
& Van Horn, 2007; Babbie, 2008).   
  
Given that the research described the views of transport industry players over a 
specific period, the appropriate time horizon was a cross-sectional study. It also 
allowed for a snapshot of prevailing views across multiple practices of PPP to be 
obtained. Furthermore, in light of the time and budgetary constraints faced by the 
researcher for the completion of the study, a cross-sectional study was appropriate as 
it allowed for the rapid collection of data. This time horizon also proved useful in 
improving the response rate of targeted participants, who were largely senior 
managers within their respective organisations. As they had busy schedules and 
limited accessibility, this was in conflict with a longitudinal time-horizon.      
 
4.8. Population and sampling  
A research population according to Ezoic (2019: para.1) ‘is generally a large collection 
of individuals or objects that is the main focus of a scientific enquiry’. These individuals 
or objects usually have common traits or binding characteristics (Ibid.). When selecting 
a target population, Daniel (2012) indicated that a researcher needs to consider the 




and accessibility of the population.    
 
For this study, the population consisted of participants from organisations that had 
some involvement in transport PPPs within South Africa. Their involvement was 
characterised by the services they provided during the lifecycle of a PPP (e.g. design, 
finance, build, operate, and maintain), through the employment of seasoned 
professionals, who assumed various roles, such as transaction advisors, lawyers, 
accountants, economists and engineers.  
 
Although the size of the population was not known, it was likely to be small given that 
there are few transport PPPs, since 1994, which have been placed on tender by public 
authorities (GTAC, 2017; GTAC, 2018; GTAC, 2019). As a result, it was expected that 
there were few organisations involved or planning to get involved in transport PPPs. 
An inspection of the spatial distribution of these projects on the GTAC’s PPP database 
showed that they were mostly located in the provinces of Gauteng; Kwa-Zulu Natal 
and the Western Cape (GTAC, 2017; GTAC, 2018; GTAC, 2019). Delmon (2017) 
pointed out that the population was heterogeneous, due to the assortment of 
organisations involved in a typical PPP structure. This assortment of organisations, 
included public authorities, private companies (special purpose vehicles), lenders, 
equity investors, engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractors and 
subcontractors, operations and maintenance (O&M) contractors, and insurers (Ibid.). 
Further inspection of the GTAC’s PPP database, showed that these organistions could 
also be characterised as being either public, private or quasi-private (e.g. state-owned 
enterprises) (GTAC, 2017; GTAC, 2018; GTAC, 2019). This population was 
appropriate for this study as it contained organisations with participants that had the 
insight and in-depth understanding of PPPs in the transport environment, which would 
contribute to addressing the research objectives.  
 
Levy and Lemeshow (2008) indicated that establishing a sampling frame is a useful 
technique for defining a population of interest. A sampling frame is defined by DJS 
research (2019: para.1) as ‘… a list or database from which a sample can be used’. 
Potential participants could be drawn from this list, which could be acquired from 
various sources such as government registers, telephone directories and email 




of data on organisations involved in transport PPPs, which were identified from the 
World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (WB, 2019) and the 
Government Technical Advisory Centre’s PPP database (GTAC, 2017; GTAC, 2018; 
GTAC, 2019). Further searches did not reveal any other comprehensive databases 
from which additional organisations involved in transport PPPs could be identified.  
 
To supplement the sampling frame and develop an exhaustive list of organisations that 
met the definition of the research population, an internet search was conducted 
through web search engines such as DuckDuckGo and Google. These search engines 
revealed websites and articles with information on other local organisations that have 








private-sector-partnerships-2015-05-11/rep_id:4136.    
 
The resultant sampling frame showed that public, private and quasi-private 
organisations are involved in transport PPPs as shown in Table 4.1. This mix of 
organisations contributed to providing a balanced perspective of the responses.   
 
Table 4-1: Sampling frame 
Organisation  Type PPP involvement 
Airports Company of South 
Africa (ACSA) 
Public  Guarulhos International Airport 




 Private Section of N1 north of Pretoria up to 
Warmbaths interchange, and the 
Platinum Highway (N4 travelling west 
Botswana) 




Bombardier Transportation  Private  Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
Boygues TP  Private  Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
Capstone 252  Private  Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
Comair Limited  Private  Air Botswana Concession 
Concor  Private Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
Cross Border Road 
Transport Agency (CBRTA) 
Public  Maputo Development Corridor 
Dean Zimu and Associates   Private  DFO-5 years; 
Decathlon   Private  Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
Deloitte   Private  Fleet management-Eastern Cape 
Department of Transport; National 
fleet management-Department of 
Transport; 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA) 
Public   Transnet PSP projects 
Eastern Cape Department of 
Transport  
Public   Fleet management-Eastern Cape 
Department of Transport 
Ernst and Young  Private Internal audit and probity adviser on 
Transnet concession: Douglas-
Belmont branch line 
Fleet Africa Eastern Cape   Private  Fleet management-Eastern Cape 
Department of Transport 
Free State Provincial 
Government   
Public   Harrismith Logistics Hub 
Gauteng Department of 
Roads and Transport  
Public   Gautrain Rapid Rail Link; Extension of 
Gautrain Rapid Rail System; 
Variation for the procurement of 48 
additional rolling stock 
Gautrain Management 
Agency (GMA) 
Public   Gautrain Rapid Rail Project; Extension 
of Gautrain Rapid Rail System; 
Variation for the procurement of 48 
additional rolling stock 
Genesis   Private  Harrismith Logistics Hub 
GIBBS  Private  Gautrain Rapid Rail Link; 
Harrismith Logistics Hub; Variation for 
the procurement of 48 additional 
rolling stock 
Government Technical 
Advisory Centre (GTAC) 
Public   All PPP projects 




Hofmeyr, Herbstein and 
Gihwala 
 Private  Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
Ignis   Private  Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
Infracon consulting   Private  Engineering Procurement Construction 
(EPC) contractor 
Intertoll  Private  Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
J&J Group  Private Black empowerment equity investor in 
the Gautrain Rapid Rail Project  
J Maynard SA  Private  Procurement of two emergency towing 
vessels (ETV)(Salva Tugs) 
Jeffares and Green   Private  Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
Kagiso Financial Services   Private  Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
Khuthele   Private  Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
Kwa Zulu Natal Provincial 
Government  
Public   King Shaka International Airport Link 
Ledwaba Mazwai   Private  Gautrain Rapid Rail Link; Variation for 
the procurement of 48 additional 
rolling stock 
Letsema  Private  Variation for the procurement of 48 
additional rolling stock 
Lion Sands  Private  Skukuza Airport 
Madhlopa Attorneys   Private  National fleet management-Department 
of Transport; 
Marib Holdings  Private  Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
Masons   Private  Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
Murray and Roberts   Private  Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
Musina Local Municipality Public  Intermodal Facility 
National Department of 
Public Enterprises (DPE) 
Public   Maputo Development Corridor; Transnet 
PSP projects 
National Department of 
Transport (DOT)  
Public   Gautrain Rapid Rail Link; National fleet 
management-Department of 
Transport; Procurement of two 
emergency towing vessels 
(ETV)(Salva Tugs) 
National Department of 
Trade and Industry 
Public   Maputo Development Corridor; Musina 
Intermodal Facility 
National Treasury Public  All PPPs 
Northern Cape Department 
of Transport, Safety, and 
Liaison  
Public   DFO-5 years; De Aar Freight Transport 





Nyumbane Fleet Services    Private  DFO-5 years; 
N3 Toll Concessions (N3TC)  Private  N3 between Heidelberg in Gauteng and 
Cedara near Pietermaritzburg 
Passenger Rail Agency of 
South Africa (PRASA) 
Public   Moloto Corridor 
Phakisa World Fleet 
Solutions 
 Private  National fleet management-Department 
of Transport 
PowerLaw Capital   Private  Greenfield port and rail PPP in Africa  
Rand Merchant Bank   Private  Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road; Fleet 
management – Eastern Cape 
Department of Transport; 
RATP Development   Private  Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
SA Airlink   Private   Skukuza Airport 
Safiri  Private  Harrismith Logistics Hub 
Sanlam   Private  Beitbridge Border Post 
SANParks Public  Skukuza Airport 
SMEC South Africa  Private  Extension of Gautrain Rapid Rail System 
South African Airways (SAA) Public  Partnership with Swissair; Restructuring 
of SAA 
South African National 
Roads Agency Limited 
(SANRAL) 
Public   N3 between Heidelberg in Gauteng and 
Cedara near Pietermaritzburg; 
Section of N1 north of Pretoria up to 
Warmbaths interchange, and the 
Platinum Highway (N4 travelling west 
towards Botswana); Maputo 
Development Corridor (Part of the 
N4) 
Standard Bank  Private  Beitbridge Border Post 
Strategic Partners Group    Private  Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
Thebe Investments   Private  Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
TM Consulting   Private  De Aar Freight Transport Hub and Port 
Nolloth Harbour Development 
Toll Infrastructure Services  
(TollInfra) 
 Private N17 Toll Plaza Design and Construction 
Supervision; N2 Dube Toll Plaza 
Trans Africa 
Concessionaires (TRAC) 
 Private Maputo Development Corridor (Part of 
the N4) 
Transnet  Public   Transnet Private Sector Participation 
(PSP) projects 
Turner and Townsend  Private  Platform extension project at Gautrain’s 




Western Cape Department of 
Transport and Public Works   
 
Public   Chapman’s Peak Drive toll road 
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
It is usually too expensive and time-consuming to test every individual in a population 
according to the British Medical Journal Publishing Group Ltd. (2019), therefore, a 
sample has to be drawn from the population, whose views could be regarded as being 
representative of the entire population. Sampling is a useful technique for drawing a 
sample from a population in this regard. It is the ‘… process of selecting units (e.g., 
people, organisations) from a population of interest, so that by studying the sample we 
may fairly generalise our results back to the population from which they were chosen’ 
(Trochim, 2006: pg.1). This definition refers to the ‘generalisation of results’, which 
assumes that samples are chosen statistically and at random using probability 
sampling (Saunders et al., 2009). However, probability sampling is not always possible 
or appropriate in answering the research questions (Ibid.).  
 
Given the exploratory nature of this research, a non-probability sampling technique 
was the most practical and appropriate (Daniel, 2012). Non-probability sampling 
involves the selection of a sample based on the subjective judgement of a researcher 
(Ibid.). This subjective judgement allows for the selection of a sample for a particular 
purpose (Ibid.). It also provides the researcher with the necessary freedom to select a 
sample that could provide the information-rich responses required to explore the 
research questions and gain theoretical insights (Ibid.).  
 
Patton (1990: pg.169) stated ‘the logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in 
selecting information-rich cases for study in-depth. Information-rich cases are those 
from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the 
purpose of the research, thus the term purposeful sampling’. Salmons (2011) 
suggested that purposive or purposeful sampling is often used by researchers 
conducting qualitative studies, as it allows them to intentionally select participants 
according to the purpose of the study. This technique would allow the researcher to 
select a sample that best enabled them to address the research questions and meet 
the research objectives (Dworkin, 2012). However, Macnee and McCabe (2008) 




participants, who have a specific experience, characteristic or understanding, and as 
a result, miss a broader range of views from participants who do not meet these 
specified characteristics.  
 
In light of the study’s need for information-rich responses, the most appropriate non-
probability sampling technique was purposive sampling. Macnee and McCabe (2008) 
indicated that purposive sampling is typically used for selecting small samples that 
could lead to information-rich responses. Dworkin (2012) showed that a small sample 
size of participants would allow for more substantial interrogation of views and 
opinions, which would diminish with a large sample. Furthermore, a small sample is 
ideal as data saturation is likely to be realised after the 12th in-depth interview 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Data saturation refers to a point, where the additional data 
being provided by participants becomes redundant, with no new information or insights 
provided (Macnee & McCabe, 2008). Therefore, a sample size of at least twelve 
participants, representing the public and private sectors, was deemed to be 
appropriate for this study and was small enough to be selected through purposive 
sampling.  
 
To allow for the triangulation of data, a sample size of fourteen participants was 
selected, which comprised of seven participants emanating from the public sector and 
the other seven from the private sector. Levy and Lemeshow (2008) stated that the 
participants, who are selected through purposive sampling, should be representative 
of the population as a whole. Therefore, the 14 participants that were chosen 
represented the assortment of organisations in the typical PPP structure as outlined 
by Delmon (2017) (i.e. public authorities; SPVs; lenders; equity investors; EPC 
contractors and subcontractors; O&M contractors; and insurers (Ibid.)). Table 4.2 
identifies the research sample of 14 organisations from which participants were 
selected, in accordance with Levy and Lemeshow (2008) and Delmon (2017).  
 
Table 4-2: Research Sample 
Public Private 
1. Airports Company of South Africa  8. Aurecon 
2. Department of Public Enterprises 9. Ernst and Young   
3. Department of Transport 10. J&J Group 




5. Gautrain Management Agency   12. PowerLaw Capital  
6. South African National Roads Agency Limited    13.  SA Airlink 
7. Transnet 14. Turner and Townsend 
Source: Author’s construct based on preceding discussion  
 
These participants were selected on the basis that they had been involved in 
organisations with experience in transport PPPs and could provide an assortment of 
views across the public and private sectors. The appropriateness of these participants 
to participate in the study was reflected through their respective knowledge and 
experience in various organisations involved in transport PPPs, which is outlined 
below.  
 
The Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA) is a state-owned enterprise that is 
responsible for developing and managing the country’s nine major airports (Airports 
Company of South Africa, 2019). It has also partnered with a Brazilian company, 
Invepar, in a successful bid to develop, maintain, and operate the Guarulhos 
International Airport in São Paulo, Brazil (Ibid.). As part of the technical service 
agreement to the concession entered into in 2012, ACSA was expected to provide 
airport management services over twenty years (Lazenby, 2012).   
 
The Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) is the shareholder representative for the 
government and performs an oversight function over state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
such as Transnet and SAA (Department of Public Enterprises, 2019). In conjunction 
with the National Treasury, the Department led the process of developing the Private 
Sector Participation (PSP) framework, which is intended to promote private sector 
involvement in public projects (Department of Public Enterprises, 2018). The PSP 
framework would leverage private sector capital and expertise through public-private 
partnerships, joint ventures, public-private collaboration, and strategic equity 
partnerships (Ibid.). It is expected that these partnerships will ‘… reduce government 
exposure and introduce execution discipline’ (Ibid: pg.10).  
 
Except for pipelines, the Department of Transport is the state department responsible 
for regulation and coordination of the various modes of transport in the country (i.e. 
road, rail, maritime and air) (Department of Transport, 2019). It serves as the line 




(SANRAL), which has awarded some toll road concessions along the country’s 
national roads (Ibid.).  
 
The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) is a developmental finance 
institution that focusses on the delivery of infrastructure in South Africa and the rest of 
the continent (Development Bank of Southern Africa, 2018). It provides services to the 
Gautrain Management Agency that include ‘… financial structuring, transport 
economics and planning, as well as demand and financial model review’ (Gautrain 
Management Agency, 2018a: pg.138). The DBSA also plays a role in promoting the 
participation of previously disadvantaged groups through equity financing in the 
Gautrain Project.        
 
The Gautrain Management Agency (GMA) ‘… is a provincial public entity established 
in terms of the Gautrain Management Agency Act, Act 5 of 2006, and is listed as a 
public entity in schedule 3 of the Public Finance Management Act’ (Gautrain 
Management Agency, 2018b: para.1). Its mandate is to ensure that the Gautrain PPP 
project operates sustainably and contributes to the Gauteng Provincial Government’s 
economic goals (Ibid.).  
 
The South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) is the public agency 
responsible for toll road concessions along national routes, namely: the N3 between 
Heidelberg in Gauteng and Cedara near Pietermaritzburg; a section of the N1 north of 
Pretoria to the Warmbaths interchange in Bela Bela, and the Platinum Highway (i.e. 
the N4 travelling west towards Botswana); and the Maputo Development Corridor (i.e. 
part of the N4) (SANRAL, n.d.) amongst others.      
 
Transnet Limited is the state-owned enterprise that serves as the custodian of the 
country’s ports, rail and pipelines through its five operating divisions namely: Transnet 
Freight Rail (TFR); Transnet Engineering (TE); Transnet Port Terminals (TPT); 
Transnet Pipelines (TPL); and Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA) (Transnet, 
2019). Based on its 2019 Integrated Report, it outlines its plans to partner with the 
private sector to reduce its funding and operational requirements, whilst taking 
advantage of its partners’ capabilities for their mutual benefit (Ibid.). As quoted by 




recognises the need for PPPs or public sector participation (PSP)’. Rashid and 
Edwards (2004) defined PSP as a broad concept that includes, but is not limited to, 
the narrow definition of PPPs, and entails a wide range of private sector involvement 
compared to PPPs. The 2019 Integrated Report shows that Transnet has launched 
three PSP projects during that year, which included: the Green Ship recycling project; 
the Maydon Wharf Agri Terminal project; and the Lot 100- Durban Liquid Fuels Facility 
(Transnet, 2019).  
 
Aurecon ‘… is an engineering, design and advisory company’, with offices in South 
Africa and Australia’ (Aurecon, 2020: para.3). Its involvement with PPPs entails various 
engineering and advisory services provided to several road transport projects initiated 
by SANRAL (Ibid.).       
 
Ernst and Young is a consultancy that focusses on providing, assurance, advisory, tax, 
and transaction advisory services (Ernst & Young, 2020). It has served as an internal 
audit and probity adviser to Transnet’s branch line concession programme, for projects 
such as the Douglas-Belmont branch line concession (Transnet, 2015). The J&J Group 
is an equity partner, with an eight percent stake in the Bombela Concession Company, 
which is the SPV for the Gautrain Rapid Rail project (Sole, 2012; J&J Group, 2017).    
 
Infracon Consulting is a South African based EPC contractor that operates across the 
continent on infrastructure and logistics projects (Infracon Consulting, n.d.). The 
company’s core services include the following: project controls; project management; 
risk management; contract administration and procurement; quantity surveying; 
estimating; cost engineering; and planning and scheduling (Ibid.). In 2017, the EPC 
contractor introduced the ARES PRISM Software into the African market through its 
partnership with ARES Project Management (ARES, 2017). ARES is an international 
company that serves organisations in more than 50 countries with integrated project 
lifecycle management software for capital projects in the infrastructure, engineering, 
construction, oil gas and chemical, mining, energy, and aerospace industries (Ibid.).     
 
SA Airlink, a private airline operator in the country, and Lion Sands, an operator of 
game lodges, close to the Skukuza airport, have entered into a PPP agreement with 




Company (Skukuza Airport, 2014). This company is an SPV that was established to 
refurbish the airport’s runway and terminal building as part of the PPP agreement 
between the parties (Airlink, 2013).  
 
PowerLaw Capital is a transaction advisory firm that has a focus on the rail sector 
(Transport Forum, n.d.). Their range of services includes the following: serving as 
investment advisors for rail infrastructure funds; EPC; and advisors to port and rail 
concessionaires (Ibid.). The firm is associated with several institutions in the country 
and internationally, and is part of a global network of railway expertise. Part of the firm’s 
involvement in PPPs, entailed developing a PPP model for the De Aar Freight 
Transport Hub project on behalf of the Northern Cape Department of Transport Safety 
and Liaison (Global Africa Network, 2020). The project entailed the building of a 
container terminal that would serve as a transshipment facility for freight, a warehouse 
for agricultural goods and storage facilities, and a vehicle storage yard (Ibid.). The PPP 
model described how the department could partner with the private sector to establish 
a sustainable transport network for the benefit of the region.  
 
Turner and Townsend is a consultancy that provides a range of services, that include; 
project management; procurement; advisory, and expert opinion to a wide range of 
clients across multiple sectors (Turner & Townsend, n.d.). Its participation in PPPs, 
includes the management of a platform extension project of the Gautrain at OR Tambo 
International Airport. The consultancy was appointed in 2015 on a 12-month contract 
by the Bombela Concession Company to expand the platforms at the station. The 
expansion of the platforms was intended to increase system capacity, which would 
result in doubling the capacity from the two-car train set, to a four-car train set.           
 
4.9. Data collection instruments, sources and procedures   
The sixth layer describes the techniques and procedures for the collection of data 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Bryman (2007) argued that there is no simple decision for a 
researcher’s choice of technique of data collection as their choice is likely to be affected 
by some factors, which include: commitments to particular methods; expectations of 
the potential audience for the findings; and methods with which the researcher is 
comfortable. However, the researcher’s choice must enable them to meet their 




4.9.1. Sources of data  
Riedel (2000) defines secondary data as that which emanates from existing sources, 
such as books, government reports and institutional repositories, which were collected 
for another purpose. Mooi and Sarstedt (2011) indicated that secondary data can be 
categorised as internal secondary data (e.g. company records, and sales reports), 
external secondary data (government, trade associations, databases), or a mix of both 
(Ibid.). Wrenn, Stevens and Loudon (2002) suggested that caution be adopted when 
using either internal or external secondary data as they were generated for some 
purpose other than to answer the research questions. However, the advantage of 
secondary data is that it is usually cheaper and faster to collect than primary data 
(Ibid.). In light of the preceding discussion, the categorical data on transport PPPs of 
the BRICS countries, therefore, constitutes secondary data as it was acquired from 
existing sources and requires analysis in a different manner from which it was initially 
intended.   
 
Mooi and Sarstedt (2011) defined primary data as that which is collected for a specific 
purpose. It includes data collected through observations, interviews, focus groups, 
projective techniques and test markets (Ibid.). It is aimed at addressing the specific 
objectives of a study compared to secondary data (Ibid.) However, Wrenn et al. (2002) 
showed that a disadvantage of collecting primary data is that it could be more 
expensive and take longer compared to secondary data. Therefore, it is usually ideal 
to search for secondary data that could address the research objectives, before 
considering the collection of primary data (Ibid.). An exploration of secondary data 
proved that this was not adequate to address the second and third objectives of the 
study. As a result, data from primary sources were also required to address the 
research objectives. Given the definition of primary data by Mooi and Sarstedt (2011), 
the explanations and opinions provided by participants, therefore, constitute primary 
data as these were collected through interviews for the specific purpose of addressing 
the research objectives of the study.  
 
4.9.2. Data collection instrument  
Research instruments according to Annum (2017) refer to the tools used for the 
gathering of data from various sources. Wrenn et al. (2000) showed that the data 




gathered. Caution should therefore, be applied when designing the data collection 
instrument to ascertain that it is capable of gathering what is required to meet the 
research objectives (Ibid.).   
 
The categorical data on transport PPPs of the BRICS countries were collected from 
secondary sources. These secondary sources include databases, information 
collected by governments and multilateral institutions, which were originally collected 
for other research purposes (Saunders et al., 2009). This data is usually easily 
accessible and does not require a long time to obtain (Ibid.). However, a disadvantage 
of this type of data collection is that it might not contain all the data required for the 
new study (Boslaugh, 2015). This aspect might be overcome by inspecting the integrity 
of available data before its inclusion in the research design (Ibid.). The integrity of data 
could be tested by listing the important characteristics of data that are required, which 
includes: specific variables needed for the study; the ideal definition of these variables; 
the period of interest; and the geographic area of interest (Ibid.).     
 
Prince George’s Community College (2019) showed the procedure for collecting data 
from research databases, involves selecting an appropriate online database and 
developing a search strategy. A research database refers to ‘… organized collections 
of computerized information or data such as periodical articles, books, graphics and 
multimedia that can be searched to retrieve information’ (Ibid: para.1). The research 
topic plays a key role in determining the kind of database and information that would 
be used (Ibid.). The search strategy needs to identify keywords that relate to the 
research topic, and how they link to each other (Ibid.). Furthermore, expanding the 
fields of study could also yield greater results in identifying appropriate databases 
(Ibid.). The American Speech-Language-Hearing Association (2020) indicates that 
databases could be fee or non-fee based (i.e. open access or subscription-based) 
(Ibid.).     
 
Databases that contained secondary data on transport PPPs of the BRICS countries 
included: the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (World 
Bank Group, 2019); the Government Technical Advisory PPP database (GTAC, 2019); 
and the Economic Infrastructure Investment Data in Latin America and the Caribbean 




Private Participation in Infrastructure Database was the most appropriate and 
comprehensive source of secondary data. This is on the basis, that unlike any of the 
other databases, it contains secondary data on all of the BRICS countries, which 
allowed for the categorical analysis of their data. Furthermore, the database contains 
data that spans a period of more than 25 years, from 1984 to 2019 (Ibid.). This data is 
updated annually, with the last update conducted in 2019 (Ibid.). This allowed for the 
analysis of PPPs over the past fifteen years. The World Bank’s Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Database is also a non-fee database (Ibid.), which contributed to the 
access to information and cost-effectiveness of the study.  
 
Gillham (2000) defined an interview as a conversation that usually occurs between two 
people (i.e. the interviewer and interviewee) to solicit responses for a specific purpose. 
Gubrium and Holstein (2002) described it as a technique for securing knowledge from 
a participant about their own experience, or the experience of others that he knows, or 
is interested in. The advantage of an interview is that it is useful in providing a 
researcher with a glimpse into the observations of others of places he has not been to 
or cannot go to, and about settings in which he has not lived (Ibid.). An interview probes 
and goes beyond outward behaviour and phenomena, and secures ‘… accounts of 
events and processes as they are reflected in personal experiences’ (Ibid: pg.36). The 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (2017: para.2) state ‘interviews help 
you explain, better understand, and explore research subjects, opinions, behaviour 
and experiences’. This technique could provide new insights from participants that are 
not adequately captured in the available literature (Ibid.). However, the disadvantage 
of an interview is that it appears deceptively simple to conduct, whereas much practice, 
experience, and skill are required to effectively do so (Ibid.). Gubrium and Holstein 
(2002) distinguished between three variants of interviews, namely: structured; semi-
structured; and unstructured (Ibid.). Annum (2017) identified two additional variants of 
interviews, namely: non-directive and focus interviews.    
 
A semi-structured interview according to Galletta (2013) is adequately structured to 
address specific topics related to the phenomenon of the study, whilst also providing 
flexibility and an opportunity to participants to provide new meanings and 
interpretations to the study focus. It allows for the collection of information-rich data 




participants to explain and build-on their responses (Ibid.). This might lead the 
discussion into areas that were not initially considered that could contribute to 
addressing the research objectives (Ibid.).  
 
Based on the study’s need for information-rich responses that provided new insights, 
the appropriate instrument was a semi-structured interview. Semi-structured interviews 
allowed the researcher to obtain in-depth information on the topic, based on the 
participants’ backgrounds and experiences. By adopting a semi-structured interview 
design, the researcher was able to pursue themes that emerged, without restricting the 
responses provided by the participants. This allowed for new ideas to emerge that were 
not previously captured in the literature. 
 
4.9.3. Procedure for data collection  
The procedure for the semi-structured interview was a face-to-face interview. A face-
to-face interview according to Spinter Research (2019), entailed direct communication 
between the researcher and participant, based on the interview questions prepared in 
advance. This method has several benefits; it allows the researcher to gather 
information, which would most likely not have been revealed by other research 
methods, such as factual information, consumer evaluations, attitudes and preferences 
(Ibid.). Figure 4.2 shows that a face-to-face interview is a form of a non-standardised 











Figure 4-2: Form of interview 





Face-to-face interviews give the interviewer greater control as questions are 
formulated, including probing ones, which could reveal information that would have not 
been detected without some level of personal contact (Ibid.). Neuman (2005) also 
showed that this form of interview typically has a high response rate of about ninety 
percent. Dialsingh (2008) regarded interviews as the best form of data collection when 
a researcher wants to reduce non-responsiveness and optimise the quality of the 
information collected. 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) (2019) revealed 
the procedure for a face-to-face interview involves the preparation and pre-testing of 
interview questions (i.e. interview guide), approaching and requesting the participation 
of participants, the introduction of the interview, indicating the length of the interview, 
assurance of confidentiality, recording the interview and closing the interview.  
 
Willis (2017: pg.2) showed that pretesting is conducted to ‘… detect and remediate 
problems before a standardized set of procedures is finalized’. Brooks (2017) showed 
that pretesting the interview guide provides insight to the following key areas of an 
interview: interest by participants; flow and continuity of questions; ordering, skipping 
and rerouting of questions; variability of questions; length and timing of questions; and 
overall appropriateness of the research instrument. Brooks further showed that four 
types of pre-testing procedures exist, namely: researcher-; participant-; collaborative-; 
and non-collaborative pre-testing (Ibid.). To test an interview guide, the procedure is 
participant pre-testing (Ibid.), which involves a pilot study that would be a replica of the 
main study (Ibid.). This would be asked of a few participants, who have a similar 
background as the targeted participants, and who agree to participate in the research 
by responding to questions as per the interview guide (Ibid.).  
   
To assess the appropriateness of the questions and to allow for the application of 
corrective action if necessary, adequate preparation and pre-testing of the interview 
questions was undertaken. Pre-testing involved a pilot study, which had the same 
design as the main study, to obtain comments on the validity of the interview questions. 
It included a participant from the National Treasury, which is the department 
responsible for the development of PPP policy in the public sector, and a participant 
from the Department of Trade and Industry, which is the department responsible for 




selected through non-probability sampling as this relied on the subjective judgement 
of the researcher. They were selected based on their knowledge and experience in 
policy development for transport PPPs, such as the Branchline concessions and 
Maputo Development Corridor respectively.   
 
The pilot was conducted at the participants’ respective places of work on a one-to-one 
basis. Letters of consent were signed by both participants. During the pilot, the 
researcher noticed that in some instances, participants addressed subsequent 
interview questions before they were asked. To avoid repetition and allow for a 
seamless discussion, the researcher did not ask questions that had already been 
addressed but noted the appropriate responses. This aspect improved the researchers 
interviewing skill and confidence to navigate the interview questions, with further 
probing of specific questions. Furthermore, the pilot revealed that the questions were 
easily understood, with no need to elaborate. This was achieved by using questions 
that did not need explanation as familiar transport jargon was used. In light of these 
outcomes, there was no need to revisit the approach for the interviews.   
 
When conducting the main interviews, best practice in interviewing techniques was 
considered. FAO (2019) indicates that the targeted participants should be approached 
and requested to consent to participating in the interview. It must then be explained to 
each participant why they are relevant to be included, by considering their level of 
expertise (Ibid.). This would ensure that the participant was suitably qualified to provide 
credible feedback (Ibid.). To bolster participation and achieve a high response rate, the 
following tactics could also be employed: introductory and follow-up telephone calls; 
and requesting appointments (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2017; 
FAO, 2019). Furthermore, interviews should be conducted at the participant’s choice 
of location, which is convenient and comfortable for them (Moriarty, 2011). This 
consideration of location is believed to help participants relax during the interview 
(Ibid.). 
 
Appointments were requested of the participants to ensure their undivided attention 
during the interviews. Participants were requested to indicate their preference of 




The interviewer needs to be aware of how crucial the introduction to the interview is, 
as it could affect whether or not a participant agrees to participate (Ibid.). A good 
introduction typically fosters cooperation from the participant, whereas a bad 
introduction could lead to the refusal to cooperate, or biased responses (Ibid.). During 
the introduction, the interviewer should disclose information of who is sponsoring the 
study, the purpose of the study, how the data were to be used, and the confidentiality 
of responses (Ibid.).  
 
It was indicated to the participants that the interviews were being conducted as part of 
a study towards the fulfillment of a Master’s of Commerce degree at the University of 
Johannesburg. It was then expressed that the collected data would be used solely for 
academic purposes, and the responses would be confidential.     
 
FAO (2019) states that the length of the interview should also be communicated when 
requesting appointments to ensure that participants allocate adequate time (Ibid.). It 
was crucial that the interviewer kept to the allocated time as protracted discussions 
could be abruptly ended by weary participants (Ibid.). Jacob and Ferguson (2012) 
indicated that an interview should not exceed 90 minutes so as not to intrude on 
competing priorities of the participants. FAO (2019) stated that the length of the 
interview should be kept as short as possible without affecting the quality of responses.  
 
The amount of time required for the interviews was expressed in the invitation letter to 
the participants, which was limited to about 30 minutes. During the interviews, a timer 
was used to keep track and avoid detaining participants for protracted periods. 
However, participants, who exceeded this time limit, due to extensive responses, were 
not interrupted.   
 
FAO (2019) showed that interviews could be regarded as useless if the discussions 
were not adequately recorded. Furthermore, it could prove difficult to record everything 
discussed in the interviews if appropriate preparation and measures were not taken 
(Ibid.). Al-Yateem (2012) indicated that a voice recorder could provide the interviewer 
the opportunity to give a participant their full attention during discussions, by minimising 
the need for the constant scribbling of notes. It also reduces the interviewer’s reliance 




later stage (Ibid.). FAO (2019) indicated that the prior consent of participants must be 
requested before recording their responses. 
A digital voice recorder was used to record the entire conversations verbatim. It was 
communicated to all participants that interviews would be recorded and a consent form 
was provided to accommodate this aspect of the research.  
 
Measures should be taken to limit biased responses from the participants (Ibid.). Payne 
and Payne (2011: pg.27) defined bias as a ‘… systematic error in data collection or 
analysis, caused by inadequate technical procedures (for instance in sampling, 
interviewing or coding)’. Typical sources of bias by the participants, include faulty 
memory; exaggeration and dishonesty; failure to answer questions correctly; 
misunderstanding the purpose of the interview; the presence of other individuals at the 
interview; and courtesy bias (FAO, 2019).  
 
To limit participant bias, the interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the research was explained to avoid any 
misunderstanding by stating it in the interview request letter, and providing further 
explanation during the opening remarks of the interview.   
 
Payne and Payne (2011) indicated that measures should be taken to limit bias by the 
interviewer, who can distort data collection by prompting at the wrong point, or through 
an inadequate recording (Ibid.). Other sources of bias by the interviewer, can include 
the desire to help a participant; failure to follow instructions in administering the 
questions; and showing reactions to responses (FAO, 2019). Researcher bias can be 
reduced according to Regoniel (2013) by adopting the following measures: 
interviewing participants when they are ready to be interviewed; being patient when 
administering questionnaires; asking clear and unambiguous questions; assessing the 
ability of participants to respond; conducting interviews not within hearing distance of 
others; conducting interviews within a reasonable period; and explaining to participants 
that their answers would not be held against them.   
 
Bias was limited by the interviewer guarding against the desire to assist participants to 
respond in a certain manner, and not showing emotion to the responses provided by 




FAO (2019) also stated that it is essential that the interviewer has an excellent 
understanding of the study’s objectives, and of the information to be collected, as this 
would allow for probing questions to elicit the required responses.    
 
The researcher had a good understanding of the study’s objectives to conduct the 
interview. He prepared by reading related literature associated with the research 
objectives, and could enter into a meaningful discussion without fear of 
misunderstanding the responses of the participants. His understanding was also 
demonstrated by his ability to justify the inclusion of certain questions and asking 
probing questions that provided further insight.   
 
4.10. Data analysis procedure  
Data analysis according to Sridhar (2018) is the process of assessing data using 
analytical tools to provide useful information to assist decision-making. Grant (2020) 
showed that several techniques are available for conducting data analysis, including 
data mining, text analytics, business intelligence and data visualisation.   
 
Concerning the procedure for analysing qualitative data, Saunders et al. (2009: 
pg.482) stated ‘… the non-standardised and complex nature of the data that you have 
collected will probably need to be condensed (summarised), grouped (categorised) or 
restructured as a narrative to support meaningful analysis; otherwise the most that may 
result may be an impressionistic view of what they mean’. This procedure could be 
enhanced with computer-aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), which 
allows for more efficient transcriptions of recordings, coding, and analysis compared 
to manual techniques (Ibid.). CAQDAS includes Atlas.ti and NVivo (Scientific Software 
Development GmbH, n.d.; QRS International, 2019). Atlas.ti was utilised for the study 
as it is provided by the University as one of the support tools for researchers.     
 
In light of the qualitative nature of the primary and secondary data that was collected, 
the data had to be condensed, categorised and restructured to support meaningful 
analysis. The secondary data from the World Bank’s Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Database was already arranged into categories. The primary data from 
the transcribed recordings were amalgamated in Microsoft Word, then uploaded to 




4.11. Trustworthiness  
Trustworthiness according to Given (2008: pg.2) can be defined as ‘… the way in which 
qualitative researchers ensure that transferability, credibility, dependability and 
confirmability are evident in their research’. It addresses the concepts, such as 
generalisability, internal validity, reliability and objectivity, which are usually associated 
with quantitative research (Ibid.). Lincoln and Guba (1985: pg.290) were of the view 
that by addressing issues of credibility, consistency, dependability and trustworthiness 
in the design of the study, a researcher could answer the question: ‘How can an 
inquirer persuade his or her audiences that the research findings of an inquiry are worth 
paying attention to?’  
     
Transferability refers to the extent to which the findings of qualitative research can be 
applied or transferred beyond the bounds of the study (Dick, 2014). However, unlike 
generalisability, it emphasises the need for a researcher to be cognisant of the scope 
of their research so that they can discern the applicability of their findings to different 
situations (Given, 2008). Transferability can be realised by providing a detailed 
description of the bounds of the study, which includes: the number of participants in 
the study, their locations; constraints of the participants who provided information; the 
number of researchers involved in the fieldwork; the data collection methods used; the 
number and length of sessions for data collection; and the period over which data were 
collected (Ibid.). Korstjens and Moser (2018) indicated that a rich description of the 
participants and processes is critical towards realising transferability.          
 
For the study, the transferability of the findings was achieved by providing a rich 
description of the bounds of the research. These bounds entailed the following: a 
sample of fourteen participants, who were employed by different organisations 
involved in transport PPPs; the identification of bias of public and private sector 
participants; only one researcher to conduct the fieldwork; and the collection of data 
from primary and secondary sources. These bounds ensured transferability by drawing 
a full picture of the context of the study, the participants, and the research design. All 
relevant organisations related to the study, who were interviewed were included in the 
sample of 14 participants (i.e. public authorities; SPC; lenders; equity investors; EPC 
contractors and subcontractors; O&M contractors; and insurers). Therefore, the views 




researcher instead of many, meant that bias was limited to one source. Using many 
researchers would have introduced multiple sources of bias, due to different 
understandings of the context of the study.   
 
In qualitative research, credibility refers to the accuracy of the description of 
phenomena being investigated (Given, 2008). The accuracy of the data according to 
Roller (2016) refers to gaining information that is as close as possible to what the 
research participant is thinking or experiencing at any moment in time. An accurate 
picture of the phenomenon entails the inclusion of inconsistencies and contradictions 
that are identified and followed-up on of each participant's response (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, accuracy is achieved by giving equal attention to the participants rather 
than focusing on a certain participant (Ibid.) Korstjens and Moser (2018) regarded 
credibility as the confidence that can be placed on the truthfulness of the findings of 
qualitative research. Strategies that could be employed to ensure credibility include: 
triangulation; pro-longed engagement; persistent observation; and member check. 
 
Triangulation according to Carter, Bryant-Lukosius, DiCenso, Blythe and Neville (2014) 
is a technique for validating findings by involving the use of two or more methods that 
yield similar findings of a study (Ibid.). Given (2008) indicated that although 
triangulation is generally associated with data collection methods, it does apply to the 
sources of data. However, there is criticism of triangulation, as questions arise about 
how to interpret divergence rather than validating convergence of the findings 
(Malamatidou, 2018).   
 
Credibility was realised for the study by providing an accurate description of the 
phenomenon being studied. The strategy that was employed was triangulation. To 
perform triangulation, three sources of data were used, namely: secondary data from 
existing sources; primary data from the interviews of seven public sector participants 
and seven private sector participants. Open-ended questions were used in the 
interviews, which allowed participants to express their views in an open manner. The 
interviewer did not try to influence these views in any way and captured them as they 





Korstjens and Moser (2018: pg.121) defined dependability as the ‘… stability of 
findings over time’. To achieve dependability, a researcher outlines the procedure and 
instruments used, to allow other researchers to collect data in a similar manner (Given, 
2008). Confirmability refers to the confidence of the findings based on the responses 
of the participants and not the subjective views of the researcher. Given (2008: pg.2) 
stated that confirmability emphasises ‘… the need for interpretations and findings to 
match the data’, which means that no claims could be made that cannot be 
substantiated by the data. The audit trail is the strategy required to ensure 
dependability and confirmability according to Korstjens and Moser (2018).    
 
For the research to be regarded as dependable and confirmable, the strategy that was 
adopted was an audit trail, where the researcher kept copies of the unedited voice 
recordings and transcripts of the interviews. Records of data reduction products were 
kept, such as the tables of categorical data that were generated. Furthermore, 
electronic copies of notes and completed questionnaire guides used during the 
interviews, would be held in safekeeping for five years, which provides adequate time 
to safe-guard against accusations of research misconduct. This period is informed by 
the University of Virginia (2020: para.1), which indicates that a researcher must keep 
their research records for at least five years or ‘… until there is no reasonable possibility 
that you will be required to defend against an allegation of scientific misconduct’. 
     
4.12. Ethical Considerations  
All research raises ethical issues (Moriarty, 2011). According to Hammersley and 
Traianou (2012: pg.16), social research ethics refers to ‘… the study of what 
researchers ought and ought not to do, and how this should be decided’. Ethics 
provides a set of principles that allow a researcher to distinguish between what is right 
or wrong (Ibid.). This is the reason why a researcher needs to obtain ethical clearance 
from the ethics committee of their research institution or be guided by a relevant code 
of conduct for their profession or a statement of ethical practice (Moriarty, 2011; 
Hammersley & Traianou, 2012).  
 
Ethical considerations are important for both quantitative and qualitative research, 
however, qualitative research raises specific ethical questions (Moriarty, 2011). These 





 power dynamics between the researcher and the participant (Moriarty, 2011);  
 studying sensitive topics that have the potential of arousing distress among 
participants (Moriarty, 2011);  
 consent and informing participants of the broad areas of enquiry (Hammersley 
& Traianou, 2012; Salmons, 2011);  
 demands made on participants (FAO, 2019);  
 intrusive studies (Moriarty, 2011);  
 anonymity and confidentiality (Moriarty, 2011; FAO, 2019);  
 dilemmas raised by the researcher’s obligation to maintain confidentiality 
(Moriarty, 2011); and  
 the impact of new technologies (Moriarty, 2011).  
 
Power dynamics are more of a concern when a greater disparity exists in the social 
and economic privilege between the researcher and the participants, e.g. children and 
the destitute (Moriarty, 2011). For this study, the influence of power dynamics was 
mitigated through the selection of the participants, who were predominantly senior 
managers in their respective organisations. The social and economic privilege of these 
individuals made it improbable and unlikely for them to be coerced or exploited by the 
researcher to participate or respond in a particular manner. The potential for a study 
to raise distress among participants by researching sensitive topics also poses an 
ethical question for qualitative studies (Gibbs, Molyneaux, Whiteley, Block, Harms, 
Bryant, Forbes, Gallagher, MacDougall & Ireton, 2018). Although no potentially 
distressful questions were identified for this study, participants were informed of their 
right not to respond or participate any further.  
 
It is important to seek consent and inform participants of the broad areas of enquiry ( 
Salmons, 2011; Hammersley & Traianou, 2012). This consideration ensures that there 
is buy-in, the building of trust, and support for the study by the participants as they feel 
more comfortable to fully engage when aware of the implications of the study, with no 
hidden agendas (Salmons, 2011; Hammersley & Traianou, 2012). Participants were 
provided with a consent form before the interviews.  
 




(2019) such as setting aside extended periods to participate in the study. For this 
reason, interviews were limited to 30 minutes. Qualitative studies could also prove 
more intrusive to participants than other types of research, especially if the participants 
are expected to interact with the researcher over multiple periods i.e. longitudinal time 
horizons for interviews (Ibid.). Intrusion of the participants’ time was limited by adopting 
a cross-sectional time horizon for the interviews, where they were asked questions and 
follow-up questions during the same session (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016).     
 
Anonymity and confidentiality of participants were also outlined (Moriarty, 2011; FAO, 
2019). Participants should be assured that their identities would be kept confidential 
(Moriarty, 2011; FAO, 2019), and that their responses would only be used in an 
aggregate form (FAO, 2019). This aspect is important to build trust and reveal the real 
views and attitudes of participants of the interview questions (Moriarty, 2011; FAO, 
2019). No dilemmas should be raised by the researcher’s duty to maintain 
confidentiality e.g. disclosure by a participant of their intention to harm themselves or 
others, versus the researcher’s need to inform other people of this intent (Moriarty, 
2011). The researcher did not experience any ethical dilemmas with maintaining 
confidentiality.   
 
Moriarty (2011) identified the need for ethical consideration when using new 
technologies, such as audio and visual recording devices, and the Internet. Advances 
in technology have provided researchers with enhanced abilities to record, store and 
share various aspects relating to a conversation, which a participant might or might not 
be aware of (Ibid.). As a result, there is an obligation by the researcher to inform the 
participants of their intention to use such aids (FAO, 2019). If the participant should 
refuse to be recorded using such aids, then the researcher could resort to traditional 
measures, such as taking hand-written notes. All of the participants consented to be 
recorded.   
 
In light of these ethical considerations, ethical clearance was granted for the study by 






4.13. Conclusion  
The research onion, as depicted by Saunders et al., (2019) in Figure 4.1 was used to 
define the research methodology for the study. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the 
methodology used. 
 
Table 4-3: Summary of the research methodology 
Philosophy  Positivism  
Approach  Deduction  
Design and plan  Descriptive and exploratory  
Methodological choice  Qualitative  
Strategy Survey 
Time horizon  Cross-sectional  




















CHAPTER 5 : ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY DATA AND DISCUSSION 
OF FINDINGS  
 
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter provides an analysis of the secondary data and discussion of findings that 
address the first research objective, which entails identifying trends that are evident in 
the transport PPPs of the BRICS countries over the past fifteen years. By addressing 
this objective, practices that are widely recognised for contributing to the success of 
the BRICS countries, were identified, and areas of underperformance revealed. 
Furthermore, this chapter provides a basis for validating convergent findings in chapter 
six by enabling triangulation.   
 
The secondary data entails the categorical data of the 837 transport PPPs that reached 
financial closure in the BRICS countries, over the past fifteen years. It was analysed 
categorically to identify, describe, and explore the general direction in PPP practices 
of the BRICS countries. Frequency distribution tables and bar charts were used to 
enhance the process of identifying trends and patterns. To establish the credibility of 
the findings and confirm trends that were expected, a comparison with the literature 
was then conducted to ascertain consistency between them. Inconsistencies in the 
trends were also revealed to identify divergent practices. Conclusions were then drawn 
from the key findings to synthesise new ideas.      
  
The data were obtained from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure 
(PPI) Database, which is a secondary source (World Bank Group, 2020a). This 
database was selected because the World Bank Group (2016a: pg.6) indicated that it 
‘… is uniquely positioned to present the historical trends of PPPs in the past 25 years’. 
Furthermore, an examination of other databases, such as the InfraPPP Database 
(Aninver InfraPPP Partners, 2020), Global Infrastructure Hub Project Pipeline (Global 
Infrastructure Hub, 2019), Infralatam Economic Infrastructure Investment Data (CAF-
Development Bank of Latin America, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, & Inter-American Development Bank, 2020), and IJ Global PPP Projects 
Database (Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC, 2020) revealed that the PPI was by 
far the most comprehensive repository of secondary data on transport PPPs for all of 




The trends, which the study sought to reveal, relate to the list of practices outlined in 
Table 2.10, which displays the detailed list of PPP practices. An inspection of the 
dataset indicated that the available data were adequate to reveal trends on aspects of 
practice that relate to the following: the establishment of legal frameworks; incentive-
based regulations; political commitment and support; transparency of processes and 
proactive disclosure of project information; prioritisation of commercially viable 
projects; threshold on project value; project term; transfer of risk to the private partner; 
the debt-to-equity ratio in financing; promotion of competition in the market; and 
technical and service innovation.  
 
5.2. Establishment of legal frameworks  
The Natural Resource Governance Institute (2015: pg.1) defines the legal framework 
as ‘… the rules, rights and obligations of companies, governments and citizens are set 
forth in a system of legal documents’. This system of documents includes a country’s 
constitution, legislation, policy, regulations, and contracts (Ibid.). Therefore, to identify 
the trend in the establishment of legal frameworks, categories of data that revealed a 
general direction in the laws, rules, policies, or contracts for the regulation of PPPs had 
to be analysed. For this purpose, the category of data classified under the Government 
Granting Contract was selected for analysis. According to the World Bank Group 
(2020a), the Government Granting Contract refers to the level of government that 
enters into a contract (i.e. National, state/provincial, or municipal/local). Given that 
contracts are regarded as an integral component of a legal framework (Natural 
Resource Governance Institute, 2015), the general direction in the granting of 
contracts by most of these governments would reveal a trend in the establishment of 
legal frameworks.  
 
Figure 5.1 displays the frequency distribution of data categorised under a Government 
Granting Contract. It shows that all of the BRICS countries have entered into contracts 
for transport PPPs over the past fifteen years. Of these countries, India granted the 
most contracts, followed by China, Brazil, Russia then South Africa. Between the two 
of them, the Asian economies of India and China accounted for most of the contracts. 
Further inspection also indicates that most of these countries have granted contracts 
across all three levels of their respective governments (i.e. National, state/provincial, 




at the municipal/local level. It has only granted one contract at the national level for the 
Beitbridge Border Post, and two contracts at the state/provincial levels for the Gautrain 
Rapid Rail Project and the Durban Passenger Terminal operated by MSC Cruises. It 
is also evident that these countries predominantly granted contracts at the national or 
provincial tier of their governments. The exception is China, which granted contracts 
mainly at the local/municipal level of its government.   
 
 
Figure 5-1: Frequency distribution of government granting contract 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a)  
 
Analysis of the data in Figure 5.1, reveals a trend for the establishment of legal 
frameworks across the BRICS countries, which are characterised by the autonomy of 
different tiers of government to enter into a contract. This finding is evidenced by the 
literature, which also shows that all of the BRICS countries have established legal 
frameworks for PPPs, albeit at differing levels of maturity (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 
2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). The literature also 
reveals that Brazil (Pereira, 2014), South Africa (Ittmann, 2017) and Russia (Polyakova 
& Vasilyeva, 2016) have the authority to grant contracts across different levels of 
government. For these countries, the granting of contracts is predominantly realised at 
the national, as well as the provincial tiers (Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory 






India China Brazil Russian Federation South Africa
National 316 46 41 17 2
State/Provincial 154 37 39 3 1
Local/Municipal 5 125 8 6
Not Applicable 1 1




Facility, 2017). This trend is attributed to the establishment of PPP units, which are 
recognised for their contribution to the development of contracting capacity, at the 
higher echelons of the governments of these countries (Istrate & Puentes, 2011). As a 
result, there is greater capacity to contract at these tiers of government. 
   
What was not expected, was China’s contradiction of this trend, as the data shows that 
this country realised the greatest uptake of contracts at the municipal/local level of its 
government, despite having located its PPP unit at the national tier. This finding is 
supported by Guo, Martek and Chuan (2019: pg.2) who indicated that ‘… more than 
90% of PPP projects were initiated by local governments in China’. The prevalence of 
PPPs at the local level is attributed to China’s system of governance, which recognises 
the hierarchical authority of central government leadership above other tiers of the 
state (China Legal Information Centre, 2015). This means that the central government 
of China, through its PPP unit, has greater authority in directing the uptake of projects 
at the sub-national level, compared to democracies that fully uphold the autonomy of 
the different tiers of government.  
 
In light of these findings, a conclusion can be drawn that, except for China, most of the 
BRICS countries reflect their greatest capacity is to enter into PPP contracts at the 
national level, then provincial, then local. Van den Hurk, Brogaard, Lember, Petersen 
and Witz (2016) showed that a greater contracting capacity was observed at the 
national tier of several European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Belgium and 
Switzerland. It can also be concluded that the central government of China has a 
significant influence on the uptake of PPPs at the local level. The centralised control 
or regulation of local level PPPs by the national tier, is observed in France and Spain, 
which use national procurement legislation to regulate local PPPs (APM Group, 
2020c). The dominance of contracts in India and Brazil at the national tier, followed by 
the state, which is not lagging far behind, is supported by the World Bank Group 
(2016b). This is attributed to ‘… several policy and institutional initiatives taken by the 
central, as well as many state governments’ (World Bank Group, 2016b: para.2), which 
has created an enabling environment and capacity to undertake PPPs.         
 
5.3. Incentive-based regulation  




state regulations intended to induce changes in the behaviour of individuals or firms, 
which will result in economic or social benefits. Therefore, to identify trends in an 
incentive-based regulation, the categories of data that reveal financial aid or support 
provided by authorities, were analysed (e.g. subsidies and guarantees). For this 
purpose, the categories of data classified as direct government support and indirect 
government support, were analysed. Based on the World Bank Group (2020a), direct 
government support refers to the liabilities of the state that cover project costs, which 
are certain to occur. This includes capital and revenue subsidies, and in-kind support 
provided by authorities to the private sector for implementing PPPs (e.g. cash 
subsidies and land) (Ibid.). In contrast, indirect government support refers to contingent 
liabilities that are not certain to occur, or state policies that support investment (Ibid.). 
This includes guarantees, such as debt; revenue; construction cost; interest rate; 
payment; tax deductions and government credit (Ibid.). The granting of subsidies and 
guarantees by most countries would be indicative of incentive-based regulations, as 
they are intended to induce the private sector to implement a public policy for a social 
or economic benefit (Harvey, 2015).  
 
Figure 5.2 displays a frequency distribution of the data categorised as direct 
government support. It shows that due to the unavailability of the data on subsidies, 
there was no disclosure for more than half of the projects undertaken across the BRICS 
countries. This finding could be attributed to Carter (2015), who indicated that there is 
strong opposition to subsidies for PPPs; this discourages transparency. Among the 
projects, where the data were disclosed, the indication is that all of the BRICS countries 
received subsidies, with the most common being capital subsidy, and to a lesser 
extent, revenue subsidy. Of these countries, the projects in India received the largest 
number of capital subsidies, while projects in China received the largest number of 
revenue subsidies. It is also evident that Brazil and South Africa have not granted 






Figure 5-2: Frequency distribution of direct government support 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
Figure 5.3 displays a frequency distribution of data categorised under indirect 
government support. Due to the unavailability of the data on guarantees, these were 
not disclosed in more than three-quarters of the projects in the BRICS countries. Of 
the projects shown to have received guarantees, all of the BRICS countries were 
represented. The most prevalent type received was the revenue guarantee. Projects 
in China received the largest number of revenue guarantees, followed by projects in 
Brazil and Russia, while projects in India and South Africa have not received this type 
of guarantee. The least prevalent forms of guarantees across these countries, were 
those associated with construction costs, interest rates, other annualised operations 
and maintenance costs, and other state guarantees. 
 










Revenue subsidy 1 20 1
Capital subsidy 264 64 12 6 1
Not Applicable 112 19 37 2





Figure 5-3: Frequency distribution of data on indirect government support 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
The analysis of the data in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, shows that the trend of the subsidies 
and guarantees across the BRICS countries is characterised mainly by non-disclosure 
of data related to the incentives provided to the private sector. This finding is supported 
by the Association of Corporate Treasurers (2020), and De Castro e Silva Neto, Cruz, 
Rodrigues and Silva (2020), who show that there is a lack of transparency of the 
incentives in China and Brazil. Of the projects where data were disclosed, the granting 
of capital subsidies is the most prevalent type. Although guarantees are not as popular 
as subsidies, the most prevalent amongst these countries was the revenue guarantee.  
 
The finding on the granting of subsidies and guarantees was expected, as the literature 
also shows that all of the BRICS countries apply incentive-based regulations 
(Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury 2017; Ittmann 
2017). The popularity of capital subsidies over government guarantees, was also 










Revenue Guarantee 8 5 1
Payment Guarantee 3 1
Tax Deduction/Government Credit 1 1
Construction Cost Guarantee 1
Debt Guarantee 1 1
Interest Rate Guarantee 1
Other Annualised operations and
maintenance cost
1
Other State Guarantee 1
Not Applicable 39 12 40 4




expected as capital subsidies are shown to decrease the cost of capital whereas 
guarantees increase it (Pereira, 2014). Therefore, capital subsidies improve the 
economic viability of projects, which in turn encourages investment (World Bank 
Institute, 2012).  
 
What was not expected was the high degree of non-disclosure of the data of the 
incentives, of more than three-quarters of the projects undertaken by these countries, 
as this contradicts Gurria (n.d.), who indicated that transparency builds trust, 
encourages buy-in and progress. This finding is supported by Yubo, Martek and Chuan 
(2019: pg.1), who indicated that in China there is a lack of ‘… financial incentives and 
poor transparency and disclosure supervision’. Shukla (2011) highlighted the lack of 
transparency in India’s PPP programme on aspects, such as the government’s 
financial contribution. The omission of most of the data on incentives appears 
deliberate, as subsidies for PPP projects in developing countries is a controversial 
topic, with concerns raised from some quarters of society. This finding is demonstrated 
by Carter (2015), who showed that the decision to subsidise private investment was 
strongly opposed by some civil organisations and some eminent economists. Basu 
(2014: pg.3), who is the World Bank Chief Economist, stated  
 
‘… this partnership between the private and public is, however, fraught with risks, because it is 
like bringing two very different animals inside the arena. If the design of incentives and 
boundaries of action are not well-specified, PPP can be a disaster, with one side draining the 
other or stalling its functioning. Remember, crony capitalism is also a form of public-private 
partnership’.  
 
Basu (2014) showed that in the past, reckless governments provided guarantees in a 
bid to promote the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects, where the 
government would pay the investor if the project failed. In the context of developing 
economies, which have competing priorities, project failure has dire financial 
consequences for the state, which might explain the governments’ reluctance to 
disclose information in this regard.  
 
In light of these findings, a conclusion can be drawn that the BRICS governments have 
an interest in creating environments conducive to attracting investments using 




2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury 2017; Ittmann 2017). It can also be 
concluded that they are reluctant to fully disclose details of this support, given the 
controversies that might arise if these projects fail (Carter, 2015).  
 
5.4. Political commitment and support  
Political commitment is defined by Baker, Hawkes, Wingrove, Demaio, Parkhurst, 
Thow and Walls (2018: pg.2) as ‘…the will of societal actors to act and keep up on 
acting until the job is done’. It is demonstrated through ‘… the mobilisation of political 
systems and institutions, adopting policies, allocating resources and coordinating 
responses for as long as necessary to ensure results’ (Ibid: pg.2). Therefore, to identify 
trends in political commitment and support, categorical data that revealed public sector 
approvals, financial contributions, the status of the project, or formulation of policies 
intended to support PPPs, had to be analysed. Downs, Sankara and Yeboah-Antwi 
(2017) showed that the concept of political commitment is much broader than the 
support of the executive or senior government officials. It also entails the endorsement 
of projects by the private sector, civil society, and other affected stakeholders (Ibid.). 
For this purpose, data under the following categories were analysed: project status; 
main revenue source; and unsolicited proposal.  
 
The World Bank Group (2020a) refers to project status as the state of affairs of a 
project at a given time. Seven types of project status are identified, namely: active, 
concluded; cancelled; selling or transferring; removal of management; ceasing 
operation; and distressed (Ibid.). Several active projects are indicative of strong 
political commitment as these projects would not have commenced or remained active 
without sustained political support (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2017). The main revenue source 
identifies the key stakeholder responsible for paying the private party (Ibid.). These 
sources include user fees, variable or fixed annuities/availability payments from the 
state, and purchase agreements with public or private sector entities (Ibid.). The main 
sources of revenue that are derived externally of a government are indicative of strong 
political support as they demonstrate a willingness by other stakeholders to contribute 
to the sustainability of a project (Pradhan, 2019).  
 
The Bureau of Public Affairs (2017) defined unsolicited proposals as privately-initiated 




for proposals or any other form of government solicitation. The willingness of the 
executive and senior government officials to consider plans that originate externally to 
the public sector, shows a degree of political commitment as external stakeholders are 
perceived as being part of the decision-making process (Gratton & Beddows, 2018). 
Unsolicited proposals have been received for 10-30% of all projects undertaken by low 
to middle-income countries globally according to the World Bank Group (2020b). 
Therefore, receipt of unsolicited proposals in more than a third of the projects of the 
BRICS countries, is indicative of strong political commitment, as these projects are 
unlikely to be realised, unless policy-makers are convinced that the project will result 
in significant benefits to the public by deviating to the normal public infrastructure 
planning process (Gratton & Beddows, 2018). However, Osei-Kyei, Chan, Dansoh, 
Ofori-Kuragu and Owusu (2018) cautioned that unsolicited proposals are also a source 
of political abuse, especially if competitive and consultative approaches are not 
adopted during the process.        
 
Figure 5.4 displays a frequency distribution of the data categorised under project 
status. It reveals that most of the projects are still active across the BRICS countries. 
More than half of these active projects are in India, followed by China, Brazil, Russia 
and South Africa. It also shows that only Brazil has concluded one of its projects, while 
India has cancelled a few.   
 
 
Figure 5-4: Frequency distribution of data on project status 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
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Based on the literature, it was expected that there exists strong political support for 
transport PPPs in the BRICS countries (Tiong, 2013; Churakov, 2014; Mouraviev & 
Kakabadse, 2014; Cruz et al., 2015; Gopalkrishna & Karnam, 2015). An analysis of 
the data in Figure 5.4 demonstrates that there is strong political support for transport 
PPPs in India, China and Brazil as evidenced by a large number of active projects. 
This finding is supported by Swamy and Patel (2014), who indicated that India triggered 
several projects to address the rapid rate of urbanisation and the demand for urban 
mobility. These projects would most likely have not commenced or remained active 
without political support, as Boardman et al. (2015) stated that PPPs require a high 
level of political and community support to succeed, especially if the user-pay principle 
is applied. For Russia, an analysis of the data in Figure 5.4 suggests that there is 
limited political support, as demonstrated by the low number of active projects. This 
finding contradicts Cruz et al. (2015), who stated that there is high political support for 
PPPs in Russia. This is supported by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2013), which 
stated that Russia planned and implemented other PPPs that were not reflected in the 
World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. It is not apparent why 
the World Bank Group omitted these projects from its database (Ibid.). This information 
gap might be attributed to Kurchatov, Khariton, Sakharov, Zeldovich and Altshuler 
(2017), who indicated that the former Soviet Union has a history of clandestine mega 
infrastructure projects, of which the information has not been readily accessible to 
foreigners.    
 
In light of these findings, it can be concluded that there is strong political support for 
PPPs in Brazil, India and China, as evidenced by the large number of projects 
undertaken (Swamy & Patel, 2014). It can also be concluded that Russia has greater 
political support than what is demonstrated by the data from the World Bank Group, 
based on the existence of other PPPs that are not captured in its database (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2013).        
  
India’s cancellation of some of its projects that had reached financial closure, was not 
expected. This is on the basis that it can take as much as twenty-four to thirty-six 
months to satisfy all the conditions of the project and financing agreements required to 
reach financial closure, making cancellations at this advanced stage unlikely (Mandri-




stages, as decision-makers would have already had an idea of whether or not to 
proceed with the said projects, instead of waiting such a long time only to cancel 
(Beerbohm & Fitzgerald, 2019). Agarchand and Laishram (2017) attributed the 
cancellation of PPPs to the shortcomings of India’s PPP procurement process in 
promoting sustainable development. They indicated that these shortcomings include:  
 
‘… incomprehensive environmental impact assessment and social impact assessment studies; 
lack of stakeholder and local participation; high bidding and transaction cost; high user charges; 
improper risk allocation; lack of transparency and accountability; goal conflicts between public 
and private sector; and lack of skill and knowledge about sustainability’ (Ibid: pg.642). 
 
The cancellation of contracts in India was in stark contrast to the rest of the BRICS 
countries that did not have any cancellations after the stage of financial closure. 
However, cancellations before this stage are evident, as Matos and Gonçalves (2020) 
show that there has been a high rate of cancellations and delays in the pre-contractual 
phase of PPPs in Brazil. This indicates that shortcomings exist in the procurement 
process of PPPs of this country, which is mainly attributed to regulatory failures (Ibid.)    
 
In light of this finding, a conclusion can be drawn that there are shortcomings to India’s 
PPP procurement process in promoting sustainable development (Agarchand & 
Laishram, 2017). It can also be concluded that there are shortcomings in the pre-
contractual phase of PPPs in Brazil (Matos & Gonçalves, 2020). 
 
Figure 5.5 displays a frequency distribution of data categorised under ‘Main revenue 
source’. It shows that user-fees were the main source of revenue in more than half of 
the projects undertaken in the BRICS countries. The user-fees were most prevalent in 
India, followed by Brazil, China, Russia and then South Africa. It also indicates that 
fixed annuity/availability payments were more popular than the user-fees in China. 






Figure 5-5: Frequency distribution of data on main revenue source 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
Analysis of the data in Figure 5.5 demonstrates strong political commitment and 
support for transport PPPs in the BRICS countries, as proven by the willingness of 
users to pay user-fees. This finding is supported by Pradhan (2019), who indicates that 
there has been an increase in payment of tolls as recorded by the National Payments 
Corporation of India (NPCI). Data from the NPCI shows that electronic toll concessions 
exceeded 31 million transactions in October 2019 (Ibid.) Similarly, Reja, Amos and 
Hongye (2013) indicated that user-fees are widely collected in China to finance most 
of the expressways. Pradhan (2019) attributes the growth in collections in India to the 
implementation of an interoperable electronic toll collection system known as FASTag, 
which is recognised for improving convenience for user payments and reducing 
operational costs associated with toll collection. Thillai, Deep and Mangu (2018) also 
showed that although annuities remain popular as evidenced by the implementation of 
several projects under ‘a hybrid annuity model’, decision-makers prefer user-fees as 
the main revenue regime and payment mechanism. The APM Group (2020d: para.3) 










User fees 272 53 92 21 3
Fixed annuity/availability payment(s)
from the government
84 87 1 2
Variable annuity/availability
payment(s) from the government
44 17 1
User fees plus other revenue source 4
Purchase agreements with public
entity(ies)
2








states ‘User-pays PPPs are a popular revenue regime for governments due to the 
practically neutral budgetary impact of such projects’.  
 
What was not expected, was that the main revenue source for transport PPPs in China, 
was dominated by the availability-based payments over user-fees. This finding is 
supported by Chang and Chen (2016: pg.3) who indicated that  
 
‘… of the 700 plus PFI projects, the vast majority were contracted through a variant of PFI, 
known as design-build-finance-operate (DBFO), under which the private investor’s return is 
made dependent upon the availability of project assets and the performance of services 
provided’.  
 
The dominance of availability-based payments as the main source of revenue, shows 
that the Chinese government contributes substantially to the financing of projects from 
public sector resources (Ibid.). However, user-fees also contribute a substantial portion 
of the revenue as shown by the tolling of most of the expressways in China (Reja et 
al., 2013).    
 
A conclusion can therefore, be drawn, that there is a strong political commitment and 
support for transport PPPs in the BRICS countries, as shown by the political support 
for the willingness of the user-pay principle (Reja et al., 2013; Pradhan, 2019). It can 
also be concluded that there is a strong political commitment in India and China, based 
on the willingness of their governments to contribute annuity payments (Reja et al., 
2013; Thillai et al., 2018)  
 
Figure 5.6 displays a frequency distribution of the data in the category of unsolicited 
proposal, which shows that these were received in almost half of the projects 
undertaken by the BRICS countries. India received unsolicited proposals for more than 
half of its projects, while Brazil for less than half of its projects. It is also evident that 
China received unsolicited proposals for over a third of the projects. Russia received 
seventeen unsolicited proposals, while South Africa received an unsolicited proposal 
for one project. Except for India, the rest of the BRICS countries implemented all of the 
projects that emanated from unsolicited proposals. Although India had some 






Figure 5-6: Frequency distribution of data of unsolicited proposals 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
Similar to Figures 5.4 and 5.5, Figure 5.6 demonstrates that there is strong political 
support and commitment for the transport PPPs in India, China and Brazil, as 
demonstrated by the large number of unsolicited proposals that were implemented. 
This finding is supported by the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (2014), 
which indicated that during 2014, Asia accounted for 60% of all unsolicited proposals 
in the Private Participation Infrastructure Database. During this period, unsolicited 
proposals were mainly implemented in India and China as they were the largest PPP 
markets in the world (Ibid.). Marques (2018) showed that unsolicited proposals were 
used extensively in Brazil, Korea and the United States of America. The popularity of 
unsolicited proposals in Brazil is attributed to their ability to deliver timeously according 
to the political mandates (Ibid.). The Public-Private Infrastructure Facility (2014) also 
showed that unsolicited proposals submitted by foreign developers tend to be backed 










































Active Cancelled Active Active Concluded Active Active
Solicited 230 10 152 55 17 1




by their governments. As a result, these proposals are ‘… submitted at high political 
level (sector ministers and above), and hence are given high priority status’ (Ibid: 
pg.19). Tiong (2013) showed that private sector participation tends to follow where 
political support is strong. This is obvious in the Gautrain Rapid Rail Project, where 
strong political support promoted collaboration between the public and private sectors 
on the technical and financial aspects of the project (Centre for Public Impact, 2016). 
The political support was evident across the national and provincial governments, as 
well as other non-transport state departments (Ibid.). 
 
In light of these findings, a conclusion can be drawn that there is a strong political 
commitment in India, China and Brazil for transport PPPs, as demonstrated by the 
large number of unsolicited proposals that were implemented (Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2014). A further conclusion is where there is strong 
political support, private participation tends to follow, as shown by the cooperation of 
the public and private sectors in the Gautrain Rapid Rail Project (Centre for Public 
Impact, 2016).    
 
5.5. Transparency of processes and proactive disclosure   
The World Bank Group (2020c) defines proactive disclosure as the free and voluntary 
release or publication of full project and contract information by an accounting 
authority, without receiving any specific request. This information can be released in 
the form of an online database, a library of contracts or press releases (Ibid.). The 
analyses of the categories of data that exposed the willingness of contracting 
authorities to show their full contract information, revealed trends on the transparency 
of processes and proactive disclosure of contract information. For this purpose, the 
category of data on proactive public disclosure was analysed. The World Bank Group 
(2013: pg.10) identified five reports included in a proactive public disclosure, namely:  
 
‘… [1] the disclosure of the current PPP contract (identifying any changes made since the contract was 
originally signed) and relevant side agreements, including government guarantees, with minimal 
redactions, which reflect commercially confidential information; [2] the disclosure of future stream of 
payments and government commitments under PPP contracts; [3] the publication of a summary which 
provides in plain language the most important elements of the contract and project and key information 
on the rationalisation of the project, selection as a PPP and procurement; [4] information regularly on 





The omission of any of these reports would render the disclosure incomplete (Ibid.)   
 
Table 5.1 displays the frequency distribution of data on proactive public disclosure. It 
shows that only Brazil and Russia have proactively released full project and contract 
information to the public. However, this only occurred in three of the 837 projects 
undertaken by the BRICS countries.  
 
Table 5-1:  Frequency distribution of proactive public disclosure 
  No Yes 
Brazil 94 2 
China 225  
India 487  
Russian Federation 25 1 
South Africa 3  
 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
The analysis of the data in Table 5.1 shows that the BRICS countries do not proactively 
disclose project and contract information to the public, as proven by the publication of 
only two complete disclosures in Brazil and one in Russia. This finding is supported by 
the World Bank Group (2013), which showed that neither Brazil, India nor South Africa 
made all of the five reports public, as required for proactive public disclosure. In Brazil, 
both performance and audit reports are not proactively disclosed, nor are summaries 
of the projects and contract information provided (ibid). In India, performance reports 
are disclosed reactively, while summaries of project and contract information are not 
provided (Ibid.). In South Africa, contract information and audit reports are disclosed 
reactively (Ibid.). Interested parties need to apply to authorities for the limited contract 
information using the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (IBRD/WB, 
2014). This process does not guarantee that the required information will be received 
in part or whole, and might come at a cost (Ibid.). This finding follows expectations as 
revealed from the literature that transparency and proactive disclosure of projects and 
contract information is still a challenge across most of the BRICS countries (Churakov, 
2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; Ittmann, 2017). 
One of the reasons for the lack of transparency according to Marques (2018) is the 
perceived sensitivity of the protection of intellectual property. Some proponents of 




are usually proprietary to the private sector (IBRD/WB, 2017). As a result, governments 
are reluctant to proactively disclose any contractual information that could compromise 
commercial secrecy and lead to costly litigation by the private sector (Ibid.). However, 
Marques (2018) indicated that this claim is seldom valid as alternatives are usually 
available.  
 
What was not expected was the lack of proactive disclosure in Brazil. There is a 
requirement according to the World Bank Group (2020c) for the state of Minas Gerais 
in Brazil to disclose contracts in full to comply with the law, unlike other countries, such 
as the United Kingdom, which redacts contracts in view of protecting commercially 
sensitive information. In light of these findings, it can be concluded that there is a lack 
of proactive public disclosure in the BRICS countries as verified by the World Bank 
Group (2013).  
 
5.6. Prioritisation of commercially viable projects 
Project viability according to Kasasi (2020: para.1) refers to ‘…the assessment of 
whether the project has the capacity to meet the defined objectives and in addition 
generate significant financial and economic gains to the stakeholders and the economy 
in general’. Therefore, to reveal the trends of the prioritisation of commercially viable 
projects, it is necessary to examine the general direction of the level of contribution by 
the public sector, profitability, and demand for the project (Ibid.). For this purpose, the 
categories of data that were selected for analysis were bid criteria, subsector, and 
segment. The World Bank Group (2020a) refers to bid criteria as the conditions that a 
proposal needs to meet to provide the most value-for-money, and includes the 
following: the lowest subsidy paid; the lowest government payments; the lowest cost 
of construction or operation; the highest price paid to the government; the highest 
percentage of revenue-share with the government; the lowest tariff; and the highest 
new investment. These conditions also reveal the level of contribution by the public 
sector (Ibid.). The World Bank Group (2020a) also refers to the subsector as the mode 
of transport involved. Given that the various modes are characterised by different 
levels of demand risk, this category can expose the public sector’s affinity for demand 
risk between the various modes (e.g. road projects typically have less demand risk 
than airports) (Palmer, 2015). The World Bank Group (2020a) refers to segment as the 




runways. This category provided further insight into the form of infrastructure preferred 
for each mode of transport.     
 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the frequency distribution of data categorised under bid criteria. It 
shows that the bid criterion that is most prevalent in India, is the lowest subsidy 
required, followed by the lowest cost of construction or operation, then the lowest 
government payment, and then the highest percentage revenue share with the 
government. The data is not available on the bid criteria of a large portion of China’s 
projects. Of the projects, where data is available, the most prominent criteria are the 
lowest payments by the government, followed by the lowest cost of construction and 
operation. The criteria that are most prevalent in Brazil are the lowest tariff, followed 
by the highest price paid to the government. There is insufficient data for Russia and 
South Africa to draw any conclusive findings on this aspect.    
  
 
Figure 5-7: Frequency distribution on bid criteria 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 










Lowest subsidy required 148 3 4 1
Lowest government payments 70 39 5 1
Lowest cost of construction or
operation
78 28 1 3 1
Highest price paid to government 38 3 21 3
Highest percentage of revenue share
with government
57 2 1
Lowest tariff 1 31 1
Highest new investment 4
Other 16 2 1
Not Applicable 18 2 1




The analysis of the data in Figure 5.7 demonstrates that the prioritisation of the viable 
projects in India, is achieved through the bid criteria, which results in the selection of 
projects with the lowest financial contributions by the government. This is shown by 
the dominance of the projects selected, based on the lowest subsidies, the lowest 
government payments, and the lowest construction costs. This finding is supported by 
the Department of Economic Affairs (2020), which indicates that the government of 
India is not willing to subsidise more than 20% of the total project cost. These subsidies 
are provided in the form of a once-off or deferred grant, and are contingent on the 
private developer spending their portion of equity before disbursement of the grant 
(Ibid.). Delmon (2017) showed that low to middle-income countries have a preference 
for projects that will not place a financial burden on the state. 
 
In contrast, China has adjudicated a few projects based on the lowest subsidy required 
as is seen in Figure 5.7. This is supported by Reja et al. (2013: para.3), who indicated 
that ‘… provinces have financed the majority of capital costs’ of their expressway 
network; this demonstrates that high subsidies are prevalent. Data analysis 
demonstrated that China prioritises the bid criteria that result in the lowest government 
annuity payments or the cost of construction, as seen in Figure 5.7. This finding is 
supported by Chang and Chen (2016), who indicated that the popularity of availability-
based payments or annuities, have increased in China since 2013. This was due to 
the government’s transition from user-pays to government-pays. The Chinese 
government attributed improved performance to the consistent delivery of the 
infrastructure and services to availability-based payments, as confirmed by the high 
number of projects that received these annuities (Ibid.).         
 
What was not expected was the pervasiveness of the lowest tariff as a bid criterion in 
Brazil. This condition was recognised as a regulatory risk as early as 2005 (World Bank 
Group, 2014a). Its pervasiveness could be attributed to the delays in the amendment 
or repeal of regulations in the country that recognise the lowest tariff as a preferred 
criterion for bidding (Ibid.). It is also not evident why the Brazilian government has not 
yet amended its regulations to address this issue, when it is apparent that it does not 
have the ‘… capacity to appraise, execute, monitor and evaluate public sector 
investment projects’ (Ibid: pg.212). To sustain low tariffs, projects require investors that 




can keep the cost of capital low, is to request grants or capital contributions from the 
public sector (Ibid.). Therefore, low tariffs present the risk of high subsidies to the public 
sector, which might not be affordable to most low to middle-income countries (Delmon, 
2017).  
  
Based on these findings, it can be concluded that India prioritises the selection of viable 
projects through bid criteria that result in the lowest contributions by the government, 
either in the form of subsidies, government payments or construction costs 
(Department of Economic Affairs, 2020). It can also be concluded that China prioritises 
viable projects through the payment of the lowest annuities, which compels the private 
operator to perform and ensure project success (Chang & Chen, 2016). Concerning 
Brazil, it can be concluded that the prioritisation of projects with the lowest tariffs, 
discourage the selection of viable projects (World Bank Group, 2014a; Leighland, 
2018).     
 
Table 5.2 displays a frequency distribution of data categorised under subsector. It 
reveals that transport PPPs are most prevalent in the road sector for all of the BRICS 
countries.   
 
Table 5-2: Frequency distribution of subsector 
Country Roads Ports Airports Railways Railways & Roads 
India 429 36 12 9 1 
China 146 46 11 22  
Brazil 39 28 21 8  
Russian 
Federation 13 4 6 3  
South Africa 1 1  1  
 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
Table 5.3 displays the frequency distribution of data categorised under segment. It 
indicates that transport PPPs undertaken in the BRICS countries mainly involve 







Table 5-3:  Frequency distribution of segment 
Project type India China Brazil Russian Federation South Africa 
Highway 395 132 35 9 1 
Terminal 31 49 32 6 1 
Runway and terminal 7 6 15 2  
Bridge and highway 26  2 1  
Local passenger/light rail 2 9 4  1 
Bridge 2 7 2 2  
Freight  5 1 2  
Channel dredging and terminal 4  2   
Fixed assets only 3 4    
Fixed assets and passenger 3  2   
Fixed assets and freight 1 1 1 1  
Channel dredging 2 1    
Tunnel 2 1    
Freight and passenger 1 1    
Highway and tunnel 2     
Runway 2 1  1  
Fixed assets, freight and passenger  1    
Regional Passenger  1    
Other 2   2  
Not Available 2 6    
 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
The analysis of Tables 5.2 and 5.3 reveal that road projects, which entail the 
development of highways, were the most prevalent mode and form of infrastructure for 
transport PPPs in the BRICS countries. This finding is supported by Palmer (2015), 
who showed that there is a greater demand for road projects compared to other modes, 
such as rail, which is attributed to lower traffic risk and greater affordability (Withrington, 
2011).    
 
What was not expected was the lack of popularity of PPPs in the rail sector, as it 
contradicts the pronouncements by governments calling for greater private 
participation (Rahman, Miraj & Andreas, 2019). For China, India and South Africa, this 
aspect might be attributed to high state involvement and the unwillingness to relinquish 
control in the rail sector, which is deemed to be a strategic asset (World Bank Group, 
2014b; Ittmann, 2017; Rahman et al., 2019). As a result, limited opportunities are 




the lack of popularity of PPPs in the rail sector is not just limited to the developing 
countries but also to the developed ones. This is demonstrated by the challenges 
experienced in integrating PPP schemes into projects, such as the Channel Tunnel 
and London Underground in the United Kingdom.     
 
In light of these findings, it can be concluded that projects that entail the development 
of highways within the road transport sector, are prioritised for PPPs as supported by 
Palmer (2015), while rail is not popular (Rahman et al., 2019).     
  
5.7. Threshold on project size 
Project size according to the Right Track Associates Incorporated (2020: para.1) is an 
encompassing term ‘… used to quantify the overall extent of the project effort, usually 
accounting for duration, cost, complexity, staffing requirements and related 
parameters’. Due to the high transaction costs associated with transport PPPs, many 
governments across the world have placed a threshold on the project size, which 
prioritises the implementation of projects requiring a large investment greater or equal 
to USD$50 million (Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2019). Therefore, to 
reveal the trend in the setting of thresholds for the project size, the general direction in 
project expenditure or investment, has to be determined. For this purpose, the category 
of the data, relating to total investment, was analysed. The Law Insider (2020a) refers 
to total investment as the aggregate capital contribution made by the members to a 
project. Projects with a total investment greater or equal to USD$50 million are 
regarded as large projects and are suitable for implementation as PPPs (Public Private 
Infrastructure Facility, 2019).      
 
Table 5.4 portrays the frequency distribution of the data on total investment. It indicates 
that most of the projects undertaken in each of the BRICS countries, require a total 
investment greater or equal to USD$50 million throughout their entire lifecycle. Most 
of these projects are located in India, followed by China, Brazil, Russia and then South 
Africa. India and China also have a substantial proportion of the projects with an 












 Greater or equal to 
USD$50million Not Available 
India 80  405 2 
China 41  180 4 
Brazil 10  76 10 
Russian Federation 2  22 2 
South Africa 1  2  
  
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
The analysis of the data in Table 5.4 demonstrates that India, China, Brazil and Russia 
have a strong preference for high-cost transport PPPs that require investment greater 
or equal to USD$50million. This finding is following expectations as the literature also 
indicates that the BRICS countries have a high threshold on the project size (Churakov, 
2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 
2017). The high threshold on the project size is attributed to the amount of time and 
resources required to bring the project to financial closure during the project 
preparation phase, which would not be justified in a low-cost project (Public Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2019). The project size also affects the amount of direct 
support received, such as grants (Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2016). 
Projects requiring an investment greater than USD$50 million were found to receive 
direct support 65% of the time, compared to smaller projects that received this only 
30% of the time (Ibid.). This direct support is recognised to attract private sector 
investment (World Bank Institute, 2012). In contrast, the project size is irrelevant in 
determining the amount of indirect support received by projects, such as guarantees 
(Ibid.)    
 
What was not expected, was how the Indian and Chinese PPPs with an investment 
less than USD$50 million were widespread, as confirmed by the high number of 
projects with an investment lower than this threshold. This finding was supported by 
the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (2016: pg.13) which indicated that 
PPP investment in India was propelled by ‘… a large number of relatively small road 
projects between 1990 and 2014’. 
 




sized projects for implementation as PPPs (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; Telang & 
Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017). It is concluded that 
projects below the threshold of USD$50 million, are also widespread in India and 
China.    
 
5.8. Project term  
Project term according to the Law Insider (2020b) refers to the period between the start 
and end of a project, which becomes effective when agreed to in writing. From a project 
finance perspective, a contract which is financed through a term loan, is regarded as 
a long-term contract if it takes more than five years to mature (E-Finance Management, 
2020). This implies that contracts with a project term less than five years are regarded 
as short-term. The APM Group (2020d) indicates that experience suggests that project 
terms longer than ten years should be regarded as long-term, as most PPP project 
terms range between ten to fifty years, and in certain instances, such as some toll 
roads, can be as long as 99 years. Therefore, identifying trends for the term of projects, 
revealed the general direction of the duration of contracts. For this purpose, the 
category of data under a contract period were analysed. The contract period according 
to the World Bank Group (2020a) refers to the length of time measured in years of the 
terms of a contract agreement. 
  
Figure 5.8 displays a frequency distribution of the data categorised within the contract 
period. It indicates that most of the contract periods for the projects in India and China 
are between 11-20 years, followed by 21-30 years. In Brazil, contract periods of 
between 21-30 years are most common, followed by those between 11-20 years. It is 
also evident that contract periods of 10 years or less, and those greater than 30 years, 






Figure 5-8: Frequency distribution of contract period 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
The analysis of the data in Figure 5.8 demonstrates that the trend for the project term 
in the BRICS countries, is characterised by long-term contracts, which predominantly 
have a span of 11-30 years. The literature supports this finding as it shows that the 
BRICS countries prioritise long-term transport PPPs (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; 
Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015). This finding is consistent with the 
experience of others in the world, such as the UK, where PPPs are regarded as long-
term projects, with a typical tenure of 20-35 years (European PPP Expertise Centre, 
2012). The prioritisation of long-term contracts is not surprising as Barr (2020: para.3) 
states that ‘… concrete roads offer an expected service life of roughly 20 to 25 years, 
while asphalt roads are likely to last approximately 18 years’. Therefore, there is a need 
for contracts to provide a project term that is long enough to capture key lifecycle costs 
and enable lenders to provide the maximum term on debt repayments (The APM 
Group, 2020e).  
 
From the findings, contracts with project terms greater than 30 years are prevalent in 
China. This was not expected as the World Bank Group (2017: pg.8) indicated that ‘… 
most PPP projects present a contractual term between 20 and 30 years; others have 
shorter terms; and a few last longer than 30 years’. The APM Group (2020e) shows 










10 or less years 13 12 5 0 0
11-20 years 263 89 10 6 2
21-30 years 169 48 64 7 1
More than 30 years 15 35 5 2 0
Not Applicable 1 4 7 2




that most emerging and developing economies are limited to shorter term contracts, 
as they face constrained terms for financing, restriction of project terms by law, and 
political concern allowing too much profit to the private sector. The deviation from this 
trend is attributed to China’s large economy, which can sustain longer financing terms 
than most developing countries (World Bank Group, 2017).  
   
Based on these findings it is concluded that there is an affinity for long-term contracts 
across the BRICS countries, of between 11-30 years (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; 
Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015). A further conclusion is that contracts 
with project terms longer than 30 years are widespread in China, due to the availability 
of finance (World Bank Group, 2017).    
 
5.9. Transfer of risk to the private partner 
Project risk is defined as ‘… an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has an 
effect on at least one project objective’ (Press Books, 2020). To identify trends of risk 
of PPPs, the category of data that was analysed was the subtype of PPP. Subtype of 
PPP according to the World Bank Group (2019) refers to the contracts involved in these 
projects, such as operations and maintenance (O&M) and build-own-operate-transfer 
(BOOT) (Ibid). The type of contract is indicative of the level of risk transferred to the 
private sector, as these contracts are characterised by a variation in private 
involvement across the various types of PPP contracts (Mandri-Perrott, n.d.).  
  
Table 5.5 displays a frequency distribution of data categorised under the subtype of 
PPP. It indicates that the most prevalent forms of contract in the BRICS countries are 
the build, rehabilitate, operate and transfer (BROT) and the build, operate, and transfer 
(BOT). India and Brazil largely have BROT contracts, while China and Russia mainly 
have BOT contracts. 
 
Table 5-5: Frequency distribution of subtype of PPP 





Build, rehabilitate, operate and 
transfer 372 10 44 5 2 
Build, operate and transfer 89 179 12 12 1 
Rehabilitate, operate and transfer 21 22 7   




Management contract   9 1  
Build, own and operate 1  7   
Merchant   5 3  
Build, lease and transfer   5   
Lease contract 1 1 1   
Rehabilitate, lease or rent and 
transfer 1  2   
Full  1  1  
Other 1 1    
Not available 1 2 4 1  
 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
The analysis of the data in Table 5.5 shows that the trend of the transfer of risk in the 
BRICS countries is characterised by the allocation of a high degree of risk to the private 
sector through BROT and BOT contracts. This finding is supported by Telang and 
Kutumbale (2014: pg.18) who showed that in India ‘… almost all contracts have been 
of the Build Operate Transfer (BOT)/Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) type (either 
toll or annuity payment models) or close variants’. Ebrahimi (2011) attributes the 
prevalence of BOT contracts to their ability to attract private sector investment, transfer 
adequate risk to the private developer and reduce political resistance, as the project 
will ultimately be owned by the public sector.  
   
Based on this finding, a conclusion can be drawn that a high degree of risk is 
transferred to the private sector through BROT and BOT contracts in the BRICS 
countries, as indicated by Telang and Kutumbale (2014).  
 
5.10. Debt-to-equity ratio in financing 
The debt-to-equity ratio ‘… is a long-term solvency ratio that indicates the soundness 
of long-term financial policies of a company’ (Accounting for Management, 2020: 
para.1). It demonstrates the relationship between the assets financed by lenders and 
those by the shareholders (Ibid.). The APM Group (2020e) shows that a project finance 
structure with a debt-to-equity ratio ranging between 60:40 and 80:20, is regarded as 
high. Therefore, if the ratio is below 60:40, it is regarded as low, and if it is above 80:20, 
it is regarded as too high. To reveal the trend in the debt-to-equity ratio in the financing 
of transport PPPs of the BRICS countries, the category of data under debt-to-equity 




Figure 5.9 displays the frequency distribution of data categorised under debt-to-equity 
ratio. It indicates that the information on the project finance structures is not available 
for most of the projects in the BRICS countries. This feature is most evident in China, 
which has not revealed these ratios. Amongst those where information has been 
disclosed, the prevailing debt-to-equity ratios range between 60:40 and 80:20.   
 
 
Figure 5-9: Frequency distribution of debt-to-equity ratio 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a)  
 
The analysis of the data in Figure 5.9 shows that among the projects with known 
financing structures, high debt-to-equity ratios between 60:40 and 80:20 were the most 
prevalent in India. This finding is confirmed by Rehman (2013), who showed that the 
typical debt-to-equity ratio for PPPs in India is 70:30. A high debt-to-equity ratio 
according to the APM Group (2020a) results in more affordable projects as equity is a 
more expensive form of finance than debt. A large number of projects in India, with a 
debt-to-equity ratio below 60:40 indicates that less capital intensive projects are also 
popular. The Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (2016) agreed with this 
finding, which indicates that several small projects were undertaken in India.  
 
What was not expected was the lack of disclosure on the debt-to-equity ratios in the 
financing of projects in China, and especially in Brazil, where by law, it is compelled to 
share this information with the public (World Bank Group, 2020c). This finding is 
supported by the Association of Corporate Treasurers (2020) and De Castro e Silva 










between 60:40 and 80:20 179 6 11 6 1
below 60:40 60 2 7 2
above 80:20 27 3 4




Neto et al. (2020), who indicate that there is a lack of transparency of long-term funding 
in China and Brazil, which was attributed to the possible backlash or reputational 
damage that governments fear of the affordability of projects (Carter, 2015). The 
Association of Corporate Treasurers (2020) also indicates that China is addressing this 
issue by amending the regulations, which are starting to show results.   
 
In light of these findings, the conclusion is that projects with a high debt-to-equity ratio 
are dominant in India (Rehman, 2013). A further conclusion is that there is a lack of 
disclosure on the debt-to-equity ratio in China and Brazil (Association of Corporate 
Treasurers, 2020; De Castro e Silva Neto et al., 2020).   
 
5.11. Promotion of competition in the market 
The Collins Dictionary (2020a) refers to market competition as the rivalry between firms 
in the same industry. This is illustrated by the market structure, which characterises an 
industry, such as perfect competition, imperfect competition, oligopolies or monopolies 
(Zeder, 2020). Perfect competition entails several small firms without significant power 
to influence the market, while imperfect competition entails several firms capable of 
influencing the market to a limited extent, due to differentiation (Ibid.). In contrast, 
oligopolies entail a few firms with significant market power, and typically involve three 
to five companies (Ibid.). A monopoly entails a single firm that dominates the entire 
market and represents the highest form of market power (Ibid.). Therefore, to identify 
trends in the competition of transport PPPs, it was necessary to analyse the categorical 
data that could reveal a general direction of the system of procurement and the number 
of bidders. For this purpose, the categories of the data that were analysed, included 
the award method and the number of bids. The World Bank Group (2020a) refers to 
the award method as the system of procurement, and number of bids as the aggregate 
of the proposals received.  
 
Figure 5.10 illustrates the frequency distribution of the data categorised under the 
award method. It reveals that most of the projects were awarded through competitive 






Figure 5-10: Frequency distribution of the award method 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
 
Figure 5.11 displays the frequency distribution of the data categorised in the number 
of bids. It indicates that the number of bids received has not been disclosed in most of 
the projects in the BRICS countries. Of the projects where there is disclosure, the 
number of bids received is usually less than six.      
 
 
Figure 5-11: Frequency distribution of the number of bids 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 










Competitive bidding 445 132 79 14 2
Direct negotiation 9 43 4 2
Competitive negotiation 3 18 1
License scheme 1 4 2
Not Applicable 2 1
Not Available 27 32 8 7 1










less than 6 58 47 7 1
greater or equal to 6 36 12




The analysis of Figures 5.10 and 5.11 reveals that the trend for the system of 
procurement in the BRICS countries, is characterised by competitive bidding. This 
finding is supported by the literature, which also shows that competition in the PPP 
market is encouraged across all the BRICS countries (Bidne et al., n.d.; Churakov, 
2014; De Vries & Yehoue, 2013; Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; 
Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015; Meng et al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017). The 
dominance of competitive bidding is attributed to the benefits that the public sector 
derives from the competition, such as value-for-money and innovation (Arata et al., 
2016; Ittmann, 2017). It is apparent from the projects that disclose the number of 
bidders, that less than six bids are usually received. This finding is supported by 
Leighland (2018), who indicated that the UK has experienced less than three bidders 
in a quarter of their projects, due to the high cost of bid preparation. Although the data 
of the number of bidders in China has not been disclosed, Jones and Bloomfield (2020) 
suggest that the number of bidders is low, as the level of competitive tendering in China 
is limited by the regulations. Such a requirement for contractors is to make a full upfront 
payment of project guarantee deposits, which are only affordable by a few. Jones and 
Bloomfield (2020: pg.838) attribute the lack of information of the number of bidders in 
China on the lack of transparency on ‘… exactly how PPPs are selected, as information 
related to shortlisting, negotiations and appraisal is not typically available’. 
  
Based on these findings, the conclusion is that competition is promoted in the BRICS 
countries (Bidne et al., n.d.; De Vries & Yehoue, 2013; Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; 
Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015; Meng et al., 2015; 
National Treasury, 2017). However, given that less than six bidders usually submit 
proposals, the market can be perceived to be a monopoly or oligopoly, which is to be 
expected due to the high cost of preparation (Leighland, 2018).     
 
5.12. Technical and service innovation 
The Collins Dictionary (2020b) defines innovation as a novel way of doing something 
by introducing new ideas, methods or technology. Therefore, to reveal the trends in 
the innovation of projects of the BRICS countries, this required data that exposed the 
general direction in the ability of firms to introduce new ideas, methods or devices to a 
project. The category of data of the type of PPP was selected for this purpose. The 




involved in the project (i.e. greenfield or brownfield). Pan (n.d.) stated that greenfield 
projects lack constraints imposed by prior work on the site, compared to brownfield 
projects. Greenfield projects are new developments that have greater flexibility to 
introduce new technologies and ideas without concern for existing technologies, 
infrastructure and systems found in brownfield projects.        
 
Figure 5.12 displays the frequency distribution of the data categorised under the type 
of PPP. It shows that brownfield projects are the majority of the projects in India and 
Brazil. It is also evident that greenfield projects are more prevalent than brownfield 
projects in China and Russia. 
 
 
Figure 5-12:  Frequency distribution of the type of PPP 
Source: Author’s construct based on data from the World Bank Group (2020a) 
  
The analysis of Figure 5.12 demonstrates that India and Brazil are dominated by 
brownfield projects, which are characterised by the constraints imposed by prior work 
on the site. This finding is revealed by the Department of Economic Affairs (2016: 
pg.13) of the government of India, which states ‘… all roads that are being developed 
under a BOT framework are brownfield projects’. Rehman (2013) showed that long-
term finance for PPP projects was not available for project companies in India intending 
to develop greenfield infrastructure projects. The typical sources of long-term finance, 
such as insurance companies and pension funds do not fund these type of projects. 










Brownfield 394 32 56 5 2
Greenfield project 92 182 30 16 1




Therefore, the lack of long-term finance for greenfield projects would discourage 
investment in them.  
 
The prevalence of brownfield over greenfield projects was not expected as the 
literature shows that the policies of the BRICS countries give freedom to private parties 
to prescribe inputs or use alternatives, which would not necessarily have been 
considered through traditional procurement (Aerts et al., 2014; IBRD/WB, 2014). 
Greenfield projects are not restricted by the constraints imposed by prior work on the 
site (Pan, n.d.) and as a result, a greater degree of innovation was anticipated, due to 
the conducive environment for technical and service innovation created by these 
policies. The lack of innovation might be attributed to the decisions of the governments 
of the BRICS countries to import established technologies from other countries 
(Flyvbjerg, 2017). The first fifteen trains and components of the subsequent rolling 
stock of the Gautrain Rapid Rail project, were manufactured in Derby, England, then 
shipped to South Africa as the country could not manufacture most of the required 
parts (Flyvbjerg, 2017). Similarly, Kumar (2012) indicated that trains for the Rapid 
Metro Rail Gurgaon system in India, were imported from the China South Rail ZhuZhou 
Electric Locomotive Company.   
 
However, further analysis demonstrates that China and Russia contradicted this trend, 
as that they have a greater affinity for greenfield projects compared to brownfields. 
This finding is provided by Thieriot and Dominguez (2015), who stated that in China 
‘… greenfield projects represent a majority of the private participation in infrastructure, 
mostly through build-operate-transfer agreements’. It is not surprising that greenfield 
projects are prevalent in China, as Kumar (2012) indicated that China is one of the 
leading manufacturers of trains in the world, with an active export market of these 
capital goods. Jing and Miao (2016) showed that there is a positive relationship 
between market orientation, product innovation and export performance, based on the 
data from Chinese manufacturers. As a result, the dominance of the Chinese in the 
market contributes to innovation, which is unencumbered in greenfield projects. The 
popularity of greenfield projects in Russia could be due to the growing influence and 
economic ties between Russia and China. Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei (2019) 
indicated that Russia has become the largest recipient of Chinese funding of major 




New Eurasian Land Bridge, the China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, the Ice-Silk Route, 
and other corridors.         
 
Based on this finding, it can be concluded that India and Brazil are dominated by 
brownfield projects (Department of Economic Affairs, 2016). The importing of existing 
technologies was found to discourage innovation (Kumar, 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2017). A 
conclusion can be drawn that China’s dominance of the market and its manufacturing 
capacity, encourages innovation and the uptake of greenfield projects, that are not 
restricted by the constraints imposed by prior work on the site (Jing & Miao, 2016). 
Russia also prioritises greenfield projects, due to the influence of Chinese investments 
in the region (Garcia-Herrero & Jianwei, 2019).  
 
5.13. Summary of key findings and conclusions  
The findings of this chapter reveal trends that over the past fifteen years are evident in 
the PPP practices of the BRICS countries. This has been achieved by uncovering the 
general direction in the following practices, namely: the establishment of legal 
frameworks; incentive-based regulations; the political commitment and support; the 
transparency of processes and the proactive disclosure of project information; the 
prioritisation of commercially viable projects; the threshold of project contracts; the 
project term; the transfer of risk to the private partner; the debt-to-equity ratio in 
financing; the promotion of competition in the market; and technical and service 
innovation. Table 5.6 displays a summary of the key findings of this chapter.  
 
Table 5-6: Summary of key findings 
Establishment of legal frameworks  Different tiers of government have the autonomy to 
enter into PPP contracts.  
 The greatest uptake in contracts is realised at the 
national tier, followed by the provincial and the 
local level. 
Incentive-based regulation  BRICS countries are willing to make capital 
contributions; these are directed to the most viable 
projects  
 There is a lack of transparency by accounting 
authorities of these countries of the data of the 
incentives provided. 




evaluate proposals that do not emanate from any 
specific request. 
 Users other than the public sector, endorse these 
projects through their patronage. 
Transparency of processes and 
proactive disclosure of project 
information 
 BRICS countries do not proactively disclose or 
release detailed contract information to the public. 
Prioritisation of commercially viable 
projects 
 Demand-based infrastructure, such as highways 
are prioritised for tolling. 
Threshold on project size  There is a strong preference for high-cost transport 
PPPs, which require investment greater or equal 
to USD$50 million.  
Project term  There is a great affinity for long-term contracts that 
predominantly have a span of 11 to 30 years. 
Transfer of risk to the private partner  A high degree of risk is transferred to the private 
sector through BROT and BOT contracts. 
Debt-to-equity ratio in financing  Financing entails high debt-to-equity ratios ranging 
between 60:40 and 80:20. 
Promotion of competition in the market  Competition is promoted but less than six bids are 
usually received. 
Technical and service innovation  There exists a preference for brownfield projects in 
India and Brazil, which are characterised by the 
constraints imposed by prior work on the site. 
 China’s market dominance and manufacturing 
capacity encourages innovation. 
 Chinese investment in Russia promotes the 
uptake of greenfield projects.  





CHAPTER 6 : PRIMARY DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH 
FINDINGS      
 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter provides an analysis of the primary data and a discussion of the research 
findings that aimed to address the second and third research questions, namely: What 
reasons are provided by transport industry players for the low uptake of transport PPPs 
in South Africa?; and, What opinions are held by transport industry players on practices 
that could contribute to the uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa? By obtaining the 
views of the participants, the study was able to address the gaps identified in the 
literature and provide a more comprehensive assessment of factors contributing to the 
low uptake. This was achieved by drawing on the views of the transport sector role 
players who have lived-experience and knowledge of PPPs.   
 
To address the second and third objectives, 14 participants in the research sample 
were requested to be interviewed. This was to gather primary data from an assortment 
of participants from organisations involved in a typical PPP structure, namely: public 
authorities; SPV; lenders; equity investors; EPC contractors and subcontractors; O&M 
contractors; and insurers. Of the 14 participants identified for the original research 
sample, 11 participants from the following organisations honoured the request, namely: 
the South African National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL); the Gautrain 
Management Agency (GMA); the Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA); the 
Department of Public Enterprises (DPE); the Department of Transport (DOT); 
Transnet; the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA); the J&J Group; Infracon 
Consulting; Powerlaw Capital; and SA Airlink. It is not apparent why three of the 
participants were not responsive, as two of them had initially agreed to participate, 
while one remained unresponsive. Follow-up requests and reminders were sent to 
these three participants, including redirecting requests to other participants within their 
organisations, which did not yield a positive response.  
 
To augment this deficiency and maintain a sample size of 14 participants, three 
alternative participants from the sampling frame were interviewed that satisfied the 
same requirements. The three participants included Comair Limited, Toll Infrastructure 




announced as the preferred bidder to operate Air Botswana (Comair Limited, 2008). 
This bid emanated from the government of Botswana’s request for proposals to 
operate the country’s national carrier. The government indicated that it would consider 
joint ventures, ownership, franchising, and concessions in pursuit of this objective 
(Dikgang Publishing Company, 2017). Although a management contract was ultimately 
proposed, Comair decided to withdraw its bid, due to unsuccessful negotiations 
between the parties. Toll Infra is an engineering firm that works in ‘… various transport 
infrastructure projects, including the development of traffic control centres, electronic 
inspection stations, system operations and audits, and the design and building of toll 
and overloading control systems’ (TollInfra, 2020: para.3). Concerning SAA, as part of 
the plans to restructure the state-owned carrier and turn the airline around, the 
president of the republic proposed a PPP (Matthews, 2018). The proposal for SAA to 
enter into a PPP was inspired by the experience of airlines, such as Kenya Airways, 
which has turned part of its debt into equity through a PPP (Magubane, 2018). The 
recovery and return to profitability of Kenya Airways, are attributed in part to its PPP 
(Ibid.).  
 
Purposive, non-probability sampling was used for the selection of these participants, 
as it allowed for the involvement of individuals that could provide greater insight of the 
phenomenon, based on their knowledge and lived-experience. The interviews were 
conducted between September 2019 and March 2020, at the respective participants’ 
choice of location. The interviews were recorded electronically, using a digital voice 
recorder to obtain an accurate account of the views of the participants. Semi-structured 
interview questions were used to address specific topics related to the phenomenon 
of the study, whilst providing flexibility and an opportunity to the participants to provide 
new meanings and interpretations to the study focus. Once all the interviews were 
completed, they were then transcribed, amalgamated into a single document using 
Microsoft Word, and uploaded into Atlas.ti, which is software that is purpose-built to 
support qualitative and mixed-methods research. The qualitative data were then coded 
and themes were developed. The findings were then described and analysed, and 
conclusions drawn.   
 
The response rate was deemed sufficient based on the realisation of data saturation, 




asking participants the same questions, probing questions, and conducting data 
triangulation.   
 
6.2. Profile of interview participants   
During the interviews, the information required to describe the professional experience, 
core responsibilities, and the level of education of the participants of the research 
sample, was obtained by asking them questions related to their experience in the 
transport sector. This was intended to ascertain the suitability of the participants for the 
study, based on their qualifications and lived-experience in the transport sector, which 
would provide them with the ability to identify reasons for the low uptake of transport 
PPPs in South Africa, and suggest measures for addressing them.  
   
Table 6.1 displays the profile of these participants. It indicates participants were largely 
male, with only two participants being female, and held senior management or 
executive positions in the organisations listed in the research sample. All of the 
participants had more than seven years of work experience in the transport sector and 
were qualified in fields related to engineering, economics and finance. Furthermore, 
most of the participants indicated that they held multiple qualifications in other fields of 
study. Of the 14 participants, eight were associated with the public sector and six with 
the private sector. It is also evident that several of the participants had been employed 
by other organisations in the research sample at some stage during their career.  
 
Table 6-1: Profile of interview participants 
Participant 
No. 




Qualification Study area 
Participant 1  Male State-owned 
engineering company   






Participant 2 Male  State-owned rail 
company 







Participant 3 Male State-owned airport 
development 
company 



















Participant 6 Male  State-owned logistics 
company 







Participant 7 Male  Development Finance 
Institution  





































Male  Engineering firm 25 years Senior 
management 
Bachelor of 




















Source: Author’s construct based on the preceding discussion 
 
The analysis of this data demonstrates that all the participants were suitable for the 
study, as is demonstrated by the Transport Policy and Development Section of the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 
which indicated that the specific areas of expertise that officials involved in PPPs need 
to possess are in ‘… the five broad areas of project planning, financial, legal, technical 
and project management’ (ESCAP, n.d.: para.2). An inspection of the qualifications of 
the participants shows that they are all qualified in at least one of these five broad 
areas. The additional qualifications also demonstrated that the participants were able 
to look at the research topic from a multidisciplinary perspective, taking into 
consideration ‘… connections between different subjects and how to transfer that 
knowledge across subject boundaries’ (Open University, 2020: para.1). 
 
The participants had long-term work experience in the transport industry and seniority 
in their organisations, which provided them with insights required for developing new 




(2011: pg.44) who indicated that ‘… knowledge results from the combination of 
grasping and transforming experience’. They also showed that the process of creating 
knowledge is characterised by a cycle that involves ‘… experiencing, reflecting, 
thinking and acting in a recursive process that is responsive to the learning situation 
and what is being learned’ (Ibid: pg.44). Furthermore, they indicated that ‘… immediate 
or concrete experiences are the basis for observations and reflections. These 
reflections are assimilated and distilled into abstract concepts from which new 
implications for action can be drawn. These implications can be actively tested and 
serve as guides in creating new experiences’ (Ibid: pg.44). This demonstrated that 
participants could rely on empirical knowledge, which was based on their lived-
experience in the sector, which enabled them to identify reasons for the low uptake of 
transport PPPs and propose measures to address them.  
 
In light of the lived-experience and the knowledge of the participants in transport PPPs, 
it was concluded that the participants were suitable for being interviewed for the study. 
Their knowledge and experience provided them with the ability to provide 
comprehensive explanations for the low uptake of transport PPPs, and to suggest 
appropriate measures for addressing them (ESCAP, n.d.; Kolb & Kolb, 2011).    
 
6.3. Key reasons for the low uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa 
A review of the literature identified a broad spectrum of inadequacies in the country’s 
PPP environment that could be attributed to the low uptake of transport PPPs 
(Aigbavboa et al., 2014; Ittman, 2017). However, it does not isolate the key challenges 
that need to be overcome to address this problem. This gap was addressed by 
requesting participants to provide reasons for the low uptake so as to identify a 
dominant view. For this purpose, the participants were asked why there is a low uptake 
of PPPs in the transport sector. Figure 6.1 displays the network diagram of the reasons 
for the low uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa. It shows that the responses are 
largely associated with the politicisation of the infrastructure through aspects, such as 
party-political agendas, rhetoric by politicians, political risk, and the domination of the 
state in the delivery of strategic infrastructure and assets. Some of the responses also 
showed that a few of the participants suggested the low uptake to be the ignorance of 
policymakers of the role of transport in the economy. It shows that there is low initiative 







Figure 6-1: Network diagram of the reasons for the low uptake of transport PPPs 
Source: Author’s construct based on the interview data  
 
This finding is supported by Participant One who stated “the delivery of infrastructure 
in South Africa has been politicised”. He felt that the uptake of transport PPPs was 
impeded by the pursuit of party political agendas to the detriment of projects that are 
in the public interest; it was mentioned that the irrationality of the decision of politicians 
to forego the proposed De Beers Pass toll road concession, which would have provided 
a viable alternative route to the country’s busiest port in Durban. Participant Six was of 
the view that the political rhetoric on “radical economic transformation and white 
monopoly” had also harmed business confidence and trust, discouraging investment 




sector wants to put their resources where they are going to be sure they are going to 
receive their return”. Participant Eleven thought “the fear of the unknown from the 
public sector” and the private sector’s “perception when it comes to the public sector” 
have created this trust deficit between the two. Furthermore, Participant Thirteen 
affirmed the lack of trust between the two sectors and its impact on business 
confidence, as demonstrated by the “very low business confidence throughout the 
period under review”. He also stated, “the private sector would not want to partner with 
somebody that they did not trust”. Participant Ten indicated the lack of a PPP Act that 
could address the complexities and ambiguities associated with a broad regulatory 
framework that spans multiple policy instruments, which had undermined business 
confidence, resulting in a lack of uptake.    
 
Political risk was identified by Participant Twelve, as a major impediment to the uptake 
of transport PPPs. He provided an example of the Lekki-Epe Expressway toll 
concession in Nigeria where “the government got cold feet” from the fear of the affected 
communities, when some of the tribal leaders involved in the project, failed to play their 
part, forcing the private sector to withdraw. He also indicated that, since the private 
sector withdrew in 2013, seven years had elapsed and the Nigerian government was 
still struggling to attract private involvement, as trust and integrity had been eroded. 
This finding was supported by Participant Eight, who expressed that there were 
negative perceptions associated with the affordability of transport PPPs as “people 
think it’s more expensive”. He provided an example of the Gautrain Rapid Rail project, 
which was considered expensive by the commuters, based on what they pay “out of 
pocket”. Participant Five attributed the high cost of transport projects to the capital-
intensive nature of these projects, which “demand a lot of resources”. Participant three 
felt that given the high unemployment rate in the country, the likelihood was that there 
will be a few users from the narrow middle-class and elite. He felt that given that over 
20% of the population was on social welfare, a question arises on the affordability of 
these projects for the greater majority.     
 
Government interference and domination of projects were also identified as 
impediments to the uptake of transport PPPs. This is supported by Participant Four 
who felt the state wants “to be at the forefront of leading those particular projects”, 




investment. Participant Nine also felt the state prioritises its agencies which have 
“financing and technical capability” for the implementation of major transport projects, 
which reduces the demand for PPPs. This finding was supported by Participant Six, 
who thought the dominance of state agencies and enterprises that were granted 
priority as the “delivery instruments” for projects, effectively crowds out the private 
sector. Participant Seven felt the lack of political support for transport PPPs was 
attributable to the long-term nature of the contracts, which cannot be easily 
renegotiated as circumstances change, placing the state in a “very difficult” position.         
 
The ignorance of policy-makers on the role of transport in the economy was found to 
be a contributing factor for the low uptake of transport PPPs by some of the 
participants. Participant Fourteen thought “transport is not fully appreciated”, which had 
a bearing on the prioritisation of transport PPP. This finding is supported by Participant 
Two, who felt the public sector’s lack of interest in transport PPPs discourages private 
involvement, as the private sector usually aligns its investment to the government’s 
priorities. However, Participant Seven contradicted these findings as he held the view 
that the low uptake of PPPs was not limited to the transport sector. He indicated that 
“we probably don’t have more than 30 PPPs” based on the Government Technical 
Advisory Centre’s website, and those that had been prioritised, were the small and 
“easy ones”, such as head office accommodation, tourism and fleet management.      
 
In light of the findings that party political agendas, rhetoric, political risk, and the 
domination of the state in the delivery of strategic infrastructure and assets, contributed 
to the low uptake of transport PPPs, it is concluded that the key reason for the low 
uptake was mainly perceived to be the politicisation of the infrastructure. Although the 
politicisation of infrastructure was evident in China and India’s political environment, 
as shown by the dominance of state control in the rail sector (World Bank Group, 
2014b; Rahman et al., 2019), Vadali, Tiwari and Rajan (2015) attributed India’s 
success in implementing several PPPs in the road sector to its strong political and legal 
systems.   
 
6.4. Overregulation of PPPs and the introduction of a PPP Act 
Overregulation according to Ittmann (2017) is one of the factors which undermines the 




thought PPPs are overregulated in the country and why they felt this way. Figure 6.2 
displays the network diagram of responses on the overregulation of PPPs. It indicates 
that most of the participants agreed that PPPs are overregulated in the country, and 
the dominant reason for this was associated with the broad regulatory framework to 
which PPPs need to comply.  
 
 
Figure 6-2: Network diagram of responses on the overregulation of PPPs 
Source: Author’s construct based on the interview data 
 
This finding was supported by Participant Eleven, who indicated that the regulatory 
framework of PPPs consisted of several policies that could contradict each other at 
times, as it entailed “a lot of combined regulations that may not necessarily speak to 
each other”. Participant Ten thought this overregulation emanated from the PPP 
regulatory framework that was developed by “consultants that were hired to define the 
process who were never responsible for a PPP in their lives”. As a result of their 
inexperience, they have inadvertently “invented every single obstacle possible to 
achieve a PPP” making them difficult to implement when compared to other parts of 
the world, where the private sector “really don’t have to go through a multi-year painful 
Political and social goals 
Haven’t been many PPP projects 
Mandate of the province 
and national 
Laws for all government 
transactions 
Red tape and a lack of flexibility 
You’ve got things like PFMAs 
Makes it difficult for corruption 
Lot of combined regulations 






Participant Fourteen showed that there are “certain laws that all government 
transactions have to abide by”. Compliance with these laws resulted in a lengthy due 
diligence and approval process, which could be “off-putting” to the private sector. This 
finding was supported by Participant Four, who indicated that laws, such as the Public 
Finance Management Act (PFMA) need to be adhered to as part of the regulatory 
process of PPPs, which could “very well limit participation from the private sector based 
on the amount of bureaucracies that one has to follow to finalise that kind of 
arrangement”. Participant Nine made a similar finding as he was of the view that due 
to “the red tape and lack of flexibility” by the public sector, overregulation of PPPs 
results. Participant Seven is of the view that overregulation is necessary as “it makes 
it difficult for corruption”, due to the number of hurdles that need to be cleared, 
however, the consequence was a low uptake of PPPs. Participant Three felt the low 
number of PPPs that have been approved, was in itself indicative of overregulation as 
there would have been greater appetite if this was not the case. Participant Five held 
the view that the lack of distinction on some of the governance functions of national 
and provincial governments could result in overregulation. This was demonstrated by 
the “issues around the mandate of the province and nation”, which impacted parties 
interested in undertaking some of the functions of the government under the Soweto-
Johannesburg monorail project. He also felt that regulations are extensively used by 
the state in pursuit of its “political and social goals”, which could result in overregulation.   
 
The only participant, who did not feel that PPPs were overregulated was Participant 
One. He indicated that his organisation’s ability to implement “three of them in five 
years” was evidence of this. Participant One’s ability to implement these PPPs within 
this period, might be attributed to his previous role as a senior public official responsible 
for roads development, which has provided him with an insight to navigate and unlock 
public sector processes that other participants lack.     
 
Based on the findings that the regulatory framework of PPP consisted of several 
policies that could contradict each other at times, and compliance with these laws 
results in a lengthy due diligence and approval process, it can be concluded that PPPs 




A country can introduce a PPP Act or Concession Act to address issues related to 
over-regulation by taking ‘… priority over sector laws’ (World Bank Group, 2020d: 
para.1). This means that a PPP Act can trump other policies that bring about confusion 
and a lack of clarity on the institutional framework for the development, procurement 
and implementation of PPPs (Ibid.). To ascertain the views of participants on the need 
for specific legislation for PPPs in South Africa, they were asked if they felt that such a 
law was required in the country and how this could add value.  Figure 6.3 displays the 
network diagram of responses on the need for a specific law for PPPs, and the value 
it would add. It demonstrated that the participants largely supported the introduction of 
a PPP Act, which would add value by decoupling the amorphous application process; 
easing regulation; improving the turnaround time of the approval processes; enhancing 
implementation; improving inclusivity, policy certainty; and enhance the payment of 
services provided.  
 
 
Figure 6-3: Network diagram of responses on the need for a specific law for 
PPPs, and the value it would add   





This finding was supported by Participant Ten, who felt a specific law would “ring-fence 
the process”, decoupling it from an amorphous application process. Participant Six 
thought that this would lead to the easing of the regulation of PPPs, as the current 
regulatory framework was “a bit too stringent”. Participant Four felt it would result in a 
faster approval process for PPPs by providing “guidance on how to actually undertake 
that particular process without relying just on policymakers”. Participant Fourteen also 
believed that a specific law would provide an opportunity to focus regulations on 
activities that improve implementation by “supporting private sector participation”. 
Participant Three felt the introduction of a PPP Act would also contribute to promoting 
the inclusivity of marginalised communities by improving transparency in areas relating 
to the tariff structure. He felt the lack of regulation on how information was 
communicated made it possible for society to be misled. For example, he felt 
communication on aspects, such as the determination of tariff structure for some of 
these projects “is not entirely true”, which could impede access to “infrastructure that 
is open for all citizens and not only those that can afford”. Participant Two also thought 
this law would “provide the certainty that is required by the private partners before they 
can commit”. He felt certainty would be brought about by knowing upfront the 
implications of the policy. Participant Eight thought a PPP Act would improve the 
collection of revenue as users would know that it was illegal not to pay. He stated 
“people will not be in a position to not pay”.     
 
Another view that emerged was that a PPP Act was not required and the existing 
regulatory framework needed to be kept or amended, as it was not inhibitive and could 
rather be improved to enable a more seamless private sector participation. This finding 
was supported by Participant One who stated “I don’t find the regulations inhibiting at 
all as long as you do the work that we have to do”. He felt the regulations were not 
necessarily a problem but the “extremely low skills in South Africa as far as PPPs are 
concerned”. Participant Nine also thought a PPP Act was not necessary, he stated 
“just enabling policies that provide better incentives and access to the private sector”.  
 
What was not expected is the view of Participant Eleven, who felt that instead of a 
single law for all PPPs, the state should introduce sector-specific laws, as he 
commented that there was a requirement for “legislation per sector”. He stated that 




circumstances. This finding was supported by the tourism sector, which has its own 
PPP toolkit as ‘… the PPP manual and Standardised PPP Provisions cannot, however, 
be summarily applied to tourism PPP projects’ (National Treasury, 2005: pg.1). 
Differentiated regulations for other sectors would assist the public and private sector 
to enter into sector specific PPP by taking into consideration the special conditions in 
that sector (Ibid.). For example, in the tourism sector there are special conditions such 
as ‘… circumstances involving communal land, or private land, which is under state 
conservation management, over which conservation institutions have acquired explicit 
commercial rights which they seek to exercise via a PPP” (Ibid: pg.4).   
 
In light of these findings that a specific law would add value by decoupling the 
amorphous application process, easing regulation, improving the turnaround time of 
the approval processes, enhancing implementation, improving inclusivity, policy 
certainty, and enhancing the payment of services provided, it was concluded that the 
introduction of a PPP Act was largely supported.  
 
6.5. Public consultation and participation   
South Africa does not seem to be conducting extensive public participation and 
consultation to promote the public interest according to Aigbavboa et al. (2014). To 
ascertain this view, participants were asked if they felt there was a lack of extensive 
public consultation and participation. 
 
Figure 6.4 displays the network diagram of the responses of the public consultation 
and their participation. It indicates that the dominant view held by participants was that 
there is a lack of extensive public consultation and participation based on low public 
interest, the inability to force people to participate, and an interest only by the privileged 
and elite. It also showed that the participants felt the consultation processes are 
unsophisticated, the local government has limited capacity to engage, and the National 
Treasury is not doing enough to generate awareness. Furthermore, there was 
complete distrust of this process, and it was seen as being politically driven. It also 
showed that two participants did not share the view that there was not extensive public 
consultation as demonstrated by the success of the Gautrain project and the imbizos 






Figure 6-4: Network diagram of responses to public consultation and 
participation  
Source: Author’s construct based on the interview data 
 
These findings are supported by Participant Seven, who stated “the public did not 
participate in the consultation at the time when they were needed to participate”. He 
asserted that the public only develops an interest closer to the implementation of the 
projects, when they become aware of how they are going to be affected. Participant 
One also indicated that although the SANRAL Act and Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) requirements make public participation compulsory in the road 
sector, they “can’t force people to come to the meetings”. However, he indicated that 
this did not mean that consultation did not happen, as demonstrated by the findings of 
the Constitutional Court, which expressed that “we had done what we needed to do”. 
Participant Three felt “only the privileged and elite” participate because they have 
access to information and technology. He felt disadvantaged members of society are 
disenfranchised by the lack of information. As a result, there was a lack of “societal 
wide participation”. 
 
You get the imbizos 
Only the priviledged or 
elite participate 
Complete mistrust participating 





Participant Fourteen thought that the “public consultation process isn’t very advanced 
compared to other countries”. This subjects the consultative process to several 
influences that can distort the outcome of the discussions. This finding is supported by 
Participant One, who felt “local municipalities don’t have capacity to be able to engage 
with you” where toll roads have to go. As a result, there were no meaningful exchanges 
or engagements, even though it is mandatory to consult. He also felt the lack of 
capacity to engage meaningfully was also a problem at the provincial level. Participant 
Thirteen was of the view that “the National Treasury is not doing enough in socialising 
the idea of PPPs”. He felt the mandate on PPPs “had to move from Treasury” to 
another ministry such as the Department of Public Enterprises, which “would be a fitting 
ministry to look after PPPs”. Participant Ten indicated that there is “complete mistrust” 
of the consultation process. He felt that even before the process is undertaken, there 
was a sense of who will be the successful bidder. This finding is supported by 
Participant Nine who thought “public consultation tends to be politically driven”. As a 
result, the effectiveness of participation was limited.  
 
Contrary to most of the participants, Participant Six thought there was extensive public 
consultation and participation. He attributed his thoughts to the success of the Gautrain 
Rapid Rail Project, which he felt “was done well”. Participant Five also felt “government 
is trying really a lot in terms of public consultations” based on the “imbizos that the 
different departments will undertake with their constituencies”. An imbizo refers to an 
official gathering between the state and the public, where members of the executive 
interact closely with the public (Government of South Africa, 2020).    
 
Based on the findings that there was low public interest, the inability to force people to 
participate, that participation was largely limited to the privileged and elite, an 
unsophisticated consultation process, limited capacity of local government to engage, 
a limited effort by the National Treasury to generate awareness, complete mistrust of 
this process and perception by the public that this is a politically driven process, it was 
concluded that there was a lack of extensive public consultation and participation.    
     
6.6. The capacity of officials to plan and implement PPPs  
South African public officials generally do not have the specialised skill-set required to 




To address this, the GTAC provides introductory PPP training programmes (National 
Treasury, 2017). However, these will not impart the level of knowledge required to 
effectively implement PPPs. It is also not apparent what other measures have been 
identified that could address this issue (Makofane 2013; National Treasury 2017). This 
gap was addressed by ascertaining the views of participants on the capacity of officials 
to plan and implement PPPs. They were asked how well they felt public officials were 
capacitated, given the skills-set required to plan and implement PPPs, and what 
measures can be employed to further improve the capacity of these officials. 
 
Figure 6.5 displays the network diagram of the responses to the question of the 
capacity of officials to implement PPPs, and the measures for improving these. It 
indicates that most of the participants felt public officials lack the capacity to plan and 
implement PPPs on the basis that they lack skills and experience. PPPs are also seen 
as being too complex for officials, and the collapse of major projects was identified as 
an indicator of the incapacity. Furthermore, officials at the provincial and local levels of 
government are found to have greater incapacity than at the national level. The 
responsibilities of officials in PPPs are not included in their performance contracts, and 
there was a lack of monitoring by the officials to track implementation. This Figure 6.5 
also demonstrates that one participant felt that the public sector officials were capable. 
Measures that are recommended by the participants for improving capacity were 
highlighted, which included: in-house training; training based on legislative 






Figure 6-5: Network diagram of responses on the capacity of officials to 
implement PPPs, and measures for improving it 
Source: Author’s construct based on the interview data 
 
These findings were supported by Participant One, who held the view that “in-house 
training is the best” for addressing incapacity, based on his experience at his former 
employer. Participant Two thought that training should be geared to meeting policy 
objectives, as he stated that government officials need to be “trained to execute 
whatever mandate that will be given by this legislation”. Participant Nine indicated that 
this training would only be effective if the policies themselves were made realistic and 
attainable, as shown by his comment that “improved processes and policies will lead 
to adequate training”. Participant Ten indicated that policy could be made realistic and 
attainable if “targets are set like the Indians” and committed to within a defined timeline. 
Establish proper negotiating 
teams 
Don’t have the skill set required 
Below average 
Capacity is a limiting factor 
I think the model is a bit complex 
Collapse of big projects 
Public officials don’t have the 
skill set 




He provided an example of how project approvals were elusive in South Africa because 
“timelines are open” and are subject to changes in administration, as demonstrated by 
the need to explain the project “again and again to the new officials as the government 
changes”. 
 
Participant Six thought “we can have a programme of exchange with countries, send 
our public officials to India, to China, let them participate and work and observe how 
projects are rolled out there, how it's being done, that they can come back and bring 
information”. He also added “we can bring our compatriots from China, India, Russia, 
Brazil; they can come here and work with us on delivering projects and be mentors and 
guides to our local officials here”. This view is shared by Participant Four, who also 
thought that capacity could be built through an international exchange programme, as 
she stated “you can expose them to these kinds of projects, even if it’s not within our 
own state”. She believed exposure to successful projects would assist them to identify 
“commonalities or synergies”. Participant Eight supported this view as he felt “we would 
have to either get skills from outside to come and, you know, mentor the local South 
Africans and train them in working on those particular projects and then they can leave 
when the people are capacitated enough to take over those projects”. 
 
Participant Five thought that building capacity begins with the state hiring experienced 
professionals as he stated “government across all levels to ensure that it employs at 
correct levels and correct experience because part of the challenges that I’ve observed 
in terms of managing some of these PPPs, are actually issues of experience or the 
expertise required in a particular area”. Participant Six shared this view as he stated 
“recruit people into the public sector that have these types of skills, project 
management-type skills, engineering systems, and so forth, economics, industrial 
engineering”. He also felt the key to capacity development lay in skills transfer from the 
private sector, which would be realised by “working more closely with the private sector 
to deliver infrastructure and services to the people and to the economy”.  
 
Participant Twelve thought that the capacity of public officials could be improved if 
proper negotiating teams were established to engage with the private sector on an 
equitable basis. He stated “you have a government official who has worked for 




500 years experience. You often see a bit of, you know, how this guy knows nothing”. 
This finding is supported by Participant Thirteen, who indicated that there needs to be 
a fair distribution of responsibilities to the parties best placed to perform them.      
 
Participant Seven thought the number of projects needs to increase to provide a 
greater number of public officials an opportunity to gain experience. This finding was 
supported by his view that “the number of PPPs that have been implemented in this 
country is a fair reflection of the level and quality of PPP skills in the country” and that 
“you can't have people with expert skills in a country that has only 30 PPPs in 20 years”. 
This view was supported by Participant Six, who felt “we can put them in smaller 
projects where they can build up the kind of capability that enables them to be involved 
and work on bigger projects”.  
 
Participant Eight felt collaboration with universities was key to building capacity as he 
stated “Universities have to work with government to make sure that when it comes to 
projects that government wants to implement, especially on issues of PPPs, there's a 
lot of capacity building that can be done”. Participant Fourteen also felt continuous 
professional development needs to be promoted for public officials involved in PPPs 
as “learning is always continuous”. Participant Six held the view that a multi-pronged 
approach could be adopted in building capacity as he felt “there's a number of ways 
that we can do it”.  
  
What was not expected was the view of Participant Fourteen, which indicated that the 
capacity of the public sector was better than the private sector as he stated “the public 
sector has got an excellent amount of capacity and skills compared to the private 
sector”. He thought the state did not have a capacity issue but rather issues with the 
delegation of authority, due to the politics on the basis that “for business to run 
effectively you need the minister’s approval for absolutely everything”. As a result, the 
skills and capacity that exists in the state are rendered ineffective, due to officials’ lack 
of authority. This finding was supported by Participant Three, who also believed that 
capacity could only be developed if officials were given a greater area of responsibility 
and authority to make decisions, to ensure that objectives were realised, as 
demonstrated by his comment that “they need to be empowered to be able to make 




“the private sector is not smarter than people in the public sector. It just happens that 
they have to meet their deliverables and they know what happens when they don’t”. 
This finding showed that performance and consequence management are required to 
unlock the capacity that already exists within the public sector.     
 
Based on the findings that PPPs were seen as being complex for officials, who lack 
skills and experience, major projects have collapsed, officials at the provincial and local 
governments were found to have greater incapacity than at the national level and the 
responsibilities of officials were not included in their performance contracts, A 
conclusion can be drawn that public officials were perceived as not having the capacity 
to plan and implement PPPs.  
 
6.7. Influence of a regional credit rating agency over the decision of investors 
to finance PPPs in the country and the rest of the region  
Regional credit rating agencies play an important role in attracting investment for PPPs 
according to Tiong (2013), as they provide an alternative, in-depth analysis of ’… 
transactions and balance-sheet activities of entities across the region’ (Africa Report, 
2014: para.1). However, the introduction of competition to existing rating agencies 
brought about by the entry of a new player, can lead to rating downgrades (Manso, 
2013). This aspect raises questions about the influence of a regional credit rating 
agency on the decision of investors to finance PPPs in the country. This was addressed 
by ascertaining the views of participants on the amount of influence they thought the 
establishment of a regional credit rating agency would have over the decision of 
investors to finance PPPs in the country and the rest of the region, and the reasons 
they felt this way. 
 
Figure 6.6 displays the network diagram of responses of the influence of a regional 
credit rating agency of the decision of investors to finance PPPs. It indicates that most 
of the participants feel that it will have a meaningful and positive impact, while a few 





Figure 6-6: Network diagram of responses on the influence of a regional credit 
rating agency on the decision of investors to finance PPPs 
Source: Author’s construct based on the interview data 
 
These findings were supported by Participant One, who thought a regional rating 
agency “will have a better understanding of the region in which they operate”. He held 
the view that international agencies “do not understand the intricacies or the dynamics 
within a particular region”, which could have adverse effects on the credit rating of a 
country. Participant Three also felt that it was critical to have such an institution at a 
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regional level as “assessment on risk, it is done at the regional level”. Participant Seven 
thought that its influence would be significant as “entities, when they undertake PPPs, 
they will get loans in accordance with the rating agencies credit rating of the country”. 
Participant Nine believed that it “will have a lot of influence as they have the skills and 
capacity for project assessment and selection”. Participant Eleven felt this was “what 
we need as a country, what we need as a region, what we need as a continent” as “we 
are being measured against Western standards or against standards that are foreign 
to us, against standards that aren't comfortable with the way that we do business, in 
the way that we treat Africa”. This view is shared by Participant Thirteen, who thought 
“the global measure that the current credit rating agencies are using is not fit for all”. 
He felt “it uses the very same instrument they would use on a first world country or in 
a developed country” in the African region. He believed that “if we develop a regional 
one, it would be more fit for purpose for the African market. And that would stimulate 
to a certain degree, the availability of funds or credits”.  
 
Participant Fourteen held the view that the major ratings were biased in the 
assessment of different countries and perceived them as being “more political than 
anything else”. This view was supported by Participant One, who stated the credit 
report “is a personal view, in my opinion, of the analyst”. He felt the analyst was “not 
just looking at the numbers, the numbers will be factual, but the narrative is subjective”. 
He thought that the familiarity of analysts to certain markets, results in them being more 
considerate to these than they would to unfamiliar markets. This is demonstrated by 
the remark “because he enjoys his holiday in the Algarve, he's much more sympathetic 
to Portugal than he'd be to South Africa”, in reference to the contribution of credit rating 
agencies to the debt crisis in the Eurozone through the failure to properly assess risk 
in its financial market. Participant Twelve thought it would have an influence “if it’s done 
properly”. This view was supported by Participant Six, who felt “if it is done well, I think 
it can definitely build up the credibility to be taken seriously and have a huge positive 
effect for investors in the region. Because it’s not easy to set something like that up 
and replace the large global rating agencies”.     
 
Participant Two did not share this view as he felt it would not have an impact “as long 
as we don’t have enough funders on the region and we still gonna rely heavily on 




such an institution at a regional level as it would lack credibility. She stated “if you've 
got one that is established at a regional level, for instance, let's say in Africa, do you 
really think people are even going to consider the validity of the information that is 
provided or the kind of rating that is provided?” She also felt the major rating agencies 
would cast doubt on the credibility of this institution as “Africa is really still not seen as 
a leader in any of these areas”. This view was shared by Participant Five, who was 
also skeptical as he was “not so sure of the effectiveness given the role of the other 
big players”. He felt the major rating agencies “will have an influence in terms of how 
the locals will operate”. Participant Six believed that it was likely to have a negative 
influence as “we don’t have the capability” to run such an institution. He provided an 
example of how “we haven’t had much success with multilateral structures or units 
within the SADC region or at the continental level”. Participant Eight held the view that 
there is undue criticism of the major rating agencies as every country is subjected to 
the same “international standards to be monitored by”. He also indicated that some 
people thought “if you get some regional ones, you might devalue them, or you know, 
not be rigorous enough to do what’s supposed to be done”.    
 
It was interesting to note that Participant Ten thought regional rating agencies were 
“irrelevant” as “money doesn’t have regions. Money is global”. He indicated that money 
for PPPs was raised internationally, regardless of the location of a project and it was 
“naive to think real money is regional” and that “no regional credit rating agency will 
change that”. He indicated that “big ticket projects are syndicated globally” and 
highlighted how CRISIL, a regional rating agency in India “is a subsidiary of S&P 
Global”. This demonstrates that regional credit rating agencies might not be truly 
independent of the influence of major rating agencies.  
 
Based on the findings, a regional credit rating agency will have a better understanding 
of the region in which they operate, while the global measure that the major credit 
rating agencies are using is not fit for all. The view that the major ratings were biased 
in the assessment of different countries, it was concluded that the establishment of a 
regional credit rating agency was deemed to have a meaningful and positive impact 
on the decision of investors to finance PPPs. However, it should also be noted that the 
counter-arguments were also strong and should be taken into consideration if a 




6.8. Competition in the market     
The literature indicates that robust competition is encouraged in the PPP markets of 
all the BRICS countries (Bidne et al., n.d.; De Vries & Yehoue, 2013; Churakov, 2014; 
Pereira, 2014; Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Lukmanova & Mishlanova, 2015; Meng et 
al., 2015; National Treasury, 2017). However, the analysis of the secondary data 
revealed that most of the information of the number of bidders in the BRICS countries 
was not available. Of the projects where this data were available, it indicated that there 
were less than six bidders. This gap was addressed by ascertaining the views of 
participants by asking them if they felt the number of competitors in the PPP market 
was inadequate and what measures could be used to improve competition.   
 
Figure 6.7 displays the network diagram of responses to the inadequacy of competition 
in the PPP market. It shows that more than half of the participants felt that the number 
of competitors in the market was inadequate. It also indicates several measures 
identified by the participants that could be adopted for improving this number. 
 
 
Figure 6-7: Network diagram of responses on the inadequacy of competition  
Source: Author’s construct based on the interview data  
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Participant Two supported these findings as he felt “the market needs to open up for 
many people to get an equal opportunity to participate”. He thought the approval of 
unsolicited proposals in some of these projects “limits participation by others”, which 
could be addressed through competitive bidding. Participant Three also felt it was 
inadequate because “big conglomerates continue to dominate” as demonstrated by 
the awarding of most contracts to multinationals such as “Basil Reads and Group Five”. 
He thought this issue could be addressed by “giving smaller players a chance by 
subcontracting a certain percentage of these projects so that they can develop 
capacity, and then preparing them to take over some of the projects in the long term”. 
Participant Four thought the limited number of projects was indicative that “there isn’t 
any competition whatsoever”, otherwise a larger number of entities would be “falling 
over to actually get themselves in the PPP space”. She felt this could be remedied by 
relaxing regulations “so that there’s entry into this particular sector”. Participant Five 
thought “we’ve been having challenges here in South Africa with regard to, you know, 
fair competition”. He felt there was a “continuous emergence of dominating players in 
the market, especially if you look at the built infrastructure transport sector”. He thought 
this aspect could be addressed if the government created “conditions conducive 
enough to allow and to grow, you know, competitors”.  
 
Participant Nine felt there was limited private sector access which could be remedied 
by eliminating bureaucracy through “improving the skill/knowledge base of the public 
sector with regards to public processes required for PPP projects”. Participant Thirteen 
thought this inadequacy could be addressed by “ensuring that the industry or business 
at large is aware of this initiative and what the benefits are”. Participant Fourteen also 
felt this inadequacy could be remedied if there was “commitment from government that 
investors will be protected”.  
 
Participant One did not share the view that the number of competitors was inadequate. 
He stated “these are expensive, complex projects and that is why I personally don’t 
have an issue around the number of players in the field”. He also did not believe that 
“there’s anything that we can do to improve the number of competitors as those who 
have the appetite for this kind of risk will always remain in this particular market”. 
Participant Eight also indicated that “it’s only a limited few people that come on to the 




Participant Seven felt the number was adequate. However, he expressed that “bidders 
mean primarily construction companies”, which means there were many of them, and 
“they are all looking for work”. This finding was supported by Participant Six, who felt 
the number was sufficient as “there is always a number of consortia that is contesting 
big projects”. He indicated that these consortia could emanate from local, regional, or 
international markets. In his view if “we put out good projects, you’re always going to 
have interested parties wanting to participate”. This view was shared by Participant 
Twelve, who felt that “a lot of consortiums are usually interested”. He thought even 
more companies would be interested if the state funds these projects as it is difficult to 
compete against the Chinese companies “because of the money they make available 
at the ridiculous interest rate”. Participant Ten felt the number was adequate as he 
stated “I don’t think that’s a problem”. He thought the “shortage of good governance 
and ethics” concerning the procurement process presented a greater challenge than 
the number of competitors in the market. 
 
In light of the findings that the market needs to open for a greater number of players to 
participate, as large conglomerates dominate, and there were concerns about fair 
competition, it was concluded that the number of competitors in the market was largely 
perceived as being inadequate.   
   
6.9. Monitoring and evaluation of PPPs  
The literature suggests that there is inadequate monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of 
performance in the BRICS countries (Gaffey, 2010; Johnston & Kouzmin, 2010; Dachs, 
2011; Istrate & Puentes, 2011; Tiong, 2013; Verhoest et al., 2013; IBRD/WB, 2014). 
This view is attributed to the lack of proactive disclosure or transparency of projects 
and contract information in most of these countries (Churakov, 2014; Pereira, 2014; 
Telang & Kutumbale, 2014; Meng et al., 2015). To obtain this view with regards to 
South Africa, participants were asked if they felt there was adequate monitoring and 
evaluation of PPPs, and how they thought this aspect could be further improved.  
 
Figure 6.8 displays the network of responses on the adequacy of monitoring and 
evaluation of PPPs. It demonstrates that more than half of the participants thought that 






Figure 6-8: Network diagram of responses on the adequacy of monitoring and 
evaluation of PPPs  
Source: Author’s construct based on the interview data 
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could be held accountable. Participant Seven held the view that this inadequacy could 
be addressed by expanding the mandate of transaction advisors beyond the contract 
approval phase. He stated “the public sector should either extend the contracts of the 
people that negotiated it or alternatively appoint a new person just to monitor it”. This 
view was supported by Participant Thirteen, who felt that the inadequacies in M&E 
could be resolved through the outsourcing of this function to a consultant as he stated 
“the monitoring and evaluation aspect does not necessarily have to be with that specific 
ministry or department that is in charge of that particular project”. Participant Eight 
indicated that the government already appoints people to perform this function as 
demonstrated by his remark “they even hire somebody who’s going to monitor and 
evaluate”, but he felt they lack capacity and accountability as “you find that people don’t 
report as frequently as possible because there are no consequences for them not to 
do that”. He held the view that this issue would be remedied if the public administration 
adopts a position where it says “every project that is going to be approved by the 
National Treasury has to have this element”. This means that M&E would become 
mandatory for all projects.  
 
Participant Nine felt M&E is inadequate as it is “costly and complicated” for the public 
sector to perform with limited resources. He thought this could be addressed by 
partnering with Developmental Finance Institutions (DFIs) as “they have the right 
resources for M&E”. This view is supported by Participant Ten, who felt that not enough 
time and resources are allocated to the M&E function. He stated, “I don't think we 
spend enough time and money making sure they get going, and then once they get 
going, making sure they achieve their objectives”. It was his view that this issue could 
be remedied “through regulation” because “we have no laws” that govern this process.  
 
Participant Two did not share the view that M&E was inadequate for PPPs as he felt 
that it was conducted “during the period of the lifecycle”. He thought that it could be 
improved by extending the scope of evaluations to include an assessment of how the 
project has contributed to the broader goals of the state as opposed to only focusing 
on its narrow objectives. This finding was supported by his remark that the project 
should be evaluated “against the state objective, not only the performance of the 
project”. Participant Twelve felt M&E is sufficient as these reports are required by 




enough incentive for M&E to be appropriately conducted due to the “high risk for both 
parties”. He thought it could be further improved by strengthening the regulatory 
environment to address “loopholes and fragmentation” in the process.      
 
Based on the findings that the state has limited resources for M&E, lacks accountability 
of this function, and does not have the capacity for conducting M&E in complex 
projects, it can be concluded that the monitoring and evaluation of PPPs is generally 
perceived as being inadequate.  
 
6.10. Summary of findings 
The findings of this chapter reveal the key reasons for the low uptake of transport PPPs 
in South Africa and mention the measures for improving the uptake. This was achieved 
by obtaining and analysing the views of participants with lived-experience and 
knowledge of transport PPPs.   
 
The analysis of the data demonstrates that the politicisation of the infrastructure, which 
is characterised by party political agendas, rhetoric, political risk, and the domination 
of the state in the delivery of strategic infrastructure and assets, is perceived as the 
main reason for the low uptake of transport PPPs. It was found that they felt that PPPs 
were over-regulated based on the broad regulatory framework that was used to govern 
them. They thought that this could be remedied through the introduction of a PPP Act, 
which could trump other policies that bring about confusion and a lack of clarity on the 
institutional framework for the development, procurement, and implementation of 
PPPs. They also felt that there was an incapacity of public officials to manage PPPs, 
which could be addressed through in-house training, training based on legislative 
requirements, and granting officials with greater authority to make decisions.    
   
Participants also thought the inadequacy of M&E could be remedied by developing in-
house capacity that is well resourced to perform this function; strong contract 
management, introducing a guiding document or legislation that indicates how M&E 
could be improved, and consequence management. They felt the mandate of 
transaction advisors beyond the contract approval phase could also be extended or 




thought the public administration could adopt a position where M&E will become 
mandatory for all projects.  
 
It was also largely felt that competition was inadequate based on the dominance of a 
few conglomerates and concerns about the fairness of competition, especially for 
smaller players that want to enter the market. Most of the participants thought the 
establishment of a regional credit rating agency would have a positive influence on the 
decision of investors to finance PPPs in the country and the rest of the region. This 
could be achieved by providing an alternative view to existing agencies that do not 
have an intimate understanding of the region and are deemed to be biased in their 
assessment of various countries. Counter-arguments against the establishment of 
such an agency were also strong as some participants felt the major rating agencies 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter highlights the conclusions made concerning the research findings and 
provides recommendations to address them. It entails an overview of the study, a 
summary of the key findings and conclusions, implications for theory and practice, 
policy recommendations, and recommendations for further study.    
 
7.2. Overview of the study  
The purpose of the study was to identify the reasons for the low uptake of PPPs in 
South Africa’s transport sector and draw lessons from the practices of the four largest 
developing economies that can be used to benchmark PPP practice for the sector. 
This was achieved by meeting the following objectives, namely: to analyse trends in 
the categorical data of transport PPPs of the BRICS countries; to analyse the 
explanations provided by the transport industry players for the low uptake of transport 
PPPs in South Africa; to assess the opinions of the transport industry players of 
practices that could contribute to the uptake of transport PPPs in South Africa; and 
provide policy recommendations on practices that could contribute to the uptake of 
transport PPPs in the country. 
 
7.3. Summary of key findings and conclusions  
The findings of Chapter five of the study demonstrate that the first research objective 
was met by revealing trends in the transport PPPs of the BRICS countries. The trends 
that emerged reveal that transport PPPs of the BRICS countries mainly involve 
brownfield projects that are predominately in the road sector, and entail the build, 
rehabilitate, operate and transfer of highways. Except for China, the prominent level of 
government that mostly awards PPPs is the national tier. The findings also show that 
although in some instances these governments receive unsolicited proposals, 
contracts are predominantly awarded through competitive bidding, which emanates 
from solicited proposals, where less than six bids are usually received. The prevalent 
contract periods have a span of between 11-30 years and revenue is largely generated 
through user-fees. It is also evident that in some instances, the public sector 
supplements this revenue through fixed or variable annuity/availability payments. The 




These trends are important as they allow South Arica to benchmark its practices 
against the other BRICS countries and draw lessons from these. The country can draw 
from the experience of the other countries to identify areas where it is performing well, 
as well as areas where it is not doing well. These trends also serve as evidence for 
informed decision-making and aid in bypassing mistakes made by the other countries.    
 
The findings of Chapter six indicate that the second research objective has also been 
met by revealing the views held by the transport industry players of the reasons for the 
low uptake of PPPs in the transport sector. The main view that emerged was that the 
politicisation of infrastructure, which is characterised by party politics, political rhetoric, 
and the dominance of the state in the delivery of strategic infrastructure and assets, 
was the key reason for the low uptake of transport PPPs in the country. This finding 
was supported by Ittmann (2017), who highlighted the lack of political support for PPP 
projects in the transport sector. It is significant as it pinpoints a major cause of the low 
uptake amidst the possible reasons outlined in the literature. As a result, greater focus 
and effort can be directed to resolving this issue, leading to greater uptake.   
 
Other reasons expressed for the low uptake included, the lack of skills and capacity of 
public officials, policy uncertainty, the fragmented efforts by the public and private 
sectors in the delivery of projects, the fear of the unknown, and a state of distrust 
between the public and private sectors. Participants also felt PPPs are over-regulated 
in the country, due to the use of a broad regulatory framework. This finding was 
supported by Ittmann (2017), who indicated that PPPs are overregulated in South 
Africa. The participants held the view that there is a lack of extensive public 
consultation and participation, and not all role players are involved in decision-making 
processes. This finding is evidenced by Aigbavboa et al. (2014), who suggested that 
public participation was not being adequately promoted in the country. The legislature 
was perceived as being ineffective in its ability to hold the executives accountable for 
large infrastructure build projects, thus undermining any investment.  
 
These findings are also important as they identify other areas of practice deemed by 
participants to contribute to the low uptake. They show that participants think 
inadequacies exist in the institutionalisation, governance, and regulation of PPPs, 




The findings of Chapter 6 also show that the third research objective was met by 
revealing the opinions of transport industry players on practices that can contribute to 
the uptake of transport PPPs in the country. Participants felt that the introduction of a 
PPP Act can contribute positively in addressing over-regulation, thereby attracting 
investment. This finding is supported by Bovis (2015) and Wei et al. (2015), who 
indicated that specific regulatory frameworks have contributed to the success of PPPs 
in some countries. Participants felt that a PPP Act would add value by streamlining and 
expediting the approval processes by consolidating most compliance issues under a 
single law and promoting the inclusivity of smaller companies. They also felt that it 
would provide policy certainty to investors on how PPPs are regulated in the country.  
 
Participants also thought the proactive disclosure of the project and contract 
information was required to promote good governance. This finding was supported by 
Boardman et al. (2015) and Wei et al. (2015), who indicated that proactive disclosure 
is important for good governance. Furthermore, the establishment of PPP units at 
subnational levels is required to improve capacity throughout the state (i.e. both 
provincial and municipal). This finding is supported by Ittmann (2017), who suggested 
that the establishment of PPP units at a subnational level could result in the 
proliferation of PPPs in the transport sector. To enhance the skills of public officials, 
participants felt that training can be promoted as a measure to improve the capacity of 
officials to deliver on projects. They were of the view that capacity can be developed 
through approaches, such as an international exchange programme with the BRICS 
countries and a skills transfer programme by the private sector.  
 
It is felt that a regional credit rating agency needs to be established, as it would be 
influential over the decision of investors to finance PPPs in the country, and the rest of 
the region. This finding is supported by the Africa Report (2014), which stated that the 
establishment of a regional rating agency would contribute towards alleviating the fears 
of investors by providing in-depth information on entities operating across the region. 
 
The number of competitors in the PPP market is perceived to be inadequate. It is not 
apparent from the literature how robust the level of competition is in the South African 
PPP market (Makofane, 2013; Aigbavboa et al., 2014; National Treasury, 2017). 




Treasury, 2019). The participants felt that the lack of competition and participation can 
be addressed through advocacy of the benefits of PPPs to all industry role players and 
this would encourage competitive bidding. Furthermore, policies for private sector 
access and the knowledge of officials on public processes required for establishing 
PPP projects, need to be improved. Competition can also be encouraged by increasing 
the number of available projects. The investment in role players also needs to be 
protected to encourage greater participation and competition. The regulation of PPPs 
needs to be relaxed to make participation easier. Preferential procurement should be 
encouraged to introduce new local players by subcontracting a percentage of contracts 
to smaller companies.     
 
The findings of this study are significant as they highlight key recommendations from 
participants, which can contribute to improving the uptake of transport PPPs. These 
recommendations stem from the participants, who have lived-experience in transport 
PPPs, who know what the key problems are and can provide realistic measures that 
could prove effective in addressing them.        
 
7.4. Implications for theory 
The study has implications for theory as the findings contradict the view that most PPPs 
involve new assets in greenfield projects (IBRD/WB, 2017). The dominance of 
brownfield projects, which are characterised by constraints imposed by prior work on 
the site (Pan, n.d.), also implies that innovation in these projects is limited. This finding 
is supported by Kumar (2012) and Flyvbjerg (2017), who showed that some of the 
BRICS governments prefer to import established technologies from other countries 
instead of creating their own. For example, Kumar (2012) showed how trains for the 
Rapid Metro Rail Gurgaon system in India were imported from the China South Rail 
ZhuZhou Electric Locomotive Company. Even the Gautrain Rapid Rail project, which 
is greenfield, relies on imported technology as demonstrated by Flyvbjerg (2017), who 
mentioned how the first fifteen trains and components of the subsequent rolling stock 
of the project were manufactured in Derby, England, then shipped to South Africa, as 
the country could not manufacture most of the required parts.       
 
Based on these findings it can be concluded that the study has implications for theory 




is evidenced by Kumar (2012) and Flyvbjerg (2017). As a result, the theory has to be 
adjusted to consider this contradiction.  
 
7.5. Implications for practice  
The study can contribute to bringing about changes in practice for transport PPPs in 
South Africa, as inadequacies in PPP practice were identified that have a bearing on 
projects in the sector. By highlighting these inadequacies, the research could serve as 
a benchmark for policy-makers and the private sector of specified areas of practice 
that require improvement such as overregulation, trust deficit, lack of political 
commitment, and transparency.     
 
7.6. Policy recommendations  
Based on the conclusions of the study, the following measures are recommended for 
addressing these inadequacies, namely: strengthening of political commitment and 
support; introduction of a PPP Act; fostering of trust through proactive disclosure of 
project and contract information; strengthening of social facilitation efforts; capacity 
development at the subnational level; and the establishment of a regional credit rating 
agency.             
 
Political support and commitment to transport PPPs could be strengthened by 
translating rhetoric into actionable plans. Transport PPPs should also appear more 
prominently in the national budget and plans. Over-regulation of PPPs can be 
addressed through the introduction of a PPP Act, which would replace the broad and 
fragmented regulatory framework for PPPs that is currently underpinned by the 
Treasury Regulation 16 of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA). Such a law 
would address the inadequacies of the current regulatory framework, which is 
comprised of the PFMA and other legislation, making compliance simpler, promote 
innovation and inclusivity. This law will also contribute to providing policy certainty. To 
address the trust deficit that exists between the public and private sectors, greater 
levels of trust need to be fostered to allay suspicions they have of each other’s motives. 
This trust would be achieved by promoting greater transparency of processes and 
decision-making to assure investors that decisions are honest. The proactive 
disclosure of information on processes and decisions taken could contribute 




that are intended to improve community participation, buy-in and support over the 
lifecycle of the project, also need to be strengthened. Benefits of this include 
acceptance of projects by communities and the willingness to pay.     
 
The capacity of the lower levels of government also need to be enhanced by improving 
the skills and knowledge of officials. Improved capacity would increase their confidence 
in undertaking more complex projects, such as transport PPPs. It would also equip 
officials with the skills to conduct appropriate identification and selection of projects 
that have the best prospects of success. Retention of critical skills to improve continuity 
and capacity development of the management level is also important. The 
establishment of a regional credit rating agency would boost investor confidence by 
providing an alternative and in-depth assessment of projects and entities operating 
within the region. The intention of this agency would not be to misrepresent the status 
of projects, but to provide better information that could lead to well-informed investment 
decisions.  
 
7.7. Recommendations for further study 
To enhance the findings of this study, additional research in the following areas is 
required, namely: ways to improve political commitment and support, determining the 
minimum threshold of the project size, and the focus areas of PPP training 
programmes for officials. 
 
From the study, the recommendation is for greater political commitment and support 
to address the low uptake of PPPs in the transport sector. However, it does not outline 
strategies that can be adopted to realise this outcome. This gap can be addressed 
through further research in this area of study. Furthermore, advanced economies such 
as Australia and Singapore recommend the implementation of PPPs that have a 
project size greater than USD50 million dollars. This size might be too restrictive in 
South Africa, which is categorised as a middle-income country. Therefore, a minimum 
threshold for a project size that is acceptable for South Africa’s economic climate needs 
to be determined. It is also evident that greater focus is required in identifying the study 
areas that are critical to enhancing the knowledge and capacity of officials. A more 
detailed assessment of these areas of study is required, which could serve as a basis 
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APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM  
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
     
Research title  Benchmarking public-private partnerships in transport 
against the four largest developing economies 
 
Researcher Mr. Ofentse Sebitlo 
Student Number-201463791 
Cell: 073 934 5052 
email: sebitlo.ofentse@gmail.com  
 
Supervisor  Mr. Tatenda Mbara 
Department of Transport and Supply Chain 
Tel +27 11 559 1527 
Email: tmbara@uj.ac.za   
 
Co-supervisor  Professor Luke Rose  
Senior Lecturer 
Department of Transport and Supply Chain  
Tel +27 11 559 4951 
Email: rluke@uj.ac.za  
 
Purpose of the study  
 
The aim of the study is to identify reasons for the low 
uptake of PPP in South Africa’s transport sector, and draw 
lessons from the four largest developing economies to 
benchmark PPP practice in the country’s transport sector. 
 
Significance of the study The significance of the study is that it will provide a frame 
of reference for the benchmarking of PPP practice in South 
Africa’s transport sector based on the practices of the four 
largest developing economies. In addition, it will reveal the 
the views of transport industry players on practices that 
could improve the uptake of PPP in the country.  
 
This is important as PPP are widely regarded as a viable 
option for bridging the funding deficit for transport capital 
projects experienced by several countries. As a result, the 
various social and economic benefits associated with 
transport capital investment can be realised such as the 
creation of a robust transport network that is capable of 
supporting positive economic growth in accordance with 




calls for the prioritisation of transport capital investment in 
areas such as freight corridors, expansion of ports, 
upgrades to public transport systems and the extension of 
coal and iron-ore lines as a means of improving the 
movement of people and goods within and beyond the 
borders of the country.      
 
Selection of participant and 
procedure for selection   
Purposive sampling  
 
 
Participant’s role in the 
study 
I have been requested to participate in a face-to-face 
interview 
 
Expected duration of 
participation  
 
The interview will take about 30-45 minutes  
Location  I will specify the location for the interview, which is 
convenient for me, and allows for meaningful discussion, 
without any unnecessary disruptions.  
 
Voluntary participation  I acknowledge that participation is voluntary and that there 
is no penalty or loss of benefit for non-participation  
 
Benefit to the participant and 
others 
 
The benefit that I will derive from the study  
Potential risks as well as 
measures that will be taken if 
injury or harm attributable to 
the study occurs 
   
There are no known or anticipated risks to me for 
participating in the study   
Withdrawal    I am free to withdraw at any time without obligation to 
explain or any adverse effects.   
 
Compensation/gifts/services 
for participants   
I will not be compensated for participating in the study  
Reimbursement and any 
costs incurred by 
participants  
I do not expect reimbursment as there are no costs for 
participation.  
Indemnity  I indemnify the researcher and research institution from 
any claim that may arise as a result of my participation in 
the study.   
 
Period for which the records 
relating to the participant will 
be kept 
 
Indefinite   
 
Steps taken to ensure 
confidentiality and secure 
storage of data 
 
In order to ensure confidentiality, no private information will 
be shared or transferred to other parties who might have 
an interest in the study.  
Types of individual or 
organisation to which the  
participant’s organisation 





information of this kind 
 
Protection of private 
information  
 
Private information will not be included in the research 
report  (e.g. contact details of participants) 
Feedback  All participants will receive a copy of the final research 
report  
 
Exclusion to confidentiality  There won’t be any exclusion to confidentiality  
 
 
I confirm that I understand the above conditions of participation in the study, and consent to 
participate in the research project.  
 
__________________                    ______________________                                 ___/____/2019 
























APPENDIX III: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
BENCHMARKING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN TRANSPORT 
AGAINST THE LARGEST DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
 
Name of Interviewer  :……………………………………… 
Student Number :……………………………………… 
Place of Interview           :……………………………………… 
Date of interview         :____/____/2019  
 
A. PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENT  
 
Name of Respondent:……………………………………………….. 
Designation: ………………………………………………….………..      
Organisation : ………………………………………………………..…    
Contact Number: ……………………………………………………… 
Email: ……………………………………………………….………….  
 
 
 How long have you worked in the transport sector? Has this been at the level of 
middle and/or senior management? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………… 
 Can you tell me what your core responsibilities are in your current organisation? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………….. 





B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
General questions on PPP 
 What do you think a PPP is? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 What do you think the main advantages and disadvantages of a PPP are? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 




Question(s) on the regulation of PPP     
 
 Do you feel that PPP are overregulated in the country? Why do you feel this way?    
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 How well do you think a specific law for PPP can contribute in addressing excessive 
regulation of PPP?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 Do you feel that a specific law for PPP is required in the country? How will this add 




Question(s) on the governance of PPP   
 















 Do you feel that there is a lack of extensive public consultation and participation? Are 




Question(s) on the institutionalisation of PPP   
 
 How well do you feel public officials are capacitated and given the skills-set required to 
plan and implement PPP? What measures can be employed to further improve the 




 Do you think that PPP units should be established at a subnational level? If yes, should 
these units reside at both the provincial and municipal levels of government, only at 




Question(s) on project selection for PPP  
 
 Do you feel there is appropriate project selection and pre-assessment of projects? If 




Question(s) on risk for PPP  
 







 Do you feel there is robust risk analysis in order to determine fair allocation of expected 








Question(s) on finance of PPP 
 
 Do you feel that the long-term financing instruments in the domestic capital market are 
not adequate (i.e. shares, bonds and other long-term investments)? How satisfied are 
you with the quality of the long-term financing instruments that are currently available 
(e.g. the length of time until a loan is due)?    
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 How much influence do you think the establishment of a regional credit ratings agency 
will have over the decision of investors to finance PPP in the country and the rest of 
the region? Why do you think so? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 Do you find that a need exists for the establishment of lifecycle fund or maintenance 





Question(s) on competition in PPP  
 
 Do you feel that the number of competitors in the PPP market is not adequate? If yes, 









Question(s) on innovation in PPP  
 
 Do you find that technical and service innovation is promoted? If yes, can you provide 
an example?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 





Question(s) on the design of the contract for PPP  
 
 What approach do you see as the most effective for resolving disputes: first attempt to 
mediate, failing which litigation can follow, or litigate immediately? Kindly elaborate on 




Question(s) on the management of the contract for PPP  
 
 Do you feel that there is adequate monitoring and evaluation of PPP? How do you think 
this aspect can be further improved?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 Do you find that the procedures for contract and asset handover are clearly specified? 




Question(s) on the strategy to deal with an incomplete contract for PPP  
 







 Do you think that contracts should have provision for renegotiation, or projects should 





Practices which have contributed towards the success of the other BRICS 
countries  
 
 Of the practices that are common across the other BRICS countries, which do you think 
have contributed significantly towards a greater uptake of transport PPP? 
 
 Yes No Not 
sure 
Incentive-based regulation     
Regulation by contract     
Strong political commitment and support    
Audits by supreme auditing institutions    
Cooperative decision-making and trust    
Clear definition of institutional responsibilities and 
arrangements 
   
Appropriate skills transfer and capacity development    
Establishment of dedicated PPP units at national and 
subnational levels  
   
Use of the public sector comparator to determine value-for-
money  
   
High threshold for project value     
Prioritisation of long-term projects    
Allocation of risk to the party best suited to deal with it    
Adequate transfer of risk to the private partner    
Translation of risk allocation into contract structure     
Continuous risk assessment over the lifecycle of the project, 
especially for longer term infrastructure projects 
   
Private and public advantage and their associated negotiating 
power should be estimated on the basis of the capital gain 
arising from the investment 




Fair allocation of expected capital gains from the investment 
to the public and private sector through robust risk analysis   
   
Establishment and or identification of long term financing 
instruments 
   
Establishment of a special purpose vehicle (SPV)    
Project finance versus corporate finance    
Developing a financing strategy aimed at providing capital for 
the objectives of each stage of project implementation from 
the most appropriate source with the most appropriate 
financial instruments at the most appropriate time of the 
project’s lifecycle. 
   
High debt-to-equity ratio in financing      
Promotion of competition in the market    
Measures for dealing with unsolicited proposals and 
intellectual property 
   
Technical and service innovation    
Creativity of the private partner    
Introduction of new and environmentally friendly technologies    
Appointment of transaction advisors    
Management of the bid process    
Standardization of contracts    
Performance based contracts    
Dispute resolution    
Specification of payment and adjustment mechanisms    
Provision for contract termination    
Establishment of contract management structures    
Expiry of the contract and handover of the asset    
Multi-disciplinary team of transaction advisors    
 
 
 What other practice not mentioned above do you think has contributed towards a 









Strategies to overcome deficiencies in PPP practice  
 
 Which deficiencies in the country’s PPP practice need to be overcome to improve the 
uptake of transport PPP? How can these be overcome?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………  
 If you could make only one change to the country’s PPP practice to improve the uptake 
of transport PPP, what would it be? Why is this? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
